On the vain battle for cladistics

The fact that our conceptualization of reality separates reality from our conceptualization of reality means that conceptualization creates an artificial rift between reality and our conceptualization of it, which we call Russell's paradox. This rift (ie, Russell's paradox), in turn, is actually an orthogonal cube interface between reality and our conceptualization of it having two facets (or aspects): subjectivity and objectivity, whereof subjectivity is paradoxically contradictory and thus ultimately the inverse of a paradoxical contradiction, that is, an infinite recursion, and objectivity is consistently ambiguous. It means that our conceptualization of reality leaves us with two options: (1) paradoxical contradiction ultimately ending up in infinite recursion (ie, subjectivity), or (2) consistent ambiguity (ie, objectivity). This is the setting of conceptualization that we have to relate to.

Cladists are trying to make this fundamental choice between subjectivity and objectivity into an existential question, ie, concerning whether a particular kind of group (ie, clades, or genera with their species) "are natural groups" or not, but this focus is actually just a diversion. The problem is, instead, that such "natural groups" in fact are ultimately paradoxically contradictory. This problem does not, however, reside in the "natural groups" themselves, but in that they are inconsistent, ie, that they don't break even. Our fundamental choice is thus not an existential question between whether a particular kind of group "are natural groups" or not, but instead the much less dramatical choice of whether we prefer subjectivity or objectivity (ie, paradoxical contradiction or consistent ambiguity). Those that choose subjectivity just have a tendency to fall into existential arguments.

Biological systematics perceives itself as having the task of finding the natural classification of biological organisms. Given Russell's paradox, this task is  however, indeed mission impossible, since this paradox shows that there is no such natural classification to be found, ie, that the idea itself is practically void. The question whether biological systematics will ever accept this fact is, however, written in the stars. Presently, it is doing all it can to deny it. It battles for its existential aim, although Russell (among others) already has discarded it. Cladists are thus fighting a vain battle for the idea that there is a consistent meeting point between subjectivity and objectivity, ie, a "natural" classification, although Russell's paradox has already shown that this idea is practically void. Why continue this hopeless battle?