The difference in biological systematics between cladistics and Linnean systematics

The difference in biological systematics between cladistics and Linnean systematics is that cladistics is naive set theory, whereas Linnean systematics is axiomatic set theory. It means that cladistics is contradictory (actually paradoxically contradictory as Bertrand Russell demonstrated in 1901), whereas Linnean systematics is consistent.

As cladists claim, naive set theory is indeed simpler than axiomatic set theory is, but also contradictory in difference to axiomatic set theory. It is as Einstein stated: we shall simplify matters as much as possible, but not too much, because then we create impossibilities. The impossibility cladistics creates is "a true tree of life".

Cladists are thus actually just naive (ie, ignorant) biological systematists.

The explanation of why there isn't any single ultimate truth

The problem with finding a single ultimate truth does not reside in reasoning, but in classification. The problem is that there isn't any both internally consistent and externally unambiguous (ie, with regard to reality) classification. Instead, there are only internally inconsistent (ie, paradoxically contradictory) and externally ambiguous classifications (like cladistics and Linnean systematics, respectively).

It means that we can think forever without finding any single ultimate truth. There simply isn't any to find. There thus isn't any "single true tree of life" as cladists claim, nor any "Higgs particle" as particle physicists claim. Instead, the idea that there is such a single ultimate truth is a fundamental misunderstanding of conceptualization, called (class)-realism, ie, the belief that classes are real. This idea is actually the only conceptual construction that conceptualization excludes. Every attempt to formulate such a "truth" will thus be either paradoxically contradictory or contradicted by facts.

The idea of a single ultimate truth is thus like the carrot in front of the donkey's eyes - a practical illusion.

         

On the idea of a "true tree of life, and the problem with Cladistics for biological systeatics

The reason why there isn't any "true tree of life" is that classification is ultimately paradoxically contradictory, as Bertrand Russell demonstrated with Russell's paradox already in 1901.

This fact means that the question of a "true tree of life" is not a question about reality, ie, which the "true tree of life" is, but about modeling reality, ie, whether we can describe the history of organisms in terms of a consistent "true tree of life" or not, and the answer is thus "not".

The problem with Cladistics is thus that it misunderstands the question of a "true tree of life" fundamentally as a question about reality, when it actually is about modeling reality consistently, and that it thereby can't understand the answer that there isn't any "true tree of life", because it misunderstands this answer as an existential claim (assertion), when it actually is just a conclusion on our possibilities to model reality consistently. The answer merely concludes that there isn't any "true tree of life" because this model is paradoxically contradictory, since a paradoxical contradiction is not one, but many . (Cladists don't comprehend the notion of "trees of life" as a model of reality, but as a single reality, ie, The True Tree of Life).

This cladistic inability to understand the context means that Cladistics searches for something that can't be found, This search is, of course, their own business, but one question is why Swedish tax payers shall sponsor this vain search on Swedish universities? Why shall they sponsor a search for a pink elefant when their money can be used for many more sensible purposes? Another question is whether this inability to understand shall be allowed to be taught in Swedish universities at all? There may be students that do understand the context, and what will the "teachers" do with them? In such a case, the student actually ought to teach the teacher, but since cladists are not susceptible to anticladistic arguments, such intelligent students will thus be excluded from the universities. There are thus major problems with having cladists on universities. But, who can clear them out?

The question of a possible "true tree of life" and the answer to it

The reason why there isn't any unambiguous classification to be found, such as the idea of "a true tree of life" that cladistics rests on, is that classification is ultimately paradoxically contradictory, which we can understand from the fact that classification is orthogonal and which Bertrand Russell also demonstrated with his "Barber's paradox".

It means that the question of a possible "true tree of life" is not about reality (ie, an existential question), ie, whether there is a "true tree of life or not", but about methodology (ie, a practical question), ie, whether we can describe the history of biodiversity in the form of a consistent "true tree" or not, and the answer is thus "not". This is actually the reason why Linné invented his consistent orthogonal system of classification.

There are thus some of us that understand the question of a possible "true tree of life" and also know the answer to it, the nut for us to crack is the how we shall convey this understanding and knowledge to the rest of us, especially when they on the contrary claim (assert) that there indeed is a "true tree of life", so that they can halt their vain and confusing search for it.

