The old idea of a single "true tree of life", today providing the foundation for Cladistics, confronts the two fundamentally different approaches in our conceptualization of reality: realism (ie, assuming that classes are real) and nominalism (ie, assuming that objects are real). The fundamental problem for our conceptualization of reality is namely that not both classes and objects can be real at the same time, since they can't fuse. This problem can be analogized with that not both reality and a map of reality can be real at the same time, since they can't fuse. Confronted with this fundamental choice between classes (ie, map) and objects (ie reality), realism (ie, cladistics) thus claims (asserts) that there indeed is a single "true tree of life" (ie, claims that there indeed is a single "true" map of reality), whereas nominalism denies the existence of such a single "true tree of life" (ie, comprehends reality as reality).
So, which of them do you think is right: realism claiming that map is reality or nominalism comprehending reality as reality? The answer appears obvious (at least to me). realism's claim that map is reality is obviously wrong when it is confronted with the fact that reality is reality.
It was realists that set up this confrontation with nominalism by their claim that there indeed is a single "true tree of life", which they thus obviously lose (ie, there isn't any "true tree of life". Their claim thus appears like a pink elephant that they claim can fly. The problem with this claim is that there are no pink elephants, and even if there had been, they wouldn't have been able to fly. The claim is thus totally wrong, more wrong than that is actually impossible to be.
The problem for biological systematics is thus how it shall explain to cladists that they are wrong. Whether cladists understand that they're wrong or not does not, however, matter, since they are wrong anyway.A failure to explain to cladists that they're wrong is thus a failure for biological systematics. It leaves biological systematics as a dream that there are pink elephants that can fly.
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fredag 4 oktober 2013
onsdag 24 juli 2013
On the fundamental and everlasting split in humanity (especially obvious in biological systematics)
As soon as someone of us humans conceptualize reality (for example into ducks and geese), there is another of us humans that questions this conceptualization, asking what the concepts (ie, a duck and a goose) really is. It is just as if the pure reasoning about reality ignites a counterreasoning questioning what it is that the reasoning discusses.
This is the fundamental and everlasting split within humanity - classifying and questioning classification.This split is perhaps most obvious in biological systematics by ripping it apart into a fundamental and everlasting split between those that simply classify and those that search for classes.
This split can never be healed, because the two approaches are orthogonal, and there is no intermediate (neutral) truth between them to be found. There is actually nothing between them at all. Instead, they are all we have. The only possibility for an intermediate solution is a compromise between them in the form of an orthogonal system of classification like the Linnean systematics.
Our choice is thus between eternal split or compromise (in the form of an orthogonal system of classification). The option of an unambiguous truth, like Higg's boson or the true tree of life, is simply not given. These solutions can only be almost correct, that is, totally wrong. The problem is actually extremely simple, but the reasonings about it can be extremely complex. The problem is that we search for a solution that is not to be found. Its place is simply void. .
This is the fundamental and everlasting split within humanity - classifying and questioning classification.This split is perhaps most obvious in biological systematics by ripping it apart into a fundamental and everlasting split between those that simply classify and those that search for classes.
This split can never be healed, because the two approaches are orthogonal, and there is no intermediate (neutral) truth between them to be found. There is actually nothing between them at all. Instead, they are all we have. The only possibility for an intermediate solution is a compromise between them in the form of an orthogonal system of classification like the Linnean systematics.
Our choice is thus between eternal split or compromise (in the form of an orthogonal system of classification). The option of an unambiguous truth, like Higg's boson or the true tree of life, is simply not given. These solutions can only be almost correct, that is, totally wrong. The problem is actually extremely simple, but the reasonings about it can be extremely complex. The problem is that we search for a solution that is not to be found. Its place is simply void. .
söndag 9 juni 2013
Conceptualization and the contrary, ie, cladistics
We (humans) conceptualize the reality we perceive using a tool composed of three components: objects (aka entities), infinite classes (aka imaginary types) and finite classes (aka categories). We perform conceptualization by distinguishing objects and allocating them to finite classes using infinite classes. In this process, infinite classes functions as a catalyst for allocation of objects into categories. The only requirement of conceptualization is that we keep objects, infinite classes and finite classes consistently apart, because if we don't, then we confuse conceptualization itself by conflating them.
However, there is an inconsistency internally in conceptualization in the concept of "the finite class of all finite classes" (ie, the category of all categories) residing in the definitional fact that finite classes (ie, categories) are not single objects, but several objects, whereas the notion of "the finite class of all finite classes" is a single object consisting of several finite classes and thus both (ie, paradoxically contradictory between) an object and a finite class, that is, a single object and several objects. This notion is thus empty per definition by being both an object and a class at the same time, that is, a paradox (ie, Russell's paradox).
The German Nazi entomologist Willi Hennig did, however, turn this fact up-side-down by comprehending the finite class of all finite classes as "the only natural group". The problem with this comprehension is thus that it is inconsistent (ie, paradoxically contradictory). He (and others) may thus comprehend this "group" as "the only natural group", but neither he nor others can ever pinpoint this "group" without contradiction, because it is paradoxically contradictory per definition. If it hadn't been, then it could also have had an ancestor.
Willi Hennig and his followers (ie, cladists) obviously think that finite classes are real instead of objects, which leads them to conflation of "finite class" with "infinite class", and thus to conflation of conceptualization itself. Instead of conceptualizing reality, they, obviously, search for "the true" conceptualized reality, which in practice is their own conceptualization of reality, whichever it is, but paradoxically contradictory per definition.
This spin around the internal inconsistency of conceptualization can only be halted by considering what we talk about (ie, objects, like humans, or classes, like human).
However, there is an inconsistency internally in conceptualization in the concept of "the finite class of all finite classes" (ie, the category of all categories) residing in the definitional fact that finite classes (ie, categories) are not single objects, but several objects, whereas the notion of "the finite class of all finite classes" is a single object consisting of several finite classes and thus both (ie, paradoxically contradictory between) an object and a finite class, that is, a single object and several objects. This notion is thus empty per definition by being both an object and a class at the same time, that is, a paradox (ie, Russell's paradox).
