On the problem for cladistics

Cladists claim that only groups consisting of an ancestor and its descendants are "natural groups". However, if there is a finite number of members of such groups, then there must be an infinite number of such groups, and vice versa, because if the number of both is finite, then at least one such group is a paradox (ie, Russell's paradox).

Cladists thus have to pass the insurmountable barrier between finity and infinity, ie, resolve Russell's paradox, to realize their claim, ie, find the true tree of life. Does anyone dare to bet that they will succeed in a limited time frame?

No, cladistics is actually the worst error we can make, that is, to conflate object with class. It is not only stupid, but as stupid as we can possibly be. It is the opposite to sense, that is, nonsense. It actually marks the beginning of the end for science unless it is clearly dismissed by scientists.

The explanation of why there isn't any single ultimate truth

The problem with finding a single ultimate truth does not reside in reasoning, but in classification. The problem is that there isn't any both internally consistent and externally unambiguous (ie, with regard to reality) classification. Instead, there are only internally inconsistent (ie, paradoxically contradictory) and externally ambiguous classifications (like cladistics and Linnean systematics, respectively).

It means that we can think forever without finding any single ultimate truth. There simply isn't any to find. There thus isn't any "single true tree of life" as cladists claim, nor any "Higgs particle" as particle physicists claim. Instead, the idea that there is such a single ultimate truth is a fundamental misunderstanding of conceptualization, called (class)-realism, ie, the belief that classes are real. This idea is actually the only conceptual construction that conceptualization excludes. Every attempt to formulate such a "truth" will thus be either paradoxically contradictory or contradicted by facts.

The idea of a single ultimate truth is thus like the carrot in front of the donkey's eyes - a practical illusion.

         

On The Truth

If objects are real (like you and me), and if objects consist of objects (like how we consist of cells), then there is no smallest object, since every object consists of other objects, and there neither is a largest object, since every object is a part of a larger object.

If, on the other hand, kinds of objects are real (like humans), then there are no objects (like you and me), since the kind of all kinds consists of several objects (see Russell's paradox).

Neither objects nor kinds of objects are thus real, and both of them can't neither be real, since they contradict each other.

This fact may leave us in despair, but have faith - life continues independently of whether objects or kinds are real. Science is overrated. It can't deliever The Truth, but can just manipulate reality, just as rhetoric just can manipulate what we think about reality. None of them can deliever The Truth. Instead, "The Truth" is actually a paradox.

This is the reality we have to face. Do what you prefer with it.

Belief in a single truth is the problem for science

The fundamental problem with conceptualization of reality is that both reality and conceptualization of it are orthogonal, and that they (ie, reality and conceptualization of it) are mutually orthogonal, because it means that conceptuazation can only reach either ambiguity in relation to reality or paradoxical contradiction within itself - the former does it reach when it's internally consistent (eg, using ZFC), and latter does it reach when it's inconsistent (eg, using naive set theory). This problem does thus mean that it can't reach both consistency within conceptualization and unambiguity in relation to reality (at the same time).

Assertiing the contrary (ie, that it can reach both consistency within conceptualization and unambiguity in relation to reality) eg, cladistics, does thus actually lead to paradoxical contradiction.

Asserting that it has reached the contrary (eg, has found Higgs particles, is thus contradicted by facts (eg, the fact that time is relative with speed in space, and that there are anti-materia).

The idea of a single consistent AND unambiguous conceptualization of reality is what we intuitively call The Truth (unlike "truth" within conceptualization, ie, logical truth). Such a single "Truth" is thus not possible to reach due to the practical obstacles explained above, but fundamentally due to that conceptualization distinguishes itself from the reality it discusses. The idea of such a single "Truth" is thus not different from the old idea of a God - it is clearly irrational, but can't be wiped out from our minds.

It means that conceptualization of reality is fundamentally a quagmire from which many of us flee into a belief in something, may it be a God or "The Truth", because those of us can't stand the thought of being left on a quagmire. A true atheist, however, accepts the fact that he/she is left on a quagmire and do the best he/she can under the circumstances. It is the pure relativist approach - the only rational approach.

Belief in a single truth in science (which can be called science-ism), like cladistics and Higgs particle-ism, has the major disadvantage of including race biology (apart from being irrational). As a true atheist, I thus strongly argue against this extremism of science. Science is rational and practically useful, but belief in a single truth is irrational, actually paradoxically contradictory. This belief is thus actually both the driving force for, the "black hole" of and the main enemy to science..

