More wrong than cladistics is impossible to be

The old idea of ​​a single "true tree of life", today providing the foundation for Cladistics, confronts the two fundamentally different approaches in our conceptualization of reality: realism (ie, assuming that classes are real) and nominalism (ie, assuming that objects are real). The fundamental problem for our conceptualization of reality is namely that not both classes and objects can be real at the same time, since they can't fuse. This problem can be analogized with that not both reality and a map of reality can be real at the same time, since they can't fuse. Confronted with this fundamental choice between classes (ie, map) and objects (ie reality), realism (ie, cladistics) thus claims (asserts) that there indeed is a single "true tree of life" (ie, claims that there indeed is a single "true" map of reality), whereas nominalism denies the existence of such a single "true tree of life" (ie, comprehends reality as reality).

So, which of them do you think is right: realism claiming that map is reality or nominalism comprehending reality as reality?  The answer appears obvious (at least to me). realism's claim that map is reality is obviously wrong when it is confronted with the fact that reality is reality. 

It was realists that set up this confrontation with nominalism by their claim that there indeed is a single "true tree of life", which they thus obviously lose (ie, there isn't any "true tree of life". Their claim thus appears like a pink elephant that they claim can fly. The problem with this claim is that there are no pink elephants, and even if there had been, they wouldn't have been able to fly. The claim is thus totally wrong, more wrong than that is actually impossible to be.

The problem for biological systematics is thus how it shall explain to cladists that they are wrong. Whether cladists understand that they're wrong or not does not, however, matter, since they are wrong anyway.A failure to explain to cladists that they're wrong is thus a failure for biological systematics. It leaves biological systematics as a dream that there are pink elephants that can fly.
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The question of a possible "true tree of life" and the answer to it

The reason why there isn't any unambiguous classification to be found, such as the idea of "a true tree of life" that cladistics rests on, is that classification is ultimately paradoxically contradictory, which we can understand from the fact that classification is orthogonal and which Bertrand Russell also demonstrated with his "Barber's paradox".

It means that the question of a possible "true tree of life" is not about reality (ie, an existential question), ie, whether there is a "true tree of life or not", but about methodology (ie, a practical question), ie, whether we can describe the history of biodiversity in the form of a consistent "true tree" or not, and the answer is thus "not". This is actually the reason why Linné invented his consistent orthogonal system of classification.

There are thus some of us that understand the question of a possible "true tree of life" and also know the answer to it, the nut for us to crack is the how we shall convey this understanding and knowledge to the rest of us, especially when they on the contrary claim (assert) that there indeed is a "true tree of life", so that they can halt their vain and confusing search for it.

But, then again, maybe they actually understand the question and also know the answer, but don't see it as problem for their approach, but rather an advantage...? Its absence of a consistent solution does at east ensure the perpetual employment...

Against stupidity (like cladistics) do facts battle in vain

Cladistics was actually rejected before it emerged. Already in 1901, Bertrand Russell demonstrated that classification ultimately leads to paradox, which is the appraoch of Cladistics. The fact that Cladistics leads to paradox was thus known before Cladistcs emerged. Cladists thus ought to consider known facts before it claims that facts are wrong.

Against stupidity, like Cladistics, do facts battle in vain.

On the fundamental problem for Biological systematics

We (humans) invented concepts, and then started conceptualizing reality. The fundamental problem for this endeavor is that concepts (classification) is inherently orthogonal (see Russell's paradox), because it thereby lacks an unambiguous solution.This fact eventually led Biological systematics to Linné's consistent conceptualization of the biological diversity.

The German Nazi entomologist (ie, insect researcher) Willi Hennig did, however, take this endeavor one step further by starting to conceptualize conceptualization (later called Cladistics), as if conceptualization itself is the reality it conceptualizes instead of the reality. The problem with this step is simply that conceptualization isn't the reality it conceptualizes, but is instead in practice a paradox (see Russell's paradox). This step thus leads into barking up the wrong tree (or "jumping into crazy barrel", as we say in Sweden), or "screwing up matters", entering the back side of conceptualization where everything are up-side-down and contradictory.