But, then again, maybe they actually understand the question and also know the answer, but don't see it as problem for their approach, but rather an advantage...? Its absence of a consistent solution does at east ensure the perpetual employment...

Against stupidity (like cladistics) do facts battle in vain

Cladistics was actually rejected before it emerged. Already in 1901, Bertrand Russell demonstrated that classification ultimately leads to paradox, which is the appraoch of Cladistics. The fact that Cladistics leads to paradox was thus known before Cladistcs emerged. Cladists thus ought to consider known facts before it claims that facts are wrong.

Against stupidity, like Cladistics, do facts battle in vain.

On the fundamental problem for Biological systematics

We (humans) invented concepts, and then started conceptualizing reality. The fundamental problem for this endeavor is that concepts (classification) is inherently orthogonal (see Russell's paradox), because it thereby lacks an unambiguous solution.This fact eventually led Biological systematics to Linné's consistent conceptualization of the biological diversity.

The German Nazi entomologist (ie, insect researcher) Willi Hennig did, however, take this endeavor one step further by starting to conceptualize conceptualization (later called Cladistics), as if conceptualization itself is the reality it conceptualizes instead of the reality. The problem with this step is simply that conceptualization isn't the reality it conceptualizes, but is instead in practice a paradox (see Russell's paradox). This step thus leads into barking up the wrong tree (or "jumping into crazy barrel", as we say in Sweden), or "screwing up matters", entering the back side of conceptualization where everything are up-side-down and contradictory.

Hennig did none the less get followers (called "cladists"), which took his step one step further by cutting off a return to the right "tree" (or "barrel") by boldly claiming (asserting) that this "tree" ("barrel") indeed IS the right "tree" ("barrel") and denying the right "tree" ("barrel"). It left the only way back to the right "tree" ("barrel") via a conceptualization of a conceptualization of a conceptualization of reality, which will take some time to find since it is a quite complicated track to follow. (Or by simply forgetting Cladistics).

The course of events above is actually just one more turn in Biological systematics' consistent tilting between the right "tree" (barrel"), also called "nominalism", and the wrong "tree" ("barrel"), also called "realism", due to its impossible fundamental aim to "find the true classification", which thus is a paradox. The discipline simply can't come to rest even concerning its fundamental approach, because there are always some biological systematists that don't understand this fundamental fact (ie, that the notion "a true classification" actually is a paradox). Instead, the discipline appears to remain a battle field for nominalism contra realism forever... (A "true classification" will it none the less never find).

On the concept "clade" and the belief "cladistics"

The now popular concept "clade" in biological systematics is actually an infinitely recursive concept, like "the list of all lists", by including itself as a member of itself. A belief that this concept indeed can break even, today called "Cladistics", and its corollary search for what it calls "the true tree of life", is actually in practice a belief that every clade is what cladistics calls a "sister-group" to itself and that the most inclusive clade also is a sister-group to the least inclusive clade. It is thus an absurd belief by believing in the obviously absurd.

Linnean systematics and Evolutionary taxonomy avoid this sink hole by arranging concepts orthogonally as categories of classes (of organisms).

The question whether there is such a "single true tree of life" or not thus has a negative answer - there isn't. Instead, there are actually several equally true graph illustrations of a hypothesized evolutionary origin of biological organisms. Large scale change (ie, evolution) actually can't be unambiguous if small scale change is, because only entities are unambiguous and they are physically nested as INDEPENDENT entities in other entities. Unambiguity in change at different scales at the same time actually requires total dependency between entities on different scales, which, in turn, makes change impossible. The cladistic belief in a single true tree of life does thus contradict its own assumption of the underlying process (ie, evolution) itself. Cladistics does thus believe in something it at the same time denies.

Giddy, this siding in biological systematics, isn't it?

On conceptualization, and Linnean systematics versus cladistics

If we conceptualize reality using single entities as starting points, then there is just one statement that can't be true: that classes are real, because conceptualization allocates single entities into abstract categories (ie, finite classes) via classes (ie, infinite classes, or types), and if it could, then single entities would instead be abstract, ie, it would tilt reality and conceptualization up-side-down.

This fact, ie, that this statement can't be true, is shown by that any such claim is either ambiguous between classes and categories, like the Linnean system is, or paradoxically contradictory between different classes, like cladistics is.