There simply are no "true tree of life" or Higgs particles"

When we discuss reality, we have only two fundamentally different approaches to reality to choose between:

1. to accept that reality is infinitely changing (ie, nominalism - the basis of knowledge), or

2. to change infinitely (ie, class-realism - the basis of belief).

Option 1 means that we can reach consistency in reasoning (as with ZFC), whereas option 2 means that we will be consistently inconsistent.

However, the possible consistency of option 1 is ambiguous, because there are always more than one solution of any particular problem, whereas the consistent inconsistency of option 2 is invisible for those that choose this option, because it resides between assumption and conclusion in logical reasoning. Together, these facts thus mean that if we want to discuss reality, we can only choose between being either ambiguous or contradictory.

These facts are problematic for "science" in a loose sense (ie, not distinguishing between knowledge and belief), because they mean that the dream of an unambiguous and non-contradictory description of reality is an impossibility.We simply can't find an unambiguous and non-contradictory description of reality.

It means that the assertions that there is a "true tree of life" by cladists and that there are "Higgs particles" by particle physicists are wrong. There simply are no such things. 

The problem with the notion of a difference between clades and paraphyletic groups (ie, cladistics)

The notion of a difference between clades (aka holophyletic groups) and paraphyletic groups (an approach called "cladistics") is that in the context of continuity, clades include "all" from a particular moment in time till today, whereas paraphyletic groups only includes "some" from a particular moment in time till today.

The problem with this difference is, however, "all" and "some" of what? This problem is moreover insoluble, since every suggestion is inconsistent. The reason is that the concept "paraphyletic group" actually is orthogonal (ie, diametrically opposed) to the concept "clade", meaning that a single clade (thing) is two paraphyletic things. The members of clades and paraphyletic groups thus simply can't be of the same kind, ie, the distinction of them is inconsistent. Instead, it is actually a distinction of the general from the specific in a general sense and thereby in practice ending in the paradox we call Russell's paradox (but which cladists call "the tree of life"). It actually enters the paradox that the Linnean system avoids by its distinction of genera and species.

This problem means that the notion of a difference between clades (aka holophyletic groups) and paraphyletic groups (an approach called "cladistics") in practice lacks a consistent solution, but instead leads into an infinite recursion (ie, infinite loop), which is both a search for the tree of life and the tree of life at the same time (ie, the process is indistinguishable from its goal).

On the problem with our search for a truth about reality

The problem with our search for a truth about reality is that reality isn't constant, but changing. We can't find a single truth about reality because in the moment we find it, it is not true. Chasing a truth is like chasing the running point, because the truth is running. 

Logic is not a way to truth, but a way to find empirical tests of claimed truths

The fact that conceptualization only contains two abstractions: objects and classes, means that there are also only two principally different logical lines of reasoning: 1. assuming that objects are real, traditionally called objectivity and nominalism, and 2. assuming that classes are real, traditionally called subjectivity and class-realism.

Both of these ultimately end in one and the same paradox, ie, Russell's paradox, as Bertrand Russell demonstrated in 1901, but they comprehend the paradox differently. Objectivity comprehends it as a general paradox with many specific applications (as Bertrand Russell did), whereas subjectivity comprehends it as one (out of many possible) specific class of objects that moreover is real (like the "true tree of life" of cladistics and "Higgs particle" of particle physics). Objectivity thus comprehends it (ie, Russell's paradox) as one generic abstraction consisting of many specific abstractions, whereas subjectivity comprehends is as one (out of many) real paradoxes.

The reason for this difference is that objectivity as "basic research", ie, lacking a particular question, actually searches for the primordial object it actually assumes (as an axiom), which thus is a general paradox consisting of several specific paradoxes, whereas subjectivity as "basic research" actually searches for the primordial class it actually assumes, which thus are several possible specific paradoxes.

The practical difference between them is thus that objectivity comprehends paradoxes as abstract, whereas subjectivity comprehends them as real  So, which is right? Are paradoxes abstract or real? Well, since paradoxes actually in a general sense is a conflation of object with class (which Bertrand Russell demonstrated), the question is actually whether a distinction or a conflation of object with class (ie, objectivity or subjectivity) is right. The answer is thus obvious: if a conflation of them is right, then a distinction of them is wrong, but without a distinction of them, there is nothing to conflate. A conflation of them is thus wrong independently of whether it is right or wrong.