Hennig did none the less get followers (called "cladists"), which took his step one step further by cutting off a return to the right "tree" (or "barrel") by boldly claiming (asserting) that this "tree" ("barrel") indeed IS the right "tree" ("barrel") and denying the right "tree" ("barrel"). It left the only way back to the right "tree" ("barrel") via a conceptualization of a conceptualization of a conceptualization of reality, which will take some time to find since it is a quite complicated track to follow. (Or by simply forgetting Cladistics).

The course of events above is actually just one more turn in Biological systematics' consistent tilting between the right "tree" (barrel"), also called "nominalism", and the wrong "tree" ("barrel"), also called "realism", due to its impossible fundamental aim to "find the true classification", which thus is a paradox. The discipline simply can't come to rest even concerning its fundamental approach, because there are always some biological systematists that don't understand this fundamental fact (ie, that the notion "a true classification" actually is a paradox). Instead, the discipline appears to remain a battle field for nominalism contra realism forever... (A "true classification" will it none the less never find).

Why doesn't universities inform presumptive students that biological systematics actually is a playhouse for fools?

When I entered biological systematics in university, I thought it was a stable science about living organisms. However, soon after I entered it, I discovered that it was not about living organisms at all, but about a paranoic sorting of types (ie, classes) into a "true tree of life". Why doesn't universities inform presumptive students that biological systematics actually is a playhouse for fools? (Bertrand Russell demonstrated that such a "true tree of life" is actually a paradox about a century ago. How on earth can this idea dominate biological systematics today?)

If cladists aren't stupid, then who is?

Cladists have turned conceptualization up-side-down.

It raises the question: if cladists aren't stupid, then who is?

Is race biology rational?

Biological systematics offers two diametrically opposed (ie, orthogonal) classifications: Linnean systematics and Cladistics (ie, the PhyloCode), whereof Linnean systematics is relative and the PhyloCode is absolute. It means that Linnean systematics combines typology (is, classification) of things with historical relationship between things (ie, ethnicity) using a compromise between these two attributes of things (under the assumption that the two attributes are diametrically opposed), whereas Cladistics on the contrary assumes as an axiom (actually claims) that these two attributes are not orthogonal, but instead consistent (and therefore don't have to be combined using a compromise). Linnean systematics thus assumes that typology is orthogonal to ethnicity, whereas Cladistics on the contrary assumes as an axiom (actually claims) that typology and ethnicity are consistent. It means that Cladistics is essential for race biology. Only iff typology is consistent with ethnicity (as Cladistics assumes, actually claims) is race biology rational.

So, is typology orthogonal to or consistent with ethnicity?

Cladistics claims that the answer to this question is not a matter of facts, but of premises. This claim means that typology can be both orthogonal to and consistent with ethnicity depending on which premises one chooses, ie, that the answer only depends on which answer one prefers. If this claim is true, then "orthogonal to" and "consistent with" are not opposites, but equalities, since the difference between them is not real. If so, then there isn't any difference between Linnean systematics and Cladistics at all, but instead they are just two different aspects on the same thing, ie, the true tree of life, whereof Linnean systematics merely is a redundant complication.

The problem for the Cladistic claim is that it is contradicted both theoretically and practically. Theoretically by Bertrand Russell's demonstration already a hundred years ago (1901) that classification is ultimately paradoxically contradictory, by meaning that the cladistic equalization of typology and etnicity ends in paradox, and practically by the fact that time is relative (ie, orthogonal) to space, by meaning that the Cladistic equalization of type and ethnicity is actually just a conflation of type and ethnicity. Type and ethnicity are factually not equal, but orthogonal.

The answer to the question above is thus that typology is orthogonal to ethnicity. Fortunately, it means that race biology is irrational. When we understand this fact, there is thus no return to the old race biology that Willi Hennig transferred from the Nazi approach to today's Cladistics. Then we can discard both it and Cladistics as resting on the old erroneous idea that ethnicity (ie, races, species, genera, and so on) necessarily also is typologically distinct, instead returning to the old and fundamental question in biological systematics: what is a species? Isn't this shift interesting, Gareth (Nelson)?

The problem with race biology is that also many of those that don't like it still believe in races. They would be better off if they could understand that belief in races itself is irrational..  

On the route into the consistently inconsistent reasoning that is called "cladistics"

Those biological systematists that are called cladists believe that there is a single true description of the origin of biodiversity, which they call "the true tree of life". Whether they also believe that there is a single true description of any other historical event, a single true painting of any part of reality, or a single true description of our the present reality is unknown, but the reason for this their obviously erroneous belief is known - that they believe that "species" are real.