We can thus produce a compromise between reality and conceptualization, like Linnean systematics, or tilt reality and conceptualization up-side-down, like cladistics, but we can't fuse reality and conceptualization unambiguously, ie, truthfully. We can't, for example, describe a process unambiguously, ie, truthfully, but can just represent it in different aspects. The Unambiguous Aspect is simply lacking.

This is a fact we just have to accept. If a bucket is empty, then it is empty. We can't fill it with words. There is thus no such thing as a "true tree of life" (or Higg's boson for that sake). It would have been perfect if there had been one (or a category of Higg's bosons), but, unfortunately, there isn't. Entities are real, but neither a true tree of life, Higg's bosons, nor any other kind of entities, sorry to say, but only entities. These entities can't, sorry to say, be unambiguously allocated into any kind(s) of entities. Ultimately we are unambiguously left with just entities. We can discuss them, but we can't nail them. A single entity, like me and you, will never be unambiguously nailed to any category. This is a pain in the ass for typologists like race biologists, but it is a blessing for the rest of us.

Cladistics and Linnean systematics are merely the two possible classificatory solutions to "the problem of universals"

The "problem of universals" is an ancient problem in metaphysics about whether universals exist or not. This problem has two contradictory (orthogonal) solutions: Aristotelian essentialism and Plato's theory of forms, the former assuming that they do and the latter that they don't (at least not in the same reality as reality). Cladistics is consistent with the former and Linnean systematics is consistent with the latter, and they are mutually contradictory (ie, orthogonal). However, since classification of reality (for example into either clades or into genera, families, orders, etcetera) does not influence reality itself, Cladistics and Linnean systematics are merely the two possible (orthogonal) classificatory solutions to the problem of universals, Aristotelian essentialism and Plato's theory of forms, respectively.

This fact is, however, hidden behind the mutual contradiction between these two possible classificatory solutions by that it turns the difference between them into an existential problem for cladists and into an erroneous existential claim of cladistics to Linnean systematists. The mutual contradiction between them thus tilts the fact that they are merely the two possible (orthogonal) classificatory solutions to "the problem of universals" into a problem of cladistics' existential claim (ie, that universals exist). This claim was thus, as I have explained in recent posts on this blog, shown to be inconsistent by Betrand Russell in 1901 by what later became known as Russell's paradox (for those that hadn't understood this fact before, unlike Plato and many others).

It means that a biological systematist has to decide whether he/she believes that universals are real or not, ie, choose side between Aristotelian essentialism on the one hand and Plato's theory of forms/nominalism on the other, because the former leads to cladistic classification and the latter to Linnean systematics. However, if he/she chooses the former (ie, cladistic classification), then he/she has to be aware that it is inconsistent, ie, lacking consistent solution. None of them can thus reach the idea that cladistics calls "The Tree of Life".

Linnean systematics and cladistics are just two different kinds of classifications of dichotomously propagating processes

Linnean systematics and cladistics are just two different kinds of classifications of dichotomously propagating processes: Linnean systematics accepting the fact that the classification of such processes can't be unambiguous, and cladistics instead searching for unambiguous classifications of such processes (ie, not accepting the fact that classification of such processes can't be unambiguous).

These two kinds of classifications are thus just different (orthogonal) opinions on whether classification of dichotomously propagating processes can be unambiguous or not, whereof cladistics is wrong.

On biological systematics and "True Trees of Life"

The "new" (actually pre-scientific) approach in biological systematics that is called "cladistics" rests on the idea, actually belief, that "there is a single True Tree of Life" (which thus is possible for us to find).

This belief may appear sensible in the light of Darwin's theory "on the origin of species", but is actually an illusion emerging from a combination of Darwin's theory and a generally typological approach. The illusion is, however, not easy to disclose.

The problem with the belief resides in that such "True Tree" in practice is a trace backwards in time from the situation today, and that the situation today in practice can be classified in several different, but just as "true" ways, because it means that there are several True Trees of Life per definition. The fact that the situation today thus in practice is ambiguous, moreover means that the possible "True Trees" in practice are contradictory. (The idea (ie, belief) that there should be a single unambiguous classification of the situation today is falsified by the fact that classification is inherently orthogonal and thus ultimately paradoxically contradictory, also shown by Russell's paradox).