All this is actually just a play with words. The problem, as Bertrand Russell demonstrated, is that logic can only answer questions. As a "basic research" it just rotates around its fundamental ortogonality between object and class, with a "natural" end point in Russell's paradox. Logic does not contain any "truths" in itself, but does just lead to the answer that is logically given by its assumptions (ie, premises), which thus is an abstract paradox. Never will we thus find "The Truth" by logical reasoning. The only practical use of logic is to find empirical tests of statements, which indeed can be either true or false in relation to competing statements. Running around in the treadmill of logic is actually just a play with words (although it may be awarded with the Nobel Prize as witnessed by the claimed empirical verification of the paradox "Higgs particle"), which thus consistently is exchanged with totally different claims. It simply lacks non-contradictory claims.

Logic is definitely not a way to find truths, but just a way to find empirical tests of claimed truths. In itself, it is fundamentally paradoxically contradictory and totally lacking possibilities to distinguish truths from lies by lacking possibilities to distingush true premises from false premises. It can actually arrive to contradictory conclusions, as in the case of Linnean systematics versus cladistics, because these two approaches rest on ortogonal premises, ie, objectivity and subjectivity, respectively-.

The question of a possible "true tree of life" and the answer to it

The reason why there isn't any unambiguous classification to be found, such as the idea of "a true tree of life" that cladistics rests on, is that classification is ultimately paradoxically contradictory, which we can understand from the fact that classification is orthogonal and which Bertrand Russell also demonstrated with his "Barber's paradox".

It means that the question of a possible "true tree of life" is not about reality (ie, an existential question), ie, whether there is a "true tree of life or not", but about methodology (ie, a practical question), ie, whether we can describe the history of biodiversity in the form of a consistent "true tree" or not, and the answer is thus "not". This is actually the reason why Linné invented his consistent orthogonal system of classification.

There are thus some of us that understand the question of a possible "true tree of life" and also know the answer to it, the nut for us to crack is the how we shall convey this understanding and knowledge to the rest of us, especially when they on the contrary claim (assert) that there indeed is a "true tree of life", so that they can halt their vain and confusing search for it.

But, then again, maybe they actually understand the question and also know the answer, but don't see it as problem for their approach, but rather an advantage...? Its absence of a consistent solution does at east ensure the perpetual employment...

Against stupidity (like cladistics) do facts battle in vain

Cladistics was actually rejected before it emerged. Already in 1901, Bertrand Russell demonstrated that classification ultimately leads to paradox, which is the appraoch of Cladistics. The fact that Cladistics leads to paradox was thus known before Cladistcs emerged. Cladists thus ought to consider known facts before it claims that facts are wrong.

Against stupidity, like Cladistics, do facts battle in vain.

On the fundamental problem for Biological systematics

We (humans) invented concepts, and then started conceptualizing reality. The fundamental problem for this endeavor is that concepts (classification) is inherently orthogonal (see Russell's paradox), because it thereby lacks an unambiguous solution.This fact eventually led Biological systematics to Linné's consistent conceptualization of the biological diversity.

The German Nazi entomologist (ie, insect researcher) Willi Hennig did, however, take this endeavor one step further by starting to conceptualize conceptualization (later called Cladistics), as if conceptualization itself is the reality it conceptualizes instead of the reality. The problem with this step is simply that conceptualization isn't the reality it conceptualizes, but is instead in practice a paradox (see Russell's paradox). This step thus leads into barking up the wrong tree (or "jumping into crazy barrel", as we say in Sweden), or "screwing up matters", entering the back side of conceptualization where everything are up-side-down and contradictory.

Hennig did none the less get followers (called "cladists"), which took his step one step further by cutting off a return to the right "tree" (or "barrel") by boldly claiming (asserting) that this "tree" ("barrel") indeed IS the right "tree" ("barrel") and denying the right "tree" ("barrel"). It left the only way back to the right "tree" ("barrel") via a conceptualization of a conceptualization of a conceptualization of reality, which will take some time to find since it is a quite complicated track to follow. (Or by simply forgetting Cladistics).

