What can a species possibly be?

Ever since the dawn of Biological systematics, it has discussed what a "species" is. This fundamental problem appears to concern how we shall specify a consistent and unambiguous kind of group of organsisms, but does actually concern how we shall overcome the fact that such a kind of group is a definitional contradiction. Such a kind of group consists of both single species and single organisms at the same time, and is thus consistent only if species equal organisms, which are not groups, but single organisms. The problem is thus not how we shall specify a consistent and unambiguous kind of group of organsisms, but that we can't.

Rather than asking the question what a species is, we thus ought to ask the question why we can't specify what a "species" is, which is answered by the conclusion above. This answer does not, however, suffice to those biological systematists that ask the question what a species is. It does not even qualify as an alternative among the possible answers to their question. "Nothing" is not an acceptable answer to them.

Carl von Linné  partly overcame this problem by constructing an orthogonal system of classification wherein species is consistent in relation to genera, and genera is consistent in relation to species. This system did not solve the fundamental problem that reality is distinct from our conceptualization of it, ie, that the relation between the two can't be unambiguous, but only the problem of consistency.

A later approach in biological systematics called Cladistics instead "solved" this problem by simply asuming as an axiom that we indeed can specify what species are, in the form of a single true tree of life. This solution did not, however, actually solve the problem, but merely transfered it into finding the single true tree of life, which, thus, is a definitional impossibility. Such thing is simply impossible per definition. Another approach in biological systematics called Evolutionary taxonomy adopted Linné's system and was thus at least consistent, although ambiguous.

However, in a fundamental battle in biological systematics in the 1980-ies, biological systematists downvoted Evolutionary systematics in favor for Cladistics. The outcome of this battle tilted biological systematics up-side-down from being a scientific discipline into being a belief in a single true tree of life. It simply expelled scientific thinking from biological systematics. (This was the time I entered biological systematics (in the beginning of the 90-ies). Unfortunately, I was thus expelled from biological systematics in the moment I paid for entering it. I didn't get in before I was out. Not yielding for a belief in a single true tree of life effectively excluded me from getting any position at any academy. This belief was the ticket of entrance to positions. Since then, I have been referred to expressing my protests against this belief to media that is not governed by cladists, also excluding Wikipedia (which is governed by cladists)). Today, biological systematics is thus dominated by Cladistics, although Cladistics is paradoxically contradictory. You can thus get a position at any academy if you search for a paradox, but not if you say that Cladistics is a search for a paradox. Paranoia is acceptable, but not stating that it is a paranoia.

Ultimately, cladistics is doomed to eternal splitting (like the species it believes in are), on the contrary to Linnean systematics, because a house can only stand firmly on a consistent ground, like Linnean systematics. Belief in eternal splitting does, of course, lead to eternal splitting.



   

On the difference between phylogenetics and cladistics, and the error of cladistics

The error of cladistics is not that it assumes that species have orginated by a dichotomously branching process, but that it assumes that species (and thus also the species of species) are real, since this assumption is a paradox (which Bertrand Russell also demonstrated already in 1901, that is, before the origin of cladistics). This assumption does not phylogenetics do.

The scientific question concerning evolution is not how species have originated, as cladists appear to think, but how biological organisms have originated and diversified, as phylogeneticists think. Species are not concrete entities, as cladists appear to think, but an abstraction that phylogenetics uses together with the abstraction "genus" as an orthogonal conceptual tool to discuss the biological diversity. Cladists take the scientific phylogenetic discussion too literally, leading them into a typological perspective on reality which can be called inverse science, because it superficially looks like science but follows an orthogonally opposite line of logical reasoning, ie, resting on the axiom that abstract classes (like species) instead of concrete objects (like organisms) are real. This inverse science is also responsible for the disgusting race biology of the early 20th century.

Kladistik är endast en självmotsägande paranoia

Vi människor begreppsbildar den verklighet vi ser genom att allokera (hänföra) enheter, t ex organismer, till kategorier (dvs ändliga klasser), såsom t ex "arter", via de typologiska idéer vi har i våra huvuden om likheter och olikheter mellan enheterna, i en allmän mening kallade "klasser", men specifikt kallade oändliga klasser (även "typer"). Våra typologiska idéer om likheter och olikheter mellan enheter vi ser (ie, de oändliga klasserna, eller typerna) fungerar alltså som katalysatorer för vår allokering av enheterna till kategorier (ie, ändliga klasser).