The German Nazi entomologist Willi Hennig did, however, turn this fact up-side-down by comprehending the finite class of all finite classes as "the only natural group". The problem with this comprehension is thus that it is inconsistent (ie, paradoxically contradictory). He (and others) may thus comprehend this "group" as "the only natural group", but neither he nor others can ever pinpoint this "group" without contradiction, because it is paradoxically contradictory per definition. If it hadn't been, then it could also have had an ancestor.
Willi Hennig and his followers (ie, cladists) obviously think that finite classes are real instead of objects, which leads them to conflation of "finite class" with "infinite class", and thus to conflation of conceptualization itself. Instead of conceptualizing reality, they, obviously, search for "the true" conceptualized reality, which in practice is their own conceptualization of reality, whichever it is, but paradoxically contradictory per definition.
This spin around the internal inconsistency of conceptualization can only be halted by considering what we talk about (ie, objects, like humans, or classes, like human).
torsdag 6 juni 2013
Closer than the Linnean system can classification not come to reality
Classification can only be either ambiguous or paradoxically contradictory. It is ambiguous if we use an orthogonal system like Linnean systematics, and paradoxically contradictory if not. The reason for this fact is that classification ultimately is paradoxically contradictory, which Bertrand Russell demonstrated with Russell's paradox in 1901. It means that classification can't reach unambiguity at all. It doesn't matter what we do, never will it reach unambiguity.
This fact has cladistics, ie, Willi Hennig, turned up-side-down into a notion that classification indeed can reach unambiguity in the form of a single true tree of life. This notion is thus wrong. It can't. Classification can't reach unambiguity.Instead, this notion is just an empty belief like the belief in Creation. The two are just as empty, although believing in different contradictions. Linné's system is actually the ambiguous belance between all such contradictory beliefs. Closer than it can classification not come to reality.
This fact has cladistics, ie, Willi Hennig, turned up-side-down into a notion that classification indeed can reach unambiguity in the form of a single true tree of life. This notion is thus wrong. It can't. Classification can't reach unambiguity.Instead, this notion is just an empty belief like the belief in Creation. The two are just as empty, although believing in different contradictions. Linné's system is actually the ambiguous belance between all such contradictory beliefs. Closer than it can classification not come to reality.
fredag 31 maj 2013
What can a species possibly be?
Ever since the dawn of Biological systematics, it has discussed what a "species" is. This fundamental problem appears to concern how we shall specify a consistent and unambiguous kind of group of organsisms, but does actually concern how we shall overcome the fact that such a kind of group is a definitional contradiction. Such a kind of group consists of both single species and single organisms at the same time, and is thus consistent only if species equal organisms, which are not groups, but single organisms. The problem is thus not how we shall specify a consistent and unambiguous kind of group of organsisms, but that we can't.
Rather than asking the question what a species is, we thus ought to ask the question why we can't specify what a "species" is, which is answered by the conclusion above. This answer does not, however, suffice to those biological systematists that ask the question what a species is. It does not even qualify as an alternative among the possible answers to their question. "Nothing" is not an acceptable answer to them.
Carl von Linné partly overcame this problem by constructing an orthogonal system of classification wherein species is consistent in relation to genera, and genera is consistent in relation to species. This system did not solve the fundamental problem that reality is distinct from our conceptualization of it, ie, that the relation between the two can't be unambiguous, but only the problem of consistency.
A later approach in biological systematics called Cladistics instead "solved" this problem by simply asuming as an axiom that we indeed can specify what species are, in the form of a single true tree of life. This solution did not, however, actually solve the problem, but merely transfered it into finding the single true tree of life, which, thus, is a definitional impossibility. Such thing is simply impossible per definition. Another approach in biological systematics called Evolutionary taxonomy adopted Linné's system and was thus at least consistent, although ambiguous.
However, in a fundamental battle in biological systematics in the 1980-ies, biological systematists downvoted Evolutionary systematics in favor for Cladistics. The outcome of this battle tilted biological systematics up-side-down from being a scientific discipline into being a belief in a single true tree of life. It simply expelled scientific thinking from biological systematics. (This was the time I entered biological systematics (in the beginning of the 90-ies). Unfortunately, I was thus expelled from biological systematics in the moment I paid for entering it. I didn't get in before I was out. Not yielding for a belief in a single true tree of life effectively excluded me from getting any position at any academy. This belief was the ticket of entrance to positions. Since then, I have been referred to expressing my protests against this belief to media that is not governed by cladists, also excluding Wikipedia (which is governed by cladists)). Today, biological systematics is thus dominated by Cladistics, although Cladistics is paradoxically contradictory. You can thus get a position at any academy if you search for a paradox, but not if you say that Cladistics is a search for a paradox. Paranoia is acceptable, but not stating that it is a paranoia.
Ultimately, cladistics is doomed to eternal splitting (like the species it believes in are), on the contrary to Linnean systematics, because a house can only stand firmly on a consistent ground, like Linnean systematics. Belief in eternal splitting does, of course, lead to eternal splitting.
Rather than asking the question what a species is, we thus ought to ask the question why we can't specify what a "species" is, which is answered by the conclusion above. This answer does not, however, suffice to those biological systematists that ask the question what a species is. It does not even qualify as an alternative among the possible answers to their question. "Nothing" is not an acceptable answer to them.
Carl von Linné partly overcame this problem by constructing an orthogonal system of classification wherein species is consistent in relation to genera, and genera is consistent in relation to species. This system did not solve the fundamental problem that reality is distinct from our conceptualization of it, ie, that the relation between the two can't be unambiguous, but only the problem of consistency.
A later approach in biological systematics called Cladistics instead "solved" this problem by simply asuming as an axiom that we indeed can specify what species are, in the form of a single true tree of life. This solution did not, however, actually solve the problem, but merely transfered it into finding the single true tree of life, which, thus, is a definitional impossibility. Such thing is simply impossible per definition. Another approach in biological systematics called Evolutionary taxonomy adopted Linné's system and was thus at least consistent, although ambiguous.