The course of events above is actually just one more turn in Biological systematics' consistent tilting between the right "tree" (barrel"), also called "nominalism", and the wrong "tree" ("barrel"), also called "realism", due to its impossible fundamental aim to "find the true classification", which thus is a paradox. The discipline simply can't come to rest even concerning its fundamental approach, because there are always some biological systematists that don't understand this fundamental fact (ie, that the notion "a true classification" actually is a paradox). Instead, the discipline appears to remain a battle field for nominalism contra realism forever... (A "true classification" will it none the less never find).

There is only one way to truth: to admit when you are wrong

There is only one way to truth: to admit when you're wrong. This is the scientific way.

On the fundamental and everlasting split in humanity (especially obvious in biological systematics)

As soon as someone of us humans conceptualize reality (for example into ducks and geese), there is another of us humans that questions this conceptualization, asking what the concepts (ie, a duck and a goose) really is. It is just as if the pure reasoning about reality ignites a counterreasoning questioning what it is that the reasoning discusses.

This is the fundamental and everlasting split within humanity - classifying and questioning classification.This split is perhaps most obvious in biological systematics by ripping it apart into a fundamental and everlasting split between those that simply classify and those that search for classes.

This split can never be healed, because the two approaches are orthogonal, and there is no intermediate (neutral) truth between them to be found. There is actually nothing between them at all. Instead, they are all we have. The only possibility for an intermediate solution is a compromise between them in the form of an orthogonal system of classification like the Linnean systematics.

Our choice is thus between eternal split or compromise (in the form of an orthogonal system of classification). The option of an unambiguous truth, like Higg's boson or the true tree of life, is simply not given. These solutions can only be almost correct, that is, totally wrong. The problem is actually extremely simple, but the reasonings about it can be extremely complex. The problem is that we search for a solution that is not to be found. Its place is simply void. .       

Can cladists back off from their claim with their honor intact?

Bertrand Russell demonstrated in 1901 that naive set theory leads to paradox.

This demonstration made Ernst Zermelo (1908) propose an axiomatization of set theory that avoids this paradox by replacing arbitrary set comprehension with weaker existence axioms, such as his axiom of separation (Aussonderung). Later modifications to this axiomatization proposed in the 1920s by Abraham Fraenkel, Thoralf Skolem, and by Zermelo himself resulted in the axiomatic set theory called ZFC. This theory was initially controversial, but became widely accepted once Zermelo's axiom of choice ceased to be controversial, and has since then remained the canonical axiomatic set theory down to the present day.

The German Nazi entomologist Willi Hennig did, however, ignore both Russell's demonstration, Zemelo et al's avoidance of this paradox  and ZFC, when he in 1955 instead simply claimed that "only monophyletic groups [in effect Russell's paradox] appear to be natural groups". Hennig thus didn't consider the scientific discussion about Russell's paradox, which also confused biological systematists at the time since Darwin had presentated his theory "on the origin of species", but simply claimed that only this paradox appears to be natural groups. In spite of this Hennig's omission, his claim gave rise to the approach in biological systematics that today is called "cladistics", and which also today is searching for this paradox. This approach has thus totally missed the fact that naive set theory leads to paradox (as well as the scientific discussion about this fact).

The question now is thus: who in the world can explain to cladists that Hennig was ignorant about the discussion about monophyly (ie, Russell's paradox) when he made his claim that "only monophyletic groups [ie, Russell's paradox] appear to be natural groups". And, can cladists withdraw their claim at all (which is more of a belief than a claim)? Can cladists back off with their honor intact?

On conceptualization, and Linnean systematics versus cladistics

If we conceptualize reality using single entities as starting points, then there is just one statement that can't be true: that classes are real, because conceptualization allocates single entities into abstract categories (ie, finite classes) via classes (ie, infinite classes, or types), and if it could, then single entities would instead be abstract, ie, it would tilt reality and conceptualization up-side-down.

This fact, ie, that this statement can't be true, is shown by that any such claim is either ambiguous between classes and categories, like the Linnean system is, or paradoxically contradictory between different classes, like cladistics is.

We can thus produce a compromise between reality and conceptualization, like Linnean systematics, or tilt reality and conceptualization up-side-down, like cladistics, but we can't fuse reality and conceptualization unambiguously, ie, truthfully. We can't, for example, describe a process unambiguously, ie, truthfully, but can just represent it in different aspects. The Unambiguous Aspect is simply lacking.