Den inriktning inom biologisk systematik som kallas "kladistik" gör dock tvärtom. "Tvärtom" i detta sammanhang innebär att den sammanblandar (förvirrar) kategorier med klasser (dvs ändliga klasser med oändliga klasser), och genom detta också sammanblandar (förvirrar) båda dessa med enheter, dvs kör begreppsbildningen baklänges för att istället förvirra (sammanblanda) begreppen. Traditionellt kallas denna sammanblandning (förvirring) för en sammanblandning av sort och sak. Kladistiken är alltså en konsekvent sammanblandning av sort och sak i avsikt att sammanblanda begrepp och enheter, dvs begreppsförvirring.

Anledningen till kladistik är att kladister tror att den kan leda oss till det "sanna ursprunget" för begreppen, vilka de tror att vi inte hittar på själva utan istället är reella, dvs existerande, enheter, trots att begreppsförvirring motsäger begreppsbildning per definition, såsom en förvirring motsäger den uppdelning den förvirrar per definition, och således endast kan resultera i alla andra begreppsbildningar förutom den som den förvirrar, dvs den som kladistiken kallar "kodning av egenskaper i karaktärer och karaktärstillstånd", utan självmotsägelse. Själva förvirringen ligger i att kladistikens "analys" omvänder de egenskaper den har kodat såsom samtidiga begrepp i den initiala begreppsbildningen till på varandra följande begrepp i den resulterande begreppsbildningen, och motsäger därmed den intiala begreppsbildningen med den resulterande begreppsbildningen. Denna "analys" är alltså i praktiken en grundläggande självmotsägelse, dvs förvirring. Varje enskild sådan begreppsförvirring är alltså självmotsägande; något av den initiala eller den resulterande begreppsbildningen är fel per definition. De kan aldrig överensstämma. Kladisterna tror alltså att denna paranoida "analys" kan leda dem till det "sanna ursprunget" för begreppen, när det enda den INTE kan leda dem till är just det. Orsaken till denna (kanske överraskande) omöjlighet ligger dock inte i hur en sådan "analys" utförs, utan istället i att begreppen helt enkelt inte är reella, dvs inte är existerande enheter, utan något vi själva hittar på, därför att sådana påhittade enheter har ett tvetydigt ursprung per definition (ie, ett verkligt och ett imaginärt), då enheterna är imaginära per definition.

Kladister sammanblandar (förvirrar) alltså begrepp med enhet (ie, sort med sak), och tror då felaktigt att begreppen är reella enheter, vilket leder dem till tron att Willi Hennig's "analys" kan hitta ursprunget för begreppen. Problemet för dem är att begreppen inte kan vara reella enheter, vilket man själv kan räkna ut och Betrand Russell också demonstrerade med Russell's paradox 1901.

On the concept "clade" and the belief "cladistics"

The now popular concept "clade" in biological systematics is actually an infinitely recursive concept, like "the list of all lists", by including itself as a member of itself. A belief that this concept indeed can break even, today called "Cladistics", and its corollary search for what it calls "the true tree of life", is actually in practice a belief that every clade is what cladistics calls a "sister-group" to itself and that the most inclusive clade also is a sister-group to the least inclusive clade. It is thus an absurd belief by believing in the obviously absurd.

Linnean systematics and Evolutionary taxonomy avoid this sink hole by arranging concepts orthogonally as categories of classes (of organisms).

The question whether there is such a "single true tree of life" or not thus has a negative answer - there isn't. Instead, there are actually several equally true graph illustrations of a hypothesized evolutionary origin of biological organisms. Large scale change (ie, evolution) actually can't be unambiguous if small scale change is, because only entities are unambiguous and they are physically nested as INDEPENDENT entities in other entities. Unambiguity in change at different scales at the same time actually requires total dependency between entities on different scales, which, in turn, makes change impossible. The cladistic belief in a single true tree of life does thus contradict its own assumption of the underlying process (ie, evolution) itself. Cladistics does thus believe in something it at the same time denies.

Giddy, this siding in biological systematics, isn't it?

On conceptualization, and Linnean systematics versus cladistics

If we conceptualize reality using single entities as starting points, then there is just one statement that can't be true: that classes are real, because conceptualization allocates single entities into abstract categories (ie, finite classes) via classes (ie, infinite classes, or types), and if it could, then single entities would instead be abstract, ie, it would tilt reality and conceptualization up-side-down.

This fact, ie, that this statement can't be true, is shown by that any such claim is either ambiguous between classes and categories, like the Linnean system is, or paradoxically contradictory between different classes, like cladistics is.