However, in a fundamental battle in biological systematics in the 1980-ies, biological systematists downvoted Evolutionary systematics in favor for Cladistics. The outcome of this battle tilted biological systematics up-side-down from being a scientific discipline into being a belief in a single true tree of life. It simply expelled scientific thinking from biological systematics. (This was the time I entered biological systematics (in the beginning of the 90-ies). Unfortunately, I was thus expelled from biological systematics in the moment I paid for entering it. I didn't get in before I was out. Not yielding for a belief in a single true tree of life effectively excluded me from getting any position at any academy. This belief was the ticket of entrance to positions. Since then, I have been referred to expressing my protests against this belief to media that is not governed by cladists, also excluding Wikipedia (which is governed by cladists)). Today, biological systematics is thus dominated by Cladistics, although Cladistics is paradoxically contradictory. You can thus get a position at any academy if you search for a paradox, but not if you say that Cladistics is a search for a paradox. Paranoia is acceptable, but not stating that it is a paranoia.
Ultimately, cladistics is doomed to eternal splitting (like the species it believes in are), on the contrary to Linnean systematics, because a house can only stand firmly on a consistent ground, like Linnean systematics. Belief in eternal splitting does, of course, lead to eternal splitting.
fredag 24 maj 2013
On the concept "clade" and the belief "cladistics"
The now popular concept "clade" in biological systematics is actually an infinitely recursive concept, like "the list of all lists", by including itself as a member of itself. A belief that this concept indeed can break even, today called "Cladistics", and its corollary search for what it calls "the true tree of life", is actually in practice a belief that every clade is what cladistics calls a "sister-group" to itself and that the most inclusive clade also is a sister-group to the least inclusive clade. It is thus an absurd belief by believing in the obviously absurd.
Linnean systematics and Evolutionary taxonomy avoid this sink hole by arranging concepts orthogonally as categories of classes (of organisms).
The question whether there is such a "single true tree of life" or not thus has a negative answer - there isn't. Instead, there are actually several equally true graph illustrations of a hypothesized evolutionary origin of biological organisms. Large scale change (ie, evolution) actually can't be unambiguous if small scale change is, because only entities are unambiguous and they are physically nested as INDEPENDENT entities in other entities. Unambiguity in change at different scales at the same time actually requires total dependency between entities on different scales, which, in turn, makes change impossible. The cladistic belief in a single true tree of life does thus contradict its own assumption of the underlying process (ie, evolution) itself. Cladistics does thus believe in something it at the same time denies.
Giddy, this siding in biological systematics, isn't it?
Linnean systematics and Evolutionary taxonomy avoid this sink hole by arranging concepts orthogonally as categories of classes (of organisms).
The question whether there is such a "single true tree of life" or not thus has a negative answer - there isn't. Instead, there are actually several equally true graph illustrations of a hypothesized evolutionary origin of biological organisms. Large scale change (ie, evolution) actually can't be unambiguous if small scale change is, because only entities are unambiguous and they are physically nested as INDEPENDENT entities in other entities. Unambiguity in change at different scales at the same time actually requires total dependency between entities on different scales, which, in turn, makes change impossible. The cladistic belief in a single true tree of life does thus contradict its own assumption of the underlying process (ie, evolution) itself. Cladistics does thus believe in something it at the same time denies.
Giddy, this siding in biological systematics, isn't it?
måndag 20 maj 2013
On the fundamental battle in biological systematics between Linnean systematics (Evolutionary taxonomy) and cladistics
Biological systematics has been struggling with the issue whether kinds are real or not since the dawn of Man. The fundamental problem with this issue is that it confronts kinds and relationship groups (including single entities) concerning which of them that comes first (aka is real). This problem is actually insoluble, since kinds can't be real without single entities, and relationship groups can't be real without kinds. This fact means that kinds must be both real and not real at the same time, which, in turn, is explained by that reality has two aspects: pattern (ie, kinds) and process (ie, relationship groups) at the same time. None of them thus comes first, but both of them are, instead, simultaneous.
However, logical reasoning requires something that comes first, that is, a presumption, or axiom. It means that there are two diametrically opposite (ie, orthogonal) lines of logical reasonings, which thus are completely contradictory in not sharing a single common point. These are thus not contradictory in opinion, but in subject. They simply don't handle the same subject. Whereas one discusses kinds and derives relationship groups, the other discusses relationship groups and derives kinds. These two orthogonal lines of reasoning meet each other in biological systematics in discussing the same subject, ie, biological systematics, but not the same subject, ie, kinds and relationship groups, respectively, at the same time. They thus think they talk about the same thing, but do actually not share a single common point (ie, meaning of a concept). Instead, they dance an orthogonal dance around the insolubility that "kinds can't be real without single entities, and relationship groups can't be real without kinds". Both of them think that there is a solution to be found, which actually is the only shared point between them, and also the point that drags them into this orthogonal dance.
The orthogonal dance between the two possible lines of logical reasoning does thus not have any single solution -.neither kinds nor relationship groups comes before the other, ie, is more real. However, this lack of solution means that one of them has to end in ambiguity and the other in paradoxical contradiction, since these are the only possibilities except unambiguity. Concerning this issue, Betrand Russell demonstrated in 1901 that assuming as an axiom that kinds comes before relationship groups, ie, that kinds are real, which cladistics assumes, is paradoxically contradictory. This fact leaves the axiom that relationship groups, fundamentally single entities, comes first, ie, is real as the consistent (although ambiguous) alternative. It means that assuming that relationship groups comes first, ie, are real, as Linnean systematics does, is the consistent alternative, although it may appear illogical to cladists.
A thorough consideration of the contradiction between Linnean systematics (Evolutionary taxonomy) and cladistics in biological systematics does thus result in Linnean systematics (Evolutionary taxonomy) as the winner, although it was invented before Darwin's theory of evolution. This fact is something biological systematists have to try to understand for the coming millenias of years (they obviously can't today) to escape the eternal othogonal dance around a lacking single "correct" solution.