This is a fact we just have to accept. If a bucket is empty, then it is empty. We can't fill it with words. There is thus no such thing as a "true tree of life" (or Higg's boson for that sake). It would have been perfect if there had been one (or a category of Higg's bosons), but, unfortunately, there isn't. Entities are real, but neither a true tree of life, Higg's bosons, nor any other kind of entities, sorry to say, but only entities. These entities can't, sorry to say, be unambiguously allocated into any kind(s) of entities. Ultimately we are unambiguously left with just entities. We can discuss them, but we can't nail them. A single entity, like me and you, will never be unambiguously nailed to any category. This is a pain in the ass for typologists like race biologists, but it is a blessing for the rest of us.

No, no, reality isn't both continuous and particular at the same time (as cladistics wrongly has got it)

Cladistics has obviously understood that reality is both continuous and particular in our conceptualization of it, but wrongly thinks that it is both at the same time (ie, conflates class with entity). Turned this way, conceptualization is actually paradoxically contradictory, ie, in practice infinitely recursive, which also Russell's paradox shows.

No, continuity and particularity has to be comprehended as two aspects of reality (arising with our conceptualization of reality), whereof continuity logically is situated either between or extending over particularity, but definitely not simultaneous, since it is paradoxically contradictory (ie, in practice infinitely recursive). Moreover, if reality indeed should have been infinitely recursive, as cladists obviously think it is, then change, like the process of dichotomous propagation that cladists "only acknowledge", should actually have been impossible. Cladistics is thus not only a fundamental misunderstanding, but also fundamentally self-contradictory.  

On the vain battle for cladistics

The fact that our conceptualization of reality separates reality from our conceptualization of reality means that conceptualization creates an artificial rift between reality and our conceptualization of it, which we call Russell's paradox. This rift (ie, Russell's paradox), in turn, is actually an orthogonal cube interface between reality and our conceptualization of it having two facets (or aspects): subjectivity and objectivity, whereof subjectivity is paradoxically contradictory and thus ultimately the inverse of a paradoxical contradiction, that is, an infinite recursion, and objectivity is consistently ambiguous. It means that our conceptualization of reality leaves us with two options: (1) paradoxical contradiction ultimately ending up in infinite recursion (ie, subjectivity), or (2) consistent ambiguity (ie, objectivity). This is the setting of conceptualization that we have to relate to.

Cladists are trying to make this fundamental choice between subjectivity and objectivity into an existential question, ie, concerning whether a particular kind of group (ie, clades, or genera with their species) "are natural groups" or not, but this focus is actually just a diversion. The problem is, instead, that such "natural groups" in fact are ultimately paradoxically contradictory. This problem does not, however, reside in the "natural groups" themselves, but in that they are inconsistent, ie, that they don't break even. Our fundamental choice is thus not an existential question between whether a particular kind of group "are natural groups" or not, but instead the much less dramatical choice of whether we prefer subjectivity or objectivity (ie, paradoxical contradiction or consistent ambiguity). Those that choose subjectivity just have a tendency to fall into existential arguments.

Biological systematics perceives itself as having the task of finding the natural classification of biological organisms. Given Russell's paradox, this task is  however, indeed mission impossible, since this paradox shows that there is no such natural classification to be found, ie, that the idea itself is practically void. The question whether biological systematics will ever accept this fact is, however, written in the stars. Presently, it is doing all it can to deny it. It battles for its existential aim, although Russell (among others) already has discarded it. Cladists are thus fighting a vain battle for the idea that there is a consistent meeting point between subjectivity and objectivity, ie, a "natural" classification, although Russell's paradox has already shown that this idea is practically void. Why continue this hopeless battle? 

Cladistics looses itself in the fogs of simplicity

When we classify reality, there are only two aspects we have to keep consistently apart: reality and the abstract (ie, object and class), to keep reality and our perception of it consistently apart. In doing so, there is one aspect we misses, the middle. There simply is no place for a middle between reality and our perception of it. It means that classification can't pinpoint reality unambiguously.

If we, like cladists, instead claim that classification indeed can pinpoint reality consistently, then we actually claim that there is no difference between reality and the abstract, and thus that there is a middle between reality and the abstract.

If there indeed is a middle between reality and the abstract, then there is no reason to partition our perception of reality into reality and our perception of reality, and thus that reality is what we think it is.