We can thus produce a compromise between reality and conceptualization, like Linnean systematics, or tilt reality and conceptualization up-side-down, like cladistics, but we can't fuse reality and conceptualization unambiguously, ie, truthfully. We can't, for example, describe a process unambiguously, ie, truthfully, but can just represent it in different aspects. The Unambiguous Aspect is simply lacking.

This is a fact we just have to accept. If a bucket is empty, then it is empty. We can't fill it with words. There is thus no such thing as a "true tree of life" (or Higg's boson for that sake). It would have been perfect if there had been one (or a category of Higg's bosons), but, unfortunately, there isn't. Entities are real, but neither a true tree of life, Higg's bosons, nor any other kind of entities, sorry to say, but only entities. These entities can't, sorry to say, be unambiguously allocated into any kind(s) of entities. Ultimately we are unambiguously left with just entities. We can discuss them, but we can't nail them. A single entity, like me and you, will never be unambiguously nailed to any category. This is a pain in the ass for typologists like race biologists, but it is a blessing for the rest of us.

On the fundamental battle in biological systematics between Linnean systematics (Evolutionary taxonomy) and cladistics

Biological systematics has been struggling with the issue whether kinds are real or not since the dawn of Man. The fundamental problem with this issue is that it confronts kinds and relationship groups (including single entities) concerning which of them that comes first (aka is real). This problem is actually insoluble, since kinds can't be real without single entities, and relationship groups can't be real without kinds. This fact means that kinds must be both real and not real at the same time, which, in turn, is explained by that reality has two aspects: pattern (ie, kinds) and process (ie, relationship groups) at the same time. None of them thus comes first, but both of them are, instead, simultaneous.

However, logical reasoning requires something that comes first, that is, a presumption, or axiom. It means that there are two diametrically opposite (ie, orthogonal) lines of logical reasonings, which thus are completely contradictory in not sharing a single common point. These are thus not contradictory in opinion, but in subject. They simply don't handle the same subject. Whereas one discusses kinds and derives relationship groups, the other discusses relationship groups and derives kinds. These two orthogonal lines of reasoning meet each other in biological systematics in discussing the same subject, ie, biological systematics, but not the same subject, ie, kinds and relationship groups, respectively, at the same time. They thus think they talk about the same thing, but do actually not share a single common point (ie, meaning of a concept). Instead, they dance an orthogonal dance around the insolubility that "kinds can't be real without single entities, and relationship groups can't be real without kinds". Both of them think that there is a solution to be found, which actually is the only shared point between them, and also the point that drags them into this orthogonal dance.

The orthogonal dance between the two possible lines of logical reasoning does thus not have any single solution -.neither kinds nor relationship groups comes before the other, ie, is more real. However, this lack of solution means that one of them has to end in ambiguity and the other in paradoxical contradiction, since these are the only possibilities except unambiguity. Concerning this issue, Betrand Russell demonstrated in 1901 that assuming as an axiom that kinds comes before relationship groups, ie, that kinds are real, which cladistics assumes, is paradoxically contradictory. This fact leaves the axiom that relationship groups, fundamentally single entities, comes first, ie, is real as the consistent (although ambiguous) alternative. It means that assuming that relationship groups comes first, ie, are real, as Linnean systematics does, is the consistent alternative, although it may appear illogical to cladists.

A thorough consideration of the contradiction between Linnean systematics (Evolutionary taxonomy) and cladistics in biological systematics does thus result in Linnean systematics (Evolutionary taxonomy) as the winner, although it was invented before Darwin's theory of evolution. This fact is something biological systematists have to try to understand for the coming millenias of years (they obviously can't today) to escape the eternal othogonal dance around a lacking single "correct" solution.

On distinction of species

We can only partition biological organisms into species by distinguishing (ie, defining) the class (ie, the concept) species. Now, distinguishing classes, like species, do we, however, perform by distinguishing both some similarity between the entities in the class and some difference between this class and other classes of such entities at the same time. By this, we contrast the new class against its opposite class as being both dissimilar and different.

The problem concerning the class species is what the opposite class possibly can be? Which class can we contrast species against? The answer is that we can only contrast it against the class entity, meaning that one of them excludes the other per definition, ie, that we can't acknowledge both of them at the same time, because they are not just dissimilar, but moreover different. The class species is thus consistent only if the class entity isn't, and vice versa.