However, logical reasoning requires something that comes first, that is, a presumption, or axiom. It means that there are two diametrically opposite (ie, orthogonal) lines of logical reasonings, which thus are completely contradictory in not sharing a single common point. These are thus not contradictory in opinion, but in subject. They simply don't handle the same subject. Whereas one discusses kinds and derives relationship groups, the other discusses relationship groups and derives kinds. These two orthogonal lines of reasoning meet each other in biological systematics in discussing the same subject, ie, biological systematics, but not the same subject, ie, kinds and relationship groups, respectively, at the same time. They thus think they talk about the same thing, but do actually not share a single common point (ie, meaning of a concept). Instead, they dance an orthogonal dance around the insolubility that "kinds can't be real without single entities, and relationship groups can't be real without kinds". Both of them think that there is a solution to be found, which actually is the only shared point between them, and also the point that drags them into this orthogonal dance.
The orthogonal dance between the two possible lines of logical reasoning does thus not have any single solution -.neither kinds nor relationship groups comes before the other, ie, is more real. However, this lack of solution means that one of them has to end in ambiguity and the other in paradoxical contradiction, since these are the only possibilities except unambiguity. Concerning this issue, Betrand Russell demonstrated in 1901 that assuming as an axiom that kinds comes before relationship groups, ie, that kinds are real, which cladistics assumes, is paradoxically contradictory. This fact leaves the axiom that relationship groups, fundamentally single entities, comes first, ie, is real as the consistent (although ambiguous) alternative. It means that assuming that relationship groups comes first, ie, are real, as Linnean systematics does, is the consistent alternative, although it may appear illogical to cladists.
A thorough consideration of the contradiction between Linnean systematics (Evolutionary taxonomy) and cladistics in biological systematics does thus result in Linnean systematics (Evolutionary taxonomy) as the winner, although it was invented before Darwin's theory of evolution. This fact is something biological systematists have to try to understand for the coming millenias of years (they obviously can't today) to escape the eternal othogonal dance around a lacking single "correct" solution.
fredag 6 juli 2012
Why should biological systematics accept a premise that is impossible?
If the class clade indeed is consistent, then there must be single entities (ie, single biological species) that can be divided into clades. Exactly how cladists mean that such division is possible remains to be explained. Until cladists provide an explanation of this impossibility, their approach thus ought to be discarded. Why should biological systematics accept a premise that is impossible?
måndag 2 april 2012
On the discrepancy between the fundamental assumption of cladistics and facts
Cladistics s rests on the fundamental assumption that it is possible to reduce four dimensions consistently into three dimensions, and thereby that it is possible to reduce three dimensions consistently into two dimensions, and thus that everything can ultimately be consistently described in terms of black and white.
This assumption is, however, simply wrong. In every dimension reduction, the reduced dimension has to be spread over the remaining dimensions as some kind of error. A two-dimensional illustration simply can't convey all information in a four-dimensional illustration.
This fact means that every illustration is a dimensional reduction. We simply can't illustrate reality as it is. This fact is also illustrated by Magritte's painting,"Ceci, ce'st ne pas une pipe". An illustration of something can never become the same thing as that which it illustrates.
The cladistic assumption is thus wrong. It is not possible to illustrate anything consistently in less dimensions than what it actually occupies, since it would mean that it is something else than what it is. The cladistic idea s thus fundamentally inconsistent.
This assumption is, however, simply wrong. In every dimension reduction, the reduced dimension has to be spread over the remaining dimensions as some kind of error. A two-dimensional illustration simply can't convey all information in a four-dimensional illustration.
This fact means that every illustration is a dimensional reduction. We simply can't illustrate reality as it is. This fact is also illustrated by Magritte's painting,"Ceci, ce'st ne pas une pipe". An illustration of something can never become the same thing as that which it illustrates.
The cladistic assumption is thus wrong. It is not possible to illustrate anything consistently in less dimensions than what it actually occupies, since it would mean that it is something else than what it is. The cladistic idea s thus fundamentally inconsistent.
fredag 30 mars 2012
Is cladistics inconsistent or not?
Biological systematics has lately (during the last 50 years or so) experienced a fundamental rift between proponents for a new approach called cladistics and traditional Linnean systematics (in the context of evolution called evolutionary taxonomy). The rift is rooted in Darwin's illustration of the origin of biodiversity as "the origin of species", since cladistists claim that they base their classification only on the bifurcating phylogenetic relationships between biological species, whereas Linnean systematists (ie, evolutionary taxonomists) assert that cladistics is inconsistent. Well is cladistics inconsistent or not?
The rift concerns classification of a bifurcating process, and classification of the entities (eg, biological species) in bifurcating processes has a tendency to distort our minds.
There are only two principally different kinds of classification of bifurcating processes: (1) a flat classification conflating entity with class (in this case represented by continuity), also called pattern and process, by using mutually exclusive classes (ie, clades and paraphyletic groups) and then categorizing these classes separately (ie, cladistics), and (2) an orthogonal system of classification keeping entity and class consistently apart by using (categories of) categories of classes (eg, evolutionary taxonomy).
The former (1) is simpler to understand, but also paradoxically contradictory in present (ie, between before and after in continuity) and thus lacking a consistent solution, whereas the latter (2) is more difficult to understand, but consistent and thus having several consistent solutions. The (only) principal difference between these two possible options is thus that the former (1) lacks consistent solution, whereas the latter (2) has several consistent solutions.
The fact that puzzles us, and thus drives the distortion of our minds, is that there is no single unambiguous ("true" or "natural") classification of a single such process. Frustration over this fact was probably resposible for cladists' radical move to simply assert (actually define) that there indeed is a single unambiguous ("true" or "natural") classification to be found, in the form of what they first called "monophyletic groups" but later became known as "clades", but which consistently ought to be called "holophyletic groups". This assertion is thus wrong. There is no such unambiguous classification "to be found". Classifications are actually not found at all, they are produced.