Cladistics actually started with a discussion trying to find an answer to the question: what is a species? The answer to this question was sought after by trying to find a definition that encompasses everything they put into the concept "species". When this discussion had reached tens of different definitions, some of the biological systematists (ie, the cladists) simply changed focus from this question into the question: which is the true tree of life? The fact that this question requires an answer to the former question was dealt with by trying to define "species" post-hoc circularly in terms of the notion of a "true tree of life". This circularity led cladists into the erroneous belief in a "true tree of life" by simply shifting focus from one question to another without them even being aware of that it did. Once in the belief, they simply didn't know how to get out of it, because they didn't know how they got into it. They were simply stuck in the belief by lacking the understanding that could have kept them outside of it.

The original question was thus: what is a species? Now, this question is inconsistent by asking for what we actually decide. A species is simply what we say a species is. If we, for example, say that humans is a species, and define what we mean by "human", then humans is a species. It isn't more complicated than that. The (cladistic) idea that the question "what is a species?" has an answer rests on the assumption that species are real, ie, existing entities, like objects (eg, organisms), an assumption that, however, is inconsistent, since not both objects and species can be real at the same time by being orthogonal. If objects are real, then species are abstract, and vice versa. In conceptualization, there has to be a difference between "real" and "abstract" (ie, the represented and representation), and one of them has to be on the opposite side to the other to avoid self-contradiction. In a fundamental sense, it doesn't really matter whether we call objects or species real, but in a consistency sense, species can't, of course, be real if objects (eg, organisms) are abstract. Species can't consist of abstract entities, but abstract species can consist of real objects. This means that objects (eg, organisms) has to be real, and species has to be abstract to avoid inconsistency.

There is, however, a further problem with the concept species. Whereas an object is single both in reality and in abstraction, a species is a infinite in abstraction (ie, a type, or abstraction) and finite in reality (ie, a category). It means that assuming that species are real (and thus can be defined) conflates infinity with finity, which can't be practically accomplished, since infinity and finity are orthogonal. This imposibility composes a practical barrier to all attempts to define the concept species. No matter how "natural" we think that species are, we still will thus never succeed to define them. Instead, they are actually impossible to define.

We can thus describe the origin of biodiversity in terms of "the origin of species", but this description can never reach unambiguity, since species can't be unambiguous. Changing focus from the definition of species into "the true tree of life" does not change this fact, but just discards it. This discarding does thus not , however, change this fact, but just leads into the consistently inconsistent reasoning that cladistics is. 

How long will cladistics' belief in a single "true tree of live" survive within biological systematics?

The problem with cladistics is that it conflates states of things with change between states of things.

This conflation gives rise to the question: "why do we distinguish states of things and change if we then conflate them?", and, "which of all possible conflations of them equals them?".

Every possible conflation is namely also paradoxically contradictory (see Russell's paradox), so, how can we possibly ever agree on a particular conflation of them, when we can't even agree on the fact that it is a conflation of  states of things with change between states of things?

Now, if we can't possibly ever agree on a particular conflation of them, then we have to ask ourselves what we are doing and why. Our efforts will never result in any stable state, but will just give rise to new inconsistencies forever. This chase started from an axiomatic belief in a single "true tree of life", so when will we abandon this belief? After ten years, after one hundred years, after one thousand years, or never?

So, how long will cladistics' belief in a single "true tree of live" survive within biological systematics? (It will never die as an idea, but the question is how long it will survive in biological systematics). 

On the fundamental and everlasting split in humanity (especially obvious in biological systematics)

As soon as someone of us humans conceptualize reality (for example into ducks and geese), there is another of us humans that questions this conceptualization, asking what the concepts (ie, a duck and a goose) really is. It is just as if the pure reasoning about reality ignites a counterreasoning questioning what it is that the reasoning discusses.

This is the fundamental and everlasting split within humanity - classifying and questioning classification.This split is perhaps most obvious in biological systematics by ripping it apart into a fundamental and everlasting split between those that simply classify and those that search for classes.