This fact explains our extreme problems to define the class species. These classificatory (ie, conceptual) problems may we confuse with the (then apparently factual) problem that reality consists of a vast variety of life forms, but these two kinds of problems (ie, conceptual and real) are actually just two facets of one and the same problem, that is, that not both species and entity can be consistent at the same time. Solution of these problems does thus not hinge on whether they are abstract or real; we can't distinguish both species and entity consistently at the same time independently of which.

The distinction of species is thus doomed to fail by being inconsistent per definition. The problem of distinguishing species, which cladistics thinks it has overcomed, thus still remains. Cladistics thus still lacks the fundament it needs to turn rational to irrational, and vice versa.The concept species still lacks a consistent definition.

Cladistics is the belief in a single true tree of life

Cladistics is a belief, like Christianity and Islam, - the belief in a single true tree of life. Similar to all other beliefs it is also contradictory. Cladists may think that their belief is scientific, but this belief about the belief remains to be turned into science by finding this imaginary single true tree of life.

Similar to Higg's particle-ists, cladists may claim that they have found the single true tree with a certain probability, but at which probability can they (we) conclude that they (we) have found a particular kind of entity (ie, Higg's particle or biological species), when the probability actually can never reach 1, since there are always at least two different but just as probable kinds of entities? When can they (we) claim that they (we) have closed the gap that distinguishes reality from our comprehension of it, when there will always remain a contradiction? When can they (we) claim to have taken this final step; when they (we) actually can't take it?

I think that both Higg's particle-ists and cladists are ridiculous. They strive so tremendously hard to prove (positively) that they are correct, although many philosophers have demonstrated that positive proof of correctness is impossible. Haven't they read anything of what have been written in this issue or have they forgot it? Are they ignorant or stupid?

A long time has passed since since Simpson and Ashlock had intelligent discussions about evolution. Today the discussion in this issue is just cladist-confused. What in hell is the "paraphyletic groups" that cladists hate, the goats of Jesus?, and, what are the holophyletic groups they call "clade": the Father in Heaven? The dream? Why should we chase this impossible dream at all, when it can't be reached? Are we stupid?
     

On the fundamental error of cladistics

Those biological systematists that are called cladists conflate entity (or object) with class. It means that they also conflate monophyletic groups of entities with monophyletic groups of classes.

This conflation makes cladists erroneously believe that monophyletic groups of entities can be consistently distinguished as monophyletic groups of classes with what they call "apomorphies", and picks up that thread in a practical search for such groups.

Their conflated kind of monophyletic group is, however, what biological systematists searched for for about 2,000 years before Linné, and failed. The problem with such groups is that entities consist of classes in that every entity belongs to several classes, and that the relation between entities and classes thus is not 1-1, but 1-many, and that the relation between classes and entities thus is many-1, The latter part of this relation, ie, many-1, between classes and entities, means that there are several classes that fit one entity, and thus that there also are several monophyletic groups of classes that fit one monophyletic group of entities. There simply isn't a 1-1 relation between monophyletic groups of entities and monophyletic groups of classes which cladists erroneously believe there is.

This fundamental error of cladists´means that they search for something that isn't to be found (ie, the true tree of life). Their conflation of entity (or object) with class has lured them into the belief that there is a 1-1 relation between monophyletic groups of entities and monophyletic groups of classes, which simply is wrong. Instead, their search for this singularity is in practice an infinite recursion. It is, actually, the same search for an infinite recursion as it was before Linné. This reinvented (cladistic) approach is thus just as vain as it was before Linné, but adherents of it appears to have difficulties abandoning it. Demonstration that it is inconsistent does obviously not suffice to make them abandon it.

This fundamental error of cladistics is thus obviously larger than facts. It appears to be what we tend to believe in contradiction to facts. In the case of cladistics, it has led some of us (ie, cladists) into a vain search for something that isn't to be found, but which they believe in, ie, the true tree of life. Not even the fact that there isn't any such thing to be found suffices to make them stop searching it. Somewhere here something is fundamentally stupid.         

Doesn't cladistics represent science going nuts?

Biological systematists that are called "cladists" believe that there is a true "tree of life" to be found, and spend their time and our money searching for it. Now, if there really is such a true "tree of life" to be found, how can cladists then know when they have found it?

If this true "tree", as cladists themselves claim, is the "tree" that requires the fewest number of explanations on the origin of traits among organisms, then there isn't any such tree at all, since classification is ultimately paradoxically contradictory, which we can figure out ourselves but which Bertrand Russell also demonstrated already in 1901 (that is, before the origin of cladistics), because it means that there are at least two such "trees". If so, then cladists will thus search forever for their true "tree of life", because there simply isn't any single such thing to be found.