So, why isn't there a single unambiguous ("natural") classification of a single such process ("to be found")? Well, this question has millions of possible answers, but the mere attempt to explain it is actually irrational. An answer can only point to how the idea of such classification is inconsistent (actually paradoxically contradictory), like Bertrand Russell did in Russell's paradox, and to that it is falsified by the fact that time is relative to space, not explain why it is. The reason that such classification is lacking is a fact and as such inexplicable. Facts can't be explained; only directed processes can. It just allows us to draw conclusions about what it says about reality. The most fundamental of these conclusions is that reality is not rational, that is, that reality is irrational. The only alternative to this conclusion is to deny facts, that is, to BE irrational (like cladists do and are). Also the answer to why a single unambiguous ("true" or "natural") classification is lacking is thus lacking.
This fact explains the problems non-cladists had (and have) to respond to cladists' erroneous assertion (which Ashlock and Mayr, among many others, experienced and experience). If cladists choose (or don't understand better) to ignore facts and be irrational, then there is nothing the rest of us can do about it. There is no possibility to force anyone to accept facts and be rational. The option to ignore facts and be irrational can't be closed. That's why I'm just trying to explain that cladistics is irrational, so that cladists will have a harder time to lull others into the belief that it is rational (and thus that rationality is irrational). My only aim is, as a Swedish leader for the left wing party once expressed it, that: "there must be some kind of order also in the left wing party [ie, biological systematics]".
Classification of entities in a bifurcating process thus has a tendency to distort our minds, but I resist allowing it distort them to the degree of turning irrational into rational and vice versa, that is, turning biological systematics from a science into a belief, even if the fact that there isn't any unambiguous classification of a single bifurcating process is frustrating. Being irrational is extremely confusing, and biological systematics can probably not compete with all other beliefs anyway, especially since it evidently lacks a God. Instead, I struggle to retain biological systematics among the rational sciences by advocating evolutionary taxonomy for classification in the context of evolution. But, as I explained above, I can't hinder anyone from denying facts and being irrational. The gate to denial of facts and irrationality can't be closed.
Cladistics does thus not base its classification only on the bifurcating phylogenetic relationships between biological species, but on any contradictory belief in a bifurcating relationship between biological species. It actually tries to categorize a contradictory classification (ie, into clades and paraphyletic groups) of any bifurcating process, which actually is a generic phenomenon and therefore conflated with a category. It tries to realize an idea (which to them already appears realized) that can't be realized. Cladistics is thus clearly inconsistent, although consistently inconsistent.
The rift concerns classification of a bifurcating process, and classification of the entities (eg, biological species) in bifurcating processes has a tendency to distort our minds.
There are only two principally different kinds of classification of bifurcating processes: (1) a flat classification conflating entity with class (in this case represented by continuity), also called pattern and process, by using mutually exclusive classes (ie, clades and paraphyletic groups) and then categorizing these classes separately (ie, cladistics), and (2) an orthogonal system of classification keeping entity and class consistently apart by using (categories of) categories of classes (eg, evolutionary taxonomy).
The former (1) is simpler to understand, but also paradoxically contradictory in present (ie, between before and after in continuity) and thus lacking a consistent solution, whereas the latter (2) is more difficult to understand, but consistent and thus having several consistent solutions. The (only) principal difference between these two possible options is thus that the former (1) lacks consistent solution, whereas the latter (2) has several consistent solutions.
The fact that puzzles us, and thus drives the distortion of our minds, is that there is no single unambiguous ("true" or "natural") classification of a single such process. Frustration over this fact was probably resposible for cladists' radical move to simply assert (actually define) that there indeed is a single unambiguous ("true" or "natural") classification to be found, in the form of what they first called "monophyletic groups" but later became known as "clades", but which consistently ought to be called "holophyletic groups". This assertion is thus wrong. There is no such unambiguous classification "to be found". Classifications are actually not found at all, they are produced.
So, why isn't there a single unambiguous ("natural") classification of a single such process ("to be found")? Well, this question has millions of possible answers, but the mere attempt to explain it is actually irrational. An answer can only point to how the idea of such classification is inconsistent (actually paradoxically contradictory), like Bertrand Russell did in Russell's paradox, and to that it is falsified by the fact that time is relative to space, not explain why it is. The reason that such classification is lacking is a fact and as such inexplicable. Facts can't be explained; only directed processes can. It just allows us to draw conclusions about what it says about reality. The most fundamental of these conclusions is that reality is not rational, that is, that reality is irrational. The only alternative to this conclusion is to deny facts, that is, to BE irrational (like cladists do and are). Also the answer to why a single unambiguous ("true" or "natural") classification is lacking is thus lacking.
This fact explains the problems non-cladists had (and have) to respond to cladists' erroneous assertion (which Ashlock and Mayr, among many others, experienced and experience). If cladists choose (or don't understand better) to ignore facts and be irrational, then there is nothing the rest of us can do about it. There is no possibility to force anyone to accept facts and be rational. The option to ignore facts and be irrational can't be closed. That's why I'm just trying to explain that cladistics is irrational, so that cladists will have a harder time to lull others into the belief that it is rational (and thus that rationality is irrational). My only aim is, as a Swedish leader for the left wing party once expressed it, that: "there must be some kind of order also in the left wing party [ie, biological systematics]".
Classification of entities in a bifurcating process thus has a tendency to distort our minds, but I resist allowing it distort them to the degree of turning irrational into rational and vice versa, that is, turning biological systematics from a science into a belief, even if the fact that there isn't any unambiguous classification of a single bifurcating process is frustrating. Being irrational is extremely confusing, and biological systematics can probably not compete with all other beliefs anyway, especially since it evidently lacks a God. Instead, I struggle to retain biological systematics among the rational sciences by advocating evolutionary taxonomy for classification in the context of evolution. But, as I explained above, I can't hinder anyone from denying facts and being irrational. The gate to denial of facts and irrationality can't be closed.
Cladistics does thus not base its classification only on the bifurcating phylogenetic relationships between biological species, but on any contradictory belief in a bifurcating relationship between biological species. It actually tries to categorize a contradictory classification (ie, into clades and paraphyletic groups) of any bifurcating process, which actually is a generic phenomenon and therefore conflated with a category. It tries to realize an idea (which to them already appears realized) that can't be realized. Cladistics is thus clearly inconsistent, although consistently inconsistent.
onsdag 14 mars 2012
Biological systematics in terms of cladistics is a severe misunderstanding
If cladists were cartographers, then they would battle about which map that is the true map. Cladists obviously lack ability to straighten out the relation between reality and maps (ie, descriptions) of it, instead confusing them to the extent of believing that maps of reality can BE reality (ie,a belief in a true map).