The problem with the cladistic belief is thus not that there isn't a single True Tree of Life, but that there are several contradictory True Trees of Life. The problem with this fact for the belief is that the fact that these True Trees of Life are contradictory means that they can't be consistently summarized in a single True Tree of Life, but can instead only be consistently assembled in an orthogonal system of classification, like the Linnean systematics (and thus also evolutionary taxonomy).

It means that the founding idea (ie, belief) for cladistics, ie, that "there is a single True Tree of Life" (which thus is possible for us to find), is wrong. Fact is that there is no such thing to be found. Instead, there are several contradictory True Trees of Life which can only be consistently (coherently) assembled using an orthogonal system of classification, like the Linnean systematics (and thus also evolutionary taxonomy). Cladistics is thus an erroneous belief in a single True Tree of Life, whereas Linnean systematics is a consistent (coherent) assembly of the True Trees of Life.

On the limits for classification (and the practical impossibility of cladistic classification)

The fact that classification is orthogonal, ie, that every single class contains several classes within every single set of entities (eg, the class "primates" and all different classes of primates), and that finite class thus is orthogonal to infinite class, means that classification is fundamentally contradictory between single and several, since orthogonalities are contradictory between single and several per definition. Cladistic classification accepts this contradiction, ie, accepts being contradictory, by equalizing the concepts finite class and infinite class.

The only way to avoid this orthogonal contradiction, ie, to achieve consistency, in practical classification is to use an orthogonal system of classification, classifying entities into categories of classes, like the Linnean system, in order to thereby keep finite classes and infinite classes (ie, the orthogonal concepts finite class and infinite class) consistently apart. Such orthogonal system of classification is, however, ambiguous in relation to reality per definition, simply by keeping the orthogonal concepts finite class and infinite class) consistently apart.

It means that classification can only be either internally contradictory or ambiguous in relation to reality. The fundamental reason for this impossibility to achieve unambiguity is that classes can't be (and thus aren't) real per definition, but can only be (and thus are) an artificial invention.

On the paradoxical contradiction of the class "clade"

The concept "clade" terms a class of entities (ie, "ancestors including all their descendants"). This class of entities appear "natural" to some biological systematists, but is none the less paradoxically contradictory (ie, the subjective aspect of Russell's paradox).

This fact can be understood by considering that the fact that every class can be a member of another class (like how humans is a member of primates) means that every clade also can be a member of another clade (ie, that every clade contains member clades). Now, if there among all clades should be a single clade that is not a member of any other clade (like the idea "a true tree of life"), then this clade of clades must also equal (be the same as) each and every of its member clades, and thus exclude the possibility of any other clade of clades besides It (ie, exclude the existence of more than one clade of clades), thereby contradicting the fact that there are several clades per definition. Ie, if there are several clades, then there is no single clade, and vice versa.   

The class "clade" thus actually excludes the possibility of single instances of itself by excluding the possibility of clades that are not members of other clades.

The same explanation can be given in terms of entities: the fact that every entity can be a member of another entity (like how a cell in my body is a member of me) means that every clade of entities also can be a member of another clade of entities (ie, that every clade of entities contains member clades of entities). Now, if there among all those clades of entities should be a single clade that is not a member of any other clade (like the idea "a true tree of life"), then this clade of clades must equal (be the same as) each and every of its member clades and thus exclude any other clade of clades besides It (ie, exclude the existence of more than one clade of clades), thereby contradicting the fact that there are several clades per definition.

The class "clade" is thus actually just a mental circularity inside of Russell's paradox, that is, the subjective aspect of Russell's paradox. It actually lacks a single unambiguous solution (but has several ambiguous solutions in orthogonal systems of classification like the Linnean systematics).

The route to Linnean systematics and cladistics

The fundamental problem for conceptualization is that reality is both discrete (ie, pattern) and continuous (ie, process) at the same time, despite that this state is a conceptual contradiction, in itself, in that discreteness (separation) and continuity are orthogonal (ie, can't be equal per definition). Single entities are both discrete and in a constant process of change at the same time, despite that it is contradictory. Reality is thus contradictory between state (ie, pattern) and change (ie, process) de facto. Morever, the fact that this contradiction is orthogonal means that it also is paradoxical, which Betrand Russel also showed empirically in 1901.

