The problem with the notion of a difference between clades and paraphyletic groups (ie, cladistics)

The notion of a difference between clades (aka holophyletic groups) and paraphyletic groups (an approach called "cladistics") is that in the context of continuity, clades include "all" from a particular moment in time till today, whereas paraphyletic groups only includes "some" from a particular moment in time till today.

The problem with this difference is, however, "all" and "some" of what? This problem is moreover insoluble, since every suggestion is inconsistent. The reason is that the concept "paraphyletic group" actually is orthogonal (ie, diametrically opposed) to the concept "clade", meaning that a single clade (thing) is two paraphyletic things. The members of clades and paraphyletic groups thus simply can't be of the same kind, ie, the distinction of them is inconsistent. Instead, it is actually a distinction of the general from the specific in a general sense and thereby in practice ending in the paradox we call Russell's paradox (but which cladists call "the tree of life"). It actually enters the paradox that the Linnean system avoids by its distinction of genera and species.

This problem means that the notion of a difference between clades (aka holophyletic groups) and paraphyletic groups (an approach called "cladistics") in practice lacks a consistent solution, but instead leads into an infinite recursion (ie, infinite loop), which is both a search for the tree of life and the tree of life at the same time (ie, the process is indistinguishable from its goal).