Conceptualization and Higgs' particle-ism

There are particles, waves and fields, wherof fields are particles of waves. It means that if we want to close (ie, conflate) this trichotomy,then we have to conflate fields with waves, because this conflation is not obviously inconsistent although it also conflates waves with particles. The conflation is thus not a direct circularity, but an indirect circularity.

This is exactly what Higgs' particleism does. It conflates what conceptualization distinguishes, just as if such a conflation of concepts can reach a truth beyond conceptualization, when it actually just reaches the basis for the conceptualization, which is Russell's paradox. It means that Higgs' particle-ism acknowledges a paradox instead of acknowledging that it is a paradox, thereby entering a belief in a paradox.  Higgs' particle-ism is thus a belief in a paradox.

    

More wrong than cladistics is impossible to be

The old idea of ​​a single "true tree of life", today providing the foundation for Cladistics, confronts the two fundamentally different approaches in our conceptualization of reality: realism (ie, assuming that classes are real) and nominalism (ie, assuming that objects are real). The fundamental problem for our conceptualization of reality is namely that not both classes and objects can be real at the same time, since they can't fuse. This problem can be analogized with that not both reality and a map of reality can be real at the same time, since they can't fuse. Confronted with this fundamental choice between classes (ie, map) and objects (ie reality), realism (ie, cladistics) thus claims (asserts) that there indeed is a single "true tree of life" (ie, claims that there indeed is a single "true" map of reality), whereas nominalism denies the existence of such a single "true tree of life" (ie, comprehends reality as reality).

So, which of them do you think is right: realism claiming that map is reality or nominalism comprehending reality as reality?  The answer appears obvious (at least to me). realism's claim that map is reality is obviously wrong when it is confronted with the fact that reality is reality. 

It was realists that set up this confrontation with nominalism by their claim that there indeed is a single "true tree of life", which they thus obviously lose (ie, there isn't any "true tree of life". Their claim thus appears like a pink elephant that they claim can fly. The problem with this claim is that there are no pink elephants, and even if there had been, they wouldn't have been able to fly. The claim is thus totally wrong, more wrong than that is actually impossible to be.

The problem for biological systematics is thus how it shall explain to cladists that they are wrong. Whether cladists understand that they're wrong or not does not, however, matter, since they are wrong anyway.A failure to explain to cladists that they're wrong is thus a failure for biological systematics. It leaves biological systematics as a dream that there are pink elephants that can fly.
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On the idea of a "true tree of life, and the problem with Cladistics for biological systeatics

The reason why there isn't any "true tree of life" is that classification is ultimately paradoxically contradictory, as Bertrand Russell demonstrated with Russell's paradox already in 1901.

This fact means that the question of a "true tree of life" is not a question about reality, ie, which the "true tree of life" is, but about modeling reality, ie, whether we can describe the history of organisms in terms of a consistent "true tree of life" or not, and the answer is thus "not".

The problem with Cladistics is thus that it misunderstands the question of a "true tree of life" fundamentally as a question about reality, when it actually is about modeling reality consistently, and that it thereby can't understand the answer that there isn't any "true tree of life", because it misunderstands this answer as an existential claim (assertion), when it actually is just a conclusion on our possibilities to model reality consistently. The answer merely concludes that there isn't any "true tree of life" because this model is paradoxically contradictory, since a paradoxical contradiction is not one, but many . (Cladists don't comprehend the notion of "trees of life" as a model of reality, but as a single reality, ie, The True Tree of Life).

This cladistic inability to understand the context means that Cladistics searches for something that can't be found, This search is, of course, their own business, but one question is why Swedish tax payers shall sponsor this vain search on Swedish universities? Why shall they sponsor a search for a pink elefant when their money can be used for many more sensible purposes? Another question is whether this inability to understand shall be allowed to be taught in Swedish universities at all? There may be students that do understand the context, and what will the "teachers" do with them? In such a case, the student actually ought to teach the teacher, but since cladists are not susceptible to anticladistic arguments, such intelligent students will thus be excluded from the universities. There are thus major problems with having cladists on universities. But, who can clear them out?

Conceptualization and the contrary, ie, cladistics

We (humans) conceptualize the reality we perceive using a tool composed of three components: objects (aka entities), infinite classes (aka imaginary types) and finite classes (aka categories). We perform conceptualization by distinguishing objects and allocating them to finite classes using infinite classes. In this process, infinite classes functions as a catalyst for allocation of objects into categories. The only requirement of conceptualization is that we keep objects, infinite classes and finite classes consistently apart, because if we don't, then we confuse conceptualization itself by conflating them.

However, there is an inconsistency internally in conceptualization in the concept of "the finite class of all finite classes" (ie, the category of all categories) residing in the definitional fact that finite classes (ie, categories) are not single objects, but several objects, whereas the notion of "the finite class of all finite classes" is a single object consisting of several finite classes and thus both (ie, paradoxically contradictory between) an object and a finite class, that is, a single object and several objects. This notion is thus empty per definition by being both an object and a class at the same time, that is, a paradox (ie, Russell's paradox).

The German Nazi entomologist Willi Hennig did, however, turn this fact up-side-down by comprehending the finite class of all finite classes as "the only natural group". The problem with this comprehension is thus that it is inconsistent (ie, paradoxically contradictory). He (and others) may thus comprehend this "group" as "the only natural group", but neither he nor others can ever pinpoint this "group" without contradiction, because it is paradoxically contradictory per definition. If it hadn't been, then it could also have had an ancestor.

Willi Hennig and his followers (ie, cladists) obviously think that finite classes are real instead of objects, which leads them to conflation of "finite class" with "infinite class", and thus to conflation of conceptualization itself. Instead of conceptualizing reality, they, obviously, search for "the true" conceptualized reality, which in practice is their own conceptualization of reality, whichever it is, but paradoxically contradictory per definition.

This spin around the internal inconsistency of conceptualization can only be halted by considering what we talk about (ie, objects, like humans, or classes, like human).