The problem with traditional maps is that a 2-D representation of a 3-D reality has to err in either area, distance or angle, because the dimensional reduction from 3 to 2 can't preserve all three. The problem with phylogenetic illustrations is that a 2-D representation of a 4-D reality (then including time) is that every single representation is contradictory, because there are several just as correct 2-D representations of a single 4-D reality. And, since illustrations of phylogenies are 2-D representations of a 4-D reality, there are several just as correct illustrations of the phylogeny of biodiversity. The cladistic conflation of illustration (ie, representation) with the illustrated (ie, the represent) may be "natural", but is none the less contradictory. A single true such representation simply can't be found, because all of them are contradictory. The "natural" belief that such thing can be found is simply wrong.
Biological systematics in terms of cladistics is thus a severe misunderstanding. The illustration of the origin of biodiversity in the form of a dichotomously branching graph does not equal evolution, but is merely an illustration of it. A classification of this process in terms of the illustration (ie, cladistics) is contradictory, because there are several just as correct ways to illustrate one and the same process (see Jeremy Martin et al.). Abandoning the scientific Linnean system (ie, evolutionary taxonomy) for a cladistic classification would thus be a severe mistake.
The problem with traditional maps is that a 2-D representation of a 3-D reality has to err in either area, distance or angle, because the dimensional reduction from 3 to 2 can't preserve all three. The problem with phylogenetic illustrations is that a 2-D representation of a 4-D reality (then including time) is that every single representation is contradictory, because there are several just as correct 2-D representations of a single 4-D reality. And, since illustrations of phylogenies are 2-D representations of a 4-D reality, there are several just as correct illustrations of the phylogeny of biodiversity. The cladistic conflation of illustration (ie, representation) with the illustrated (ie, the represent) may be "natural", but is none the less contradictory. A single true such representation simply can't be found, because all of them are contradictory. The "natural" belief that such thing can be found is simply wrong.
Biological systematics in terms of cladistics is thus a severe misunderstanding. The illustration of the origin of biodiversity in the form of a dichotomously branching graph does not equal evolution, but is merely an illustration of it. A classification of this process in terms of the illustration (ie, cladistics) is contradictory, because there are several just as correct ways to illustrate one and the same process (see Jeremy Martin et al.). Abandoning the scientific Linnean system (ie, evolutionary taxonomy) for a cladistic classification would thus be a severe mistake.
måndag 26 december 2011
Is "clade" a class or an entity?
The approach called cladistics in biological systematics rests on the notion of "clades". This kind of "thing" is, however, confusing. The fundamental problem is that if "clade" (in indefinite form), analogous to "human", means both the class clade, analogous to the class human, and a single clade, analogous to a single human, then every single clade must consist of ONLY clades, and there must also be NEITHER anything else than clades NOR any clades at all, contrary to "human". "Clades" does thus, obviously, exclude everything, including itself. Accepting it does in practice mean denying everything, including itself.
What, then, is the reason for this confusion? Well, the reason is that "clade" is the opposite to "object". "Clade" is thus not a kind of "object", but actually the opposite to "object". It means that we have to think up-side-down and in-side-out when we discuss "clades". Thus,
- whereas there are different kinds of objects, there are different clades of kinds.
- whereas "object" is ambiguous between pattern and process, "clade" is instead contradictory between pattern and process.
- whereas objects are classified, classes are cladified.
- whereas objects are different from classes, clades are classes.
- whereas objects exclude clades, clades exclude objects.
"Clade" is simply using the ultimate conclusion if one starts with objects as axiom, that is, Russell's paradox, as axiom, thus landing in the opposite to object as ultimate conclusion (wherein the conclusion equals the axiom). It is a play with words landing in a paradox (i.e., Russell's paradox) as both axiom and conclusion.
The confusing property of "clade" does thus reside in that it turns assumption (actually axiom) and conclusion up-side-down and in-side-out. However, it is not the turning up-side-down and in-side-out itself that is confusing - it might just as well have been a normal development in science, a so-called "paradigm shift - but instead the fact that "clade" is a paradox, since it means that the axiom can't be real. Not even if all biological systematists would agree on this axiom could it be real, because it is contradictory, i.e., a paradox. "Clades" simply can't be real because they are contradictory, i.e., a paradox. The confusing property of "clade" is thus that it is contradictory (i.e., a paradox) and thus can't be used as an axiom because they are far from self-evident (as axioms ought to be). A contradiction may, of course, be self-evident to some of us, but not without contradiction.
The answer to the question "Is "clade" a class or an entity?" is thus "both". It is both a class and an entity. The problem is that class and entity are contradictory. The only difference between cladists and non-cladists is thus that cladists interpret this "both" erroneously as a confirmation (i.e., it is both at the same time), whereas non-cladists interpret it correctly as a contradiction (i.e., it is neither). This difference sends cladists on a vain search of a contradiction they call "clade", which currently seems to occupy a large part of the "research" in biological systematics. This search is thus correctly diagnosed as a mental desease - paranoia.
What, then, is the reason for this confusion? Well, the reason is that "clade" is the opposite to "object". "Clade" is thus not a kind of "object", but actually the opposite to "object". It means that we have to think up-side-down and in-side-out when we discuss "clades". Thus,
- whereas there are different kinds of objects, there are different clades of kinds.
- whereas "object" is ambiguous between pattern and process, "clade" is instead contradictory between pattern and process.
- whereas objects are classified, classes are cladified.
- whereas objects are different from classes, clades are classes.
- whereas objects exclude clades, clades exclude objects.
"Clade" is simply using the ultimate conclusion if one starts with objects as axiom, that is, Russell's paradox, as axiom, thus landing in the opposite to object as ultimate conclusion (wherein the conclusion equals the axiom). It is a play with words landing in a paradox (i.e., Russell's paradox) as both axiom and conclusion.