This real contradiction means that we (in conceptualization) have to keep discreteness (separation) and continuity consistently apart, ie, keep a consistent aisle between them, to avoid (conceptual) paradoxical contradiction. This did Aristotle accomplish on a fundamental level by his invention of an orthogonal tool for conceptualization that distinguishes "genera" and "species" on "generic" and "specific differences". The difference between "generic" and "specific" differences is that "generic" differences are pure otherness between entities (ie, lack of a common measure), whereas "specific" differences are differences in something they share. This tool provided the foundation for objective empirical science as we know it today.

About 2000 years later, the Swedish naturalist Carl von Linné discovered the consistent hierarchical mounting of such "genera with their species" (ie, keeping a consistent aisle between discreteness and continuity), that is, a hierarchical orthogonal system, which today is known as Linnean systematics. This kind of conceptual system (ie, a hierarchical orthogonal conceptualization) is thus the end of this route. It is what the fact that reality is both discrete (ie, pattern) and continuous (ie, process) at the same time leads us to.

About 150 years later, the English naturalist Charles Darwin presented his "theory on the origin of species", which he illustrated with a strictly bifurcating graph. This illustration is, however, a bit tricky to interpret consistently, since it uses stems and nodes to illustrate discreteness (pattern) and continuity (process), but does not distinguish them explicitly. This deficit did about 100 years later lure the German entomologist to conflate discreteness with continuity by conflating nodes with stems. This conflation appeared "natural" to Hennig, but did actually bring him back to a pre-Aristotelian idea originally formulated by Parmenides (ie, that reality is one, change is impossible, and existence is timeless, uniform, necessary, and unchanging), that is, the actual opposite to Darwin's theory. This ancient (pre-scientific) conflation was, in spite of that it (1) already had been shown to be contradictory by the ancient Greeks, (2) is the opposite to Darwin's theory and (3) is falsified by the fact that time is relative to space, adopted by many biological systematists. In this brand, it was called "cladistics" and does today have a strong influence on biological systematics.

The main problem with Hennig's conflation (ie, Parmenides' idea and today's cladistics) is that it transfers the paradoxical contradiction of reality into our conceptualization of reality, thereby entering the same vain search for a stable (ie, consistent) configuration of a paradoxical contradiction that reality obviously is in, instead of discussing reality consistently, as science does. The conflation does not change the fact that reality is orthogonally (ie, paradoxically) contradictory, but merely accepts orthogonal (paradoxical) contradiction. In this sense, the conflation is indeed "natural", as Hennig and cladists asserted and assert, but it is none-the less orthogonally (paradoxically) contradictory. It is a vain search for a void practical application of a orthogonally (paradoxically) contradictory idea, that is, the idea of "a single tree of life". "Natural" does in this sense not mean unambiguous, but rather the opposite.

On the difference between Linnean systematics and cladistic classification

Both Linnean systematics and cladistic classification classify a bifurcating process in a generic aspect (ie, all specific aspects at the same time). The difference between them is that:

Linnean systematics is a consistent (ie, non-contradictory) orthogonal system, whereas cladistic classification is inconsistent (ie, contradictory).

It means that Linnean systematics can incorporate the generic aspect of a single bifurcating process, whereas cladistic classification can only produce specific (ie, contradictory) classifications.  

Is cladistics a new approach?

Cladists think that cladistics is a new approach. Nothing could be more wrong. Already Aristotle discussed clades in terms of genera with their species.

The problem with such "things" (ie, clades, or genera with their species) is, however, to join them without contradiction. This problem did Linné solve about 2,000 years later. About 150 years later, Darwin presented his theory on the origin of biodiversity vizualizing it with a bifurcating tree graph he stated illustrated "the origin of species". What Darwin didn't mention, however, was that such bifurcating process also can be illustrated with a node-based tree graph, that these two types of tree graphs are orthogonal, and that such process thus in practice can't be illustrated unambiguously. (Whether this oversight was due to ignorance of this fact or not is impossible to say).

The only new property of cladistics is thus that it conflates node-based graphs with stem-based graphs, thereby creating the impression that the result IS the process itself, resulting in that it gets the fact that bifurcating processes can't be illustrated unambiguously up-side-down. Instead of understanding that it means that an unambiguous such process can't be found, it thinks that the problem is to find one. It is thus a direct running into the ditch from Linné's classification system and Darwin's process model by conflating them into an imaginary classification of a process model that is paradoxically contradictory in a real sense per definition. It does thus not have a single right. This property of cladistics, ie, not having a single right, is the only property that distinguishes it from all other approaches. Only it is totally wrong. Its concept of "clades" does, however, date back to at least the ancient Greeks. Cladistics just takes the irrational route from there, conflating both them and everything else.