This split can never be healed, because the two approaches are orthogonal, and there is no intermediate (neutral) truth between them to be found. There is actually nothing between them at all. Instead, they are all we have. The only possibility for an intermediate solution is a compromise between them in the form of an orthogonal system of classification like the Linnean systematics.

Our choice is thus between eternal split or compromise (in the form of an orthogonal system of classification). The option of an unambiguous truth, like Higg's boson or the true tree of life, is simply not given. These solutions can only be almost correct, that is, totally wrong. The problem is actually extremely simple, but the reasonings about it can be extremely complex. The problem is that we search for a solution that is not to be found. Its place is simply void. .       

On the belief of cladistics

Those biological systematists called cladists believe, actually claim, that there is a single true classification of biological organisms to be found, although Bertrand Russell demonstrated about a century ago that classification leads to paradox. This imagined "single true classification" is thus actually a paradox, independently of what cladists claim, and thus nothing that can be found. A paradox is a contradiction and thus not something that can be found.

Cladists' claim has, however, created confusion in biological systematics. Biological systematists are no longer sure of what they're doing. Take for example a cod, is it surely a cod or in specific question? What does biological systematics assume and know, respectively?

The belief of cladistics has thus really messed things up in biological systematics. This mess is thus due to an exchange of understanding with belief, probably due to to a lack of understanding. Where the understanding ends takes the belief at.  

Conceptualization and the contrary, ie, cladistics

We (humans) conceptualize the reality we perceive using a tool composed of three components: objects (aka entities), infinite classes (aka imaginary types) and finite classes (aka categories). We perform conceptualization by distinguishing objects and allocating them to finite classes using infinite classes. In this process, infinite classes functions as a catalyst for allocation of objects into categories. The only requirement of conceptualization is that we keep objects, infinite classes and finite classes consistently apart, because if we don't, then we confuse conceptualization itself by conflating them.

However, there is an inconsistency internally in conceptualization in the concept of "the finite class of all finite classes" (ie, the category of all categories) residing in the definitional fact that finite classes (ie, categories) are not single objects, but several objects, whereas the notion of "the finite class of all finite classes" is a single object consisting of several finite classes and thus both (ie, paradoxically contradictory between) an object and a finite class, that is, a single object and several objects. This notion is thus empty per definition by being both an object and a class at the same time, that is, a paradox (ie, Russell's paradox).

The German Nazi entomologist Willi Hennig did, however, turn this fact up-side-down by comprehending the finite class of all finite classes as "the only natural group". The problem with this comprehension is thus that it is inconsistent (ie, paradoxically contradictory). He (and others) may thus comprehend this "group" as "the only natural group", but neither he nor others can ever pinpoint this "group" without contradiction, because it is paradoxically contradictory per definition. If it hadn't been, then it could also have had an ancestor.

Willi Hennig and his followers (ie, cladists) obviously think that finite classes are real instead of objects, which leads them to conflation of "finite class" with "infinite class", and thus to conflation of conceptualization itself. Instead of conceptualizing reality, they, obviously, search for "the true" conceptualized reality, which in practice is their own conceptualization of reality, whichever it is, but paradoxically contradictory per definition.

This spin around the internal inconsistency of conceptualization can only be halted by considering what we talk about (ie, objects, like humans, or classes, like human).

Can cladists back off from their claim with their honor intact?

Bertrand Russell demonstrated in 1901 that naive set theory leads to paradox.

This demonstration made Ernst Zermelo (1908) propose an axiomatization of set theory that avoids this paradox by replacing arbitrary set comprehension with weaker existence axioms, such as his axiom of separation (Aussonderung). Later modifications to this axiomatization proposed in the 1920s by Abraham Fraenkel, Thoralf Skolem, and by Zermelo himself resulted in the axiomatic set theory called ZFC. This theory was initially controversial, but became widely accepted once Zermelo's axiom of choice ceased to be controversial, and has since then remained the canonical axiomatic set theory down to the present day.

The German Nazi entomologist Willi Hennig did, however, ignore both Russell's demonstration, Zemelo et al's avoidance of this paradox  and ZFC, when he in 1955 instead simply claimed that "only monophyletic groups [in effect Russell's paradox] appear to be natural groups". Hennig thus didn't consider the scientific discussion about Russell's paradox, which also confused biological systematists at the time since Darwin had presentated his theory "on the origin of species", but simply claimed that only this paradox appears to be natural groups. In spite of this Hennig's omission, his claim gave rise to the approach in biological systematics that today is called "cladistics", and which also today is searching for this paradox. This approach has thus totally missed the fact that naive set theory leads to paradox (as well as the scientific discussion about this fact).