So, can there possibly be another true "tree of life" (ie, one that doesn't minimize the number of explanations on the origin of traits among organisms) to be found? If so, then there will also be a mirror image of this "tree" actually representing the other side of the same real "tree" (ie, the true "tree" seen from the other side). How can cladists then distinguish which of these two true "trees" that represent the true "tree" (when both actually do)?

The existence of such a true "tree of life" does thus appear to be a practical impossibility. Instead, the belief in it appears to be a conflation of representation with the represented (ie, class with object). It gives rise to the questions: how can we pay cladists for a search for a practically impossible belief? Doesn't cladistics actually represent science (in this case biological systematics) going nuts into its own classification?

When science turns into belief: cladistics and Higg's particle-ism

Cladistics and Higg's particle-ism do actually represent scientific breakdowns into belief. When the irrationality of reality frustrates scientists enough, they find ways to escape this frustration, and these ways do, unfortunately, always lead them into the belief they tried to escape in the first place, and are, also unfortunately, just as paradoxically contradictory as the beliefs they tried to escape are. These ways do thus just lead them from the ashes into the fire. Neither clades nor Higg's particle are consistent, but are actually paradoxes.

Scientists can't understand how their rational search for the truth led them to this frustration, which forced them to take the step to belief, but I can explain that it is because the explanation of this is simpler than their explanation of reality is. They simply can't see the forest because they look to close on the trees.

The fundamental problem is that reality has two aspects: pattern and process, and that this fact prevents us from finding a single truth, just as it prevents reality from finding a stable state. This fundamental fact is not something we can overcome, but something we have to accept. Unfortunately, it means that particle physicists will not find a smallest particle and that cladists will not find the tree of life. Both of them are convinced over the boundary between science and belief that their respective ideas are to be found, but, unfortunately, they're wrong. Neither of them is to be found. This I can claim with security, since if they could be found, then time would not be relative to space. My claim thus hangs on the fact that time is relative to space.

(However, independently of this fundamental rectifier, only my reasoning is totally consistent. Please, correct me if I'm wrong).

No, extraterrestrial civilizations do not exist

No, extraterrestrial civilizations do not exist. No matter how high the probability for such civilizations is, they do not exist as pure probabilities, but only as facts. If probabilities exist (as facts), then God can also be a fact by pure probability. And, furthermore, if probabilities exist, then realities, like you and me, do not exist.

We have to choose: do realities (like you and me) or probabilities (like extraterrestrial civilizations) exist. If the latter, then not the former, and vice versa. 

On the dream of cladistics

An orthogonality is a diametrical opposition. It may be between classes, as that between 'hairy-hairless' and 'hair color', or between dimensions, as that between 'X' and 'Y'. The typical property of an orthogonality is that it lacks a common middle. There is, for example, no hair color that can be assigned to both a hairy and a hairless object. Orthogonalities emerge in the moment we conceptualize reality. Indeed, reality itself protrudes as an orthogonality between what we call 'pattern' and 'process'.

Orthogonalities are difficult to interpret in an existential sense, since both of the opposites have to "exist" as being interdependent, although not both of them thus can exist at the same time as being contradictory. An orthogonal relation do we sometimes express as that one "thing" is BOTH one and its opposite, as in that a photon is BOTH a particle and a wave. However, if this statement is correct, then it logically means that a wave also is BOTH a photon and a particle, which, obviously, isn't correct. The problem is that concepts have different extensions (ie, are of different inclusiveness among objects), and that this difference is impossible to express for certain relations. We can, for example, say that SOME waves (ie, photons) also are particles, since 'wave' is intermediate in extension between 'photon' and 'particle', but we can't incorporate this distinction in a statement about photons, since the extension of 'photon' is smaller than that of both 'wave' and 'particle'. The extension of the concept we explain must be intermediate between the concepts we use to explain it. Instead, the correct expression is that a photon is NEITHER a particle nor a wave, since it does not have any erroneous connotations, but leaving the photon unexplained.

The correct statement about reality is thus that it is neither pattern nor process, thus leaving reality unexplained. This statement excludes the existence of something like Higg's particle, although it would have explained reality if it indeed had been a particle, which it can't be because it would have meant that a particle is a wave. There is thus no Higg's particle, although Higg's particle-ists claim to almost having found it.Never will we cross the boundary between knowledge and belief.