Cladistics is thus a new approach only in that it is the irrational way of joining clades, when the Linnean system is the rational way. Cladistics can thus consistently be called irrational cladistics, when Linnean systematics is rational cladistics. It is just an orthogonal conceptual rotation around the fact that bifurcating processes can't be illustrated unambiguously. A play with concepts around a phenomenon that can't be unambiguously nailed with concepts.

On the relation between cladistics and Linnean systematics

Cladistics and Linnean systematics are opposites. Both conceptualize reality using objects, classes and categories, but whereas cladistics assumes that categories (and thus also classes), like humans and cods, are real, ie, can be found, Linnean systematics instead assumes that objects, like you and me, are real, ie, can be found. Cladistics is thus subjective, whereas Linnean systematics is objective.

Both of them (ie, categories (and thus also classes) and objects) can't be real at the same time, since they are orthogonal, ie, diametrically opposed, and that it thus would mean that they would be synonymous, which they obviously aren't. Cladistics pretends that it acknowledges both categories and objects at the same time, but in practice it acknowledges categories (and thus also classes) instead of objects. Both of them can't be acknowledged at the same time, because they are orthogonal.

Cladistics and Linnean systematics thus represent the two possible entrances to conceptualization: (1) assuming that categories (and thus also classes) are real and (2) assuming that objects are real, respectively. The problem with cladistics is that it is contradictory between categories and classes (ie, finite classes and infinite classes), whereas the problem with Linnean systematics is that it is ambiguous in relation to reality. Neither is thus unambiguous in relation to reality. It means that we can't be unambiguous in relation to reality at all, since no entrance to conceptualization is unambiguous in relation to reality, but instead are constrained to discuss advantages and disadvantages of the two possible entrances to conceptualization.

The main advantage with objectivity (eg, Linnean systematics) is that it agrees with facts. Discussing reality using a conceptualization that does not agree with facts (like the cladistic concepts "clade" and "paraphyletic group") has to be  confused, since the concepts are contradictory. The concepts simply can't be defined non-contradictory. This main advantage with objectivity explains its success in the form of empirical science and modern IT applications as object oriented programming (eg, Geomatics). Objectivity is thus superior to subjectivity by agreeing with facts.

In spite of this strong advantage of objectivity, it has severe problems being accepted in biological systematics. Biological systematists obviously prefer conducting confused existential discussions to producing a standardized system of classification. It is just as if they can't abandon the naive idea that there is a single truth to be found; as if their own existence hangs on the existence of a single truth. In practice, however, it is the other way around.

Cladistics - is a lineage real (ie, objective) or artificial (ie, subjective)?

Objective biological systematics reached an end point in the Linnean systematics, since this system is the closest objective biological systematics can come to pure subjectivity, comprehending lineages (i.e., continuity) as artificial (i.e., subjective). Subjective biological systematics represented by Willi Hennig did, however, heave biological systematics over this boundary into pure subjectivity by instead comprehending lineages as real (i.e., objective).

So, the question to answer for biological systematists is:

are lineages real (objectively true) or subjective (artificial)?

One of them has to be true, since they are opposites and there are no other alternatives, and the answer can only be found by falsification, since both can be supported inductively. The question is thus:

which criterion (-a) do we have to tell them apart?

The answer is hidden in the fact that if lineages are real (i.e., objective), then they have to be identical with themselves in each consecutive moment in time, because this they can be only be if time and space "runs" synchronously, which they do not, as evidenced by the fact that time is relative to space. This fact means that a change in resolution factually changes the relation between any two lineage in any two consecutive moments in time in time and space, respectively. There is thus an inherent displacement between time and space over resolutions, which excludes stasis and imposes change, at the same time opening up for lineages to originate and end. This fact may appear both complicated and far-fetched as a criterion to tell the two possible "beings" for lineages apart, but it is the only criterion there is that can do the job. This criterion thus falsifies the comprehension that lineages are real (ie, objective), by meaning that no lineage is identical with itself in each consecutive moment in time. Every lineage do, on the contrary, both originate and end at each consecutive moment in time.