The confusing property of "clade" does thus reside in that it turns assumption (actually axiom) and conclusion up-side-down and in-side-out. However, it is not the turning up-side-down and in-side-out itself that is confusing - it might just as well have been a normal development in science, a so-called "paradigm shift - but instead the fact that "clade" is a paradox, since it means that the axiom can't be real. Not even if all biological systematists would agree on this axiom could it be real, because it is contradictory, i.e., a paradox. "Clades" simply can't be real because they are contradictory, i.e., a paradox. The confusing property of "clade" is thus that it is contradictory (i.e., a paradox) and thus can't be used as an axiom because they are far from self-evident (as axioms ought to be). A contradiction may, of course, be self-evident to some of us, but not without contradiction.
The answer to the question "Is "clade" a class or an entity?" is thus "both". It is both a class and an entity. The problem is that class and entity are contradictory. The only difference between cladists and non-cladists is thus that cladists interpret this "both" erroneously as a confirmation (i.e., it is both at the same time), whereas non-cladists interpret it correctly as a contradiction (i.e., it is neither). This difference sends cladists on a vain search of a contradiction they call "clade", which currently seems to occupy a large part of the "research" in biological systematics. This search is thus correctly diagnosed as a mental desease - paranoia.
måndag 12 december 2011
Biological systematics - the vain quest for The Consistent Classification
Biological systematics has been chasing the idea "The Consistent Classification" since at least the ancient Greeks, that is, for at least 2500 years. The goal is a classification that breaks even, ie, is free from contradictions.
Today, we have, however, obtained the knowledge to figure out that this goal is actually an interface between subjectivity and objectivity (traditionally called realism and nominalism, respectively) and thus not a "thing", but a passage between two things, ie, between subjectivity and objectivity. The goal is the difference between subjectivity (realism) and objectivity (nominalism). If we analogize subjectivity and objectivity with railway stations, the goal is the rails between them. It is possible to pass, but it is not possible to transform to a single station (or several stations) in both approaches, because it in one view (subjectivity) has to be transformed into types of stations (ie, into several stations of the same kind) whereas it in the other has to be transformed into single stations. The two approaches thus can't see (or can't recognize) the same thing (s). The passage between them, that is, the goal for biological systematics, will thus remain an unattainable idea as long as the two approaches exist. This passage was in the early 1900's named Russell's paradox in objectivity, and about 50 years later named "clade" in subjectivity.
Today, we have, however, obtained the knowledge to figure out that this goal is actually an interface between subjectivity and objectivity (traditionally called realism and nominalism, respectively) and thus not a "thing", but a passage between two things, ie, between subjectivity and objectivity. The goal is the difference between subjectivity (realism) and objectivity (nominalism). If we analogize subjectivity and objectivity with railway stations, the goal is the rails between them. It is possible to pass, but it is not possible to transform to a single station (or several stations) in both approaches, because it in one view (subjectivity) has to be transformed into types of stations (ie, into several stations of the same kind) whereas it in the other has to be transformed into single stations. The two approaches thus can't see (or can't recognize) the same thing (s). The passage between them, that is, the goal for biological systematics, will thus remain an unattainable idea as long as the two approaches exist. This passage was in the early 1900's named Russell's paradox in objectivity, and about 50 years later named "clade" in subjectivity.
tisdag 6 december 2011
On the third alternative approach to the question of the origin of Life (i.e., evolutionary taxonomy)
Cladistics claim to BE phylogenetics. However, if cladistics (i.e., classification of biodiversity into only clades) would be possible, then evolution would be impossible, and thus also a Tree of Life, and much more the single True Tree of Life cladistics acknowledges. Cladistics is thus contradicted by denying, in turn, evolution, Trees of Life and a single Tree of Life, that is, itself.
Cladistics thus makes phylogenetics appear ridiculous. If its self-contradiction would be the only alternative to creationism, then humanity would be doomed to self-contradiction - either as a self-contradictory belief in a single True Tree of Life (i.e., cladistics) or as a self-contradictory belief in that a God created Life.
Luckily, there is a third alternative - belief in a single origin of Life combined with understanding that this origin can't be described unambiguously, that is, understanding that there is no single True Tree of Life to be found (i.e.,the scientific approach called evolutionary taxonomy). The scientific alternative thus bypasses the contradiction between the self-contradictions of cladistics and creationism by acknowledging Darwin's idea of a single origin of Life combined with understanding that a description of the origin of Life has to be either ambiguous (which it acknowledges) or contradictory (which it does not acknowledge, but which cladistics only acknowledges). The scientific alternative thus distinguishes itself from cladistics by denying cladistics' idea "a single True Tree of Life". It understands that this idea is practically impossible.
Evolutionary taxonomy is thus the preferable approach for people that acknowledge Darwin's idea of a single origin of Life, but which at the same time understand that such origin can't be unambiguously described. They understand that the fundamental obstacle for an unambiguous description of reality is that reality is distinct from descriptions of it. They do not fall into the cladistic trap of confusing reality with descriptions of it.
Evolutionary taxonomy is thus the only approach that combines belief in Darwin's idea with practical possibility. The system it uses for classification is the orthogonal Linnean systematics. It is thus not revolutionary, but inclusive. It includes Darwin's idea in Linnean systematics.
Cladistics thus makes phylogenetics appear ridiculous. If its self-contradiction would be the only alternative to creationism, then humanity would be doomed to self-contradiction - either as a self-contradictory belief in a single True Tree of Life (i.e., cladistics) or as a self-contradictory belief in that a God created Life.
Luckily, there is a third alternative - belief in a single origin of Life combined with understanding that this origin can't be described unambiguously, that is, understanding that there is no single True Tree of Life to be found (i.e.,the scientific approach called evolutionary taxonomy). The scientific alternative thus bypasses the contradiction between the self-contradictions of cladistics and creationism by acknowledging Darwin's idea of a single origin of Life combined with understanding that a description of the origin of Life has to be either ambiguous (which it acknowledges) or contradictory (which it does not acknowledge, but which cladistics only acknowledges). The scientific alternative thus distinguishes itself from cladistics by denying cladistics' idea "a single True Tree of Life". It understands that this idea is practically impossible.