If reality is what we think it is, then the question is: what who thinks it is? We can, obviously, disagree about both what reality is and what history is, so which comprehension is correct? If the answer is the most parsimonious comprehension, then the most generalizing perception is right. The notion thus turns simplicity into a virtue. Knowledge is in this approach only a burden. The boldest painting of reality in only black and white wins. The approach thus looses itself in the fogs of simplicity.   

Conceptualization (classification) is a tool that can only be ambiguous or paradoxically contradictory

Conceptualization (classification) is a tool that can only be ambiguous or paradoxically contradictory. It is ambiguous in relation to the classified if it rests on the axiom that objects are real (ie, objectivity), and it is internally paradoxically contradictory if it rests on the axiom that concepts (classes) are real (ie, subjectivity).

It means that we can't say something that isn't ambiguous or paradoxically contradictory, ie, unambiguous, at all. The question whether there is a single truth to be found or not does thus have the answer no, simply because it is impossible using the only tool we have.

The reason for this answer is, however, not the tool itself, but that unambiguity is an impossibility (ie, a void) in a changing world. There's nothing wrong with conceptualization (classification) itself; it just can't create the single truth we want. It is still a very useful tool if we use it consistently, that is, resting on the axiom that objects, not classes, are real. Using it resting on the axiom that concepts (classes) are real, like cladistics, is actually a misuse of it. Science is, as also cladistics indeed claim, a practice to optimize the fit between our models of reality and reality itself, but we have to remember that optimization always is second to reality itself, on the contrary to what cladistics claim. There is no reason to assume that reality itself is optimized. Instead, optimization must always be a matter of optimizing the fit between our models and the facts of reality, as traditional science does, not optimizing the models themselves, as cladistics does.

We must, however, abandon our paradoxically contradictory idea that there is a single truth, like The Tree of Life, to be found, and instead acknowledge the fact that there isn't. Understanding is superior to belief in painting reality, because it does in any case close up on the most accurate painting of reality. Painting reality is moreover not only a matter of black and white, but of Plato's three-folded division in his geometrical (or mathematical) atomism, wherein perfection is ultimately reduced to geometry (ie, to the world of ideas), which we today know is paradoxically contradictory (ie, Russell's paradox). However, this world is thus not a perfect reality of forms, as Plato claimed and cladists claim, since it is paradoxically contradictory, but instead a paradoxically contradictory mind construction which ultimately depends on the real, but changing, objects.

Conceptualization (classification) is thus a tool that can help us understand reality, but it can't produce a single truth. The belief that it can, ie, cladism, is indeed visionary, but wrong. It does thus not lead to a single truth, but only to a conceptual mess. If we want to keep thoughts clear, we have to abandon vision and accept facts, for example that conceptualization (classification) is a tool that can only be ambiguous or paradoxically contradictory. It is perhaps sad, but a fact. 

On the fundamental problem of conceptualization, and cladistics

The fundamental problem of conceptualization is that reality in every moment is ambiguous between generics and specifics (which we call "process" and "pattern", respectively).

This problem means that if we assume that reality actually is unambiguous in every moment, then only one of them (ie, generics or specifics) can be real in a generic sense, whereas the other instead has to be paradoxically contradictory (ie, ambiguous between specific instances of the other). The only alternative is to assume that reality is ambiguous.

Now, whereas specifics rationally can be ambiguous between generics (it is just instances of different entities of a kind, or of different kinds of a specific kind), generics rationally can't be ambiguous between specifics, since it is instances of paradoxical contradiction.

It means that we have to interpret reality in terms of specifics and generics to resolve the fundamental ambiguity of reality, and of these, specifics rationally have to be considered real whereas generics thus have to be paradoxically contradictory. This solution means that conceptualization has to be ambiguous in relation to reality.

The only alternative is to assume that reality is ambiguous (as we concluded above), but since this alternative in a conceptual sense conflates specifics with generics, it is actually paradoxically contradictory in a conceptual sense.

Together, these facts mean that talking about reality in itself excludes the option to be unambiguous. Instead, they leave us with the only options to be either (1) consistent (nominalism) or (2) consistently inconsistent (realism), whereof the former is ambiguous in relation to reality and the latter is paradoxically contradictory.

Cladistics actually chooses the alternative to assume that reality is ambiguous, although the ambiguity is disguised as "unambiguous processes" (ie, clades), and does thus land in paradoxical contradiction. The meaning of this "paradoxical contradiction" is just that it is consistently contradictory (ie, can't escape contradiction).