Willi Hennig's comprehension that lineages are real and that classification thereby can rest on historical continuity is thus wrong. The truth is, instead, that every lineage both originates and ends at each consecutive moment in time, thus making continuity subjective. And, basing classification on subjectivity (like cladistics) cannot, of course, reach stability.      

  

Realism vs nominalism (or cladistics vs Linnean systematics)

Classification can only be contradictory or ambiguous: internally contradictory or ambiguous with regard to reality. It is internally contradictory when applied on a single level (like cladistics), and ambiguous with regard to reality when applied on two levels (then necessarily orthogonal, like Linnean systematics). Classification thus can't reach consistent unambiguity, for the simple reason it IS consistently ambiguous, that is, splits every class into two classes.

Now, there are fundamentally two opposite approaches to conceptualization of reality: realism (i.e., subjectivity) assuming as an axiom that classes are real (and thus that objects are abstract), and nominalism (i.e., objectivity) assuming as an axiom that objects are real (and thus that classes are abstract). Since realism assumes that classes are real, it tends towards classification on a single level, that is, towards internal contradiction, whereas since nominalism instead assumes that objects are real, it instead tends towards classification on two levels, that is, towards ambiguity with regard to reality.

In summary: there are fundamentally two opposite approaches to conceptualization: realism and nominalism, whereof realism is internally contradictory and nominalism is ambiguous with regard to reality. Between them resides the idea of a consistent and unambiguous classification (e.g., the True Tree of Life), thus totally impossible to reach.

The idea of a consistent and unambiguous classification is thus a running point, which realism tries to catch and nominalism tries to encircle. Neither of them will, of course, succeed to catch the impossible idea, but whereas nominalism (i.e., objectivity) ought to close up on it, realism instead drifts without a rudder. The realistic (cladistic) idea that parsimony might do the trick is a return alley, since it does not offer any criteria to distinguish between just as parsimonious hypotheses, which, thus, will always remain. A worse problem with realism is, however, that it is both consistently inconsistent and at odds with facts.

The sooner we get rid of realism in the form of cladism in biological systematics the better thus for biological systematics. How can anyone believe that biological systematics can defend consistent inconsistency and incongruence with facts in the long run?
     

On the third alternative approach to the question of the origin of Life (i.e., evolutionary taxonomy)

Cladistics claim to BE phylogenetics. However, if cladistics (i.e., classification of biodiversity into only clades) would be possible, then evolution would be impossible, and thus also a Tree of Life, and much more the single True Tree of Life cladistics acknowledges. Cladistics is thus contradicted by denying, in turn, evolution, Trees of Life and a single Tree of Life, that is, itself.

Cladistics thus makes phylogenetics appear ridiculous. If its self-contradiction would be the only alternative to creationism, then humanity would be doomed to self-contradiction - either as a self-contradictory belief in a single True Tree of Life (i.e., cladistics) or as a self-contradictory belief in that a God created Life.

Luckily, there is a third alternative - belief in a single origin of Life combined with understanding that this origin can't be described unambiguously, that is, understanding that there is no single True Tree of Life to be found (i.e.,the scientific approach called evolutionary taxonomy). The scientific alternative thus bypasses the contradiction between the self-contradictions of cladistics and creationism by acknowledging Darwin's idea of a single origin of Life combined with understanding that a description of the origin of Life has to be either ambiguous (which it acknowledges) or contradictory (which it does not acknowledge, but which cladistics only acknowledges). The scientific alternative thus distinguishes itself from cladistics by denying cladistics' idea "a single True Tree of Life". It understands that this idea is practically impossible.

Evolutionary taxonomy is thus the preferable approach for people that acknowledge Darwin's idea of a single origin of Life, but which at the same time understand that such origin can't be unambiguously described. They understand that the fundamental obstacle for an unambiguous description of reality is that reality is distinct from descriptions of it. They do not fall into the cladistic trap of confusing reality with descriptions of it.

Evolutionary taxonomy is thus the only approach that combines belief in Darwin's idea with practical possibility. The system it uses for classification is the orthogonal Linnean systematics. It is thus not revolutionary, but inclusive. It includes Darwin's idea in Linnean systematics.