Evolutionary taxonomy is thus the preferable approach for people that acknowledge Darwin's idea of a single origin of Life, but which at the same time understand that such origin can't be unambiguously described. They understand that the fundamental obstacle for an unambiguous description of reality is that reality is distinct from descriptions of it. They do not fall into the cladistic trap of confusing reality with descriptions of it.
Evolutionary taxonomy is thus the only approach that combines belief in Darwin's idea with practical possibility. The system it uses for classification is the orthogonal Linnean systematics. It is thus not revolutionary, but inclusive. It includes Darwin's idea in Linnean systematics.
torsdag 8 september 2011
On biological systematics - its eternal rift between subjectivity and objectivity
Biological systematics is traditionally a battle between realists (i.e., subjectivists) and nominalists (i.e., objectivists), the former assuming as an axiom that classes are real, whereas the latter assuming as an axiom that objects are real, undulating back and forth between these entrances to reasoning. Realists created the mess in biological systematics before Linné, and Linné as a nominalist straightened out the mess. However, recently (around the 1950-ies), realists had gained new strength reappearing on the scene by the German entomologist Willi Hennig introducing a new kind of realist approach, called cladistics, which is best described as "consistent subjectivity".
Hennig's idea is basically that a consistent dichotomous confusion of classes will ultimately (i.e., by optimization of the number of included properties) lead to a single consistent classification, which is "True" with regard to the origin of classes (called "The Tree of Life"). The idea does thus not only rest on the axiom that classes are real, but also on the axiom that classes have originated in a dichotomous fashion, that is, opposite to the consistent confusion of them by which their True origin is found.
Much can be said about this idea. The first is that it is able to rotate around any classification, given that it finds the "True" origin of classes by confusion of any particular classification. This method is indeed paranoic, but not necessarily inconsistent, since its consistency is ultimately decided by whether there are several different possible classifications of the True origin of classes to be found or not, and thus ultimately of whether classes are real or not. If classes are real, and if they have originated according to the model, then this paranoic reconstruction of their origin is consistent, because it actually reconstructs their origin. The question whether this paranoic method is rational or not is thus transferred to whether classes are real or not.
This question, i.e., whether classes are real or not, can be answered only if it can be tested empirically. If it can't, then the two entrances to reasoning (i.e., subjectivity and objectivity) are indecisive, in which case cladistics is ultimately correct by the scientific parsimony criterion. The problem is thus to find facts that can decide between the two (orthogonal, i.e., diametrically opposed) approaches empirically. This search has only a single finding, namely the only fact that distinguishes reality from abstraction, that is, that time is relative to space. This fact namely falsifies subjectivity by that subjectivity equalizes space with time, thereby leaving no possibility for time to be relative to space, whereas objectivity leaves the relation between time and space open. This fact thus falsifies subjectivity in favor for objectivity. It thus reveals that subjectivity is inconsistent, and thereby that objectivity is consistent, and thus that cladistics is consistently inconsistent. This fact is thus, no matter how far-fetched it may appear, the decisive fact for the choice between subjectivity and objectivity, It actually falsifies subjectivity in a specific sense, and cladistics in a generic sense, by denying subjectivity's axiom that classes are real. It thus answers the question whether classes are real or not with a NO. Classes are not real.
Subjectivists (i.e., cladists) are thus merely a pain in the ass for biological systematics. Their approach is a paranoic, and this paranoia is falsified by empirical facts. Subjectivity can actually not find neither a specific nor a generic classification that is consistent and unambiguous, because consistent can't be consistently combined with unambiguous, no matter how much we wish it could have.
Hennig's idea is basically that a consistent dichotomous confusion of classes will ultimately (i.e., by optimization of the number of included properties) lead to a single consistent classification, which is "True" with regard to the origin of classes (called "The Tree of Life"). The idea does thus not only rest on the axiom that classes are real, but also on the axiom that classes have originated in a dichotomous fashion, that is, opposite to the consistent confusion of them by which their True origin is found.
Much can be said about this idea. The first is that it is able to rotate around any classification, given that it finds the "True" origin of classes by confusion of any particular classification. This method is indeed paranoic, but not necessarily inconsistent, since its consistency is ultimately decided by whether there are several different possible classifications of the True origin of classes to be found or not, and thus ultimately of whether classes are real or not. If classes are real, and if they have originated according to the model, then this paranoic reconstruction of their origin is consistent, because it actually reconstructs their origin. The question whether this paranoic method is rational or not is thus transferred to whether classes are real or not.
This question, i.e., whether classes are real or not, can be answered only if it can be tested empirically. If it can't, then the two entrances to reasoning (i.e., subjectivity and objectivity) are indecisive, in which case cladistics is ultimately correct by the scientific parsimony criterion. The problem is thus to find facts that can decide between the two (orthogonal, i.e., diametrically opposed) approaches empirically. This search has only a single finding, namely the only fact that distinguishes reality from abstraction, that is, that time is relative to space. This fact namely falsifies subjectivity by that subjectivity equalizes space with time, thereby leaving no possibility for time to be relative to space, whereas objectivity leaves the relation between time and space open. This fact thus falsifies subjectivity in favor for objectivity. It thus reveals that subjectivity is inconsistent, and thereby that objectivity is consistent, and thus that cladistics is consistently inconsistent. This fact is thus, no matter how far-fetched it may appear, the decisive fact for the choice between subjectivity and objectivity, It actually falsifies subjectivity in a specific sense, and cladistics in a generic sense, by denying subjectivity's axiom that classes are real. It thus answers the question whether classes are real or not with a NO. Classes are not real.
Subjectivists (i.e., cladists) are thus merely a pain in the ass for biological systematics. Their approach is a paranoic, and this paranoia is falsified by empirical facts. Subjectivity can actually not find neither a specific nor a generic classification that is consistent and unambiguous, because consistent can't be consistently combined with unambiguous, no matter how much we wish it could have.
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