The question now is thus: who in the world can explain to cladists that Hennig was ignorant about the discussion about monophyly (ie, Russell's paradox) when he made his claim that "only monophyletic groups [ie, Russell's paradox] appear to be natural groups". And, can cladists withdraw their claim at all (which is more of a belief than a claim)? Can cladists back off with their honor intact?

Closer than the Linnean system can classification not come to reality

Classification can only be either ambiguous or paradoxically contradictory. It is ambiguous if we use an orthogonal system like Linnean systematics, and paradoxically contradictory if not. The reason for this fact is that classification ultimately is paradoxically contradictory, which Bertrand Russell demonstrated with Russell's paradox in 1901. It means that classification can't reach unambiguity at all. It doesn't matter what we do, never will it reach unambiguity.

This fact has cladistics, ie, Willi Hennig, turned up-side-down into a notion that classification indeed can reach unambiguity in the form of a single true tree of life. This notion is thus wrong. It can't. Classification can't reach unambiguity.Instead, this notion is just an empty belief like the belief in Creation. The two are just as empty, although believing in different contradictions. Linné's system is actually the ambiguous belance between all such contradictory beliefs. Closer than it can classification not come to reality.

What can a species possibly be?

Ever since the dawn of Biological systematics, it has discussed what a "species" is. This fundamental problem appears to concern how we shall specify a consistent and unambiguous kind of group of organsisms, but does actually concern how we shall overcome the fact that such a kind of group is a definitional contradiction. Such a kind of group consists of both single species and single organisms at the same time, and is thus consistent only if species equal organisms, which are not groups, but single organisms. The problem is thus not how we shall specify a consistent and unambiguous kind of group of organsisms, but that we can't.

Rather than asking the question what a species is, we thus ought to ask the question why we can't specify what a "species" is, which is answered by the conclusion above. This answer does not, however, suffice to those biological systematists that ask the question what a species is. It does not even qualify as an alternative among the possible answers to their question. "Nothing" is not an acceptable answer to them.

Carl von Linné  partly overcame this problem by constructing an orthogonal system of classification wherein species is consistent in relation to genera, and genera is consistent in relation to species. This system did not solve the fundamental problem that reality is distinct from our conceptualization of it, ie, that the relation between the two can't be unambiguous, but only the problem of consistency.

A later approach in biological systematics called Cladistics instead "solved" this problem by simply asuming as an axiom that we indeed can specify what species are, in the form of a single true tree of life. This solution did not, however, actually solve the problem, but merely transfered it into finding the single true tree of life, which, thus, is a definitional impossibility. Such thing is simply impossible per definition. Another approach in biological systematics called Evolutionary taxonomy adopted Linné's system and was thus at least consistent, although ambiguous.

However, in a fundamental battle in biological systematics in the 1980-ies, biological systematists downvoted Evolutionary systematics in favor for Cladistics. The outcome of this battle tilted biological systematics up-side-down from being a scientific discipline into being a belief in a single true tree of life. It simply expelled scientific thinking from biological systematics. (This was the time I entered biological systematics (in the beginning of the 90-ies). Unfortunately, I was thus expelled from biological systematics in the moment I paid for entering it. I didn't get in before I was out. Not yielding for a belief in a single true tree of life effectively excluded me from getting any position at any academy. This belief was the ticket of entrance to positions. Since then, I have been referred to expressing my protests against this belief to media that is not governed by cladists, also excluding Wikipedia (which is governed by cladists)). Today, biological systematics is thus dominated by Cladistics, although Cladistics is paradoxically contradictory. You can thus get a position at any academy if you search for a paradox, but not if you say that Cladistics is a search for a paradox. Paranoia is acceptable, but not stating that it is a paranoia.

Ultimately, cladistics is doomed to eternal splitting (like the species it believes in are), on the contrary to Linnean systematics, because a house can only stand firmly on a consistent ground, like Linnean systematics. Belief in eternal splitting does, of course, lead to eternal splitting.