Cladists have turned conceptualization up-side-down.
It raises the question: if cladists aren't stupid, then who is?
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måndag 16 september 2013
onsdag 28 augusti 2013
Is race biology rational?
Biological systematics offers two diametrically opposed (ie, orthogonal) classifications: Linnean systematics and Cladistics (ie, the PhyloCode), whereof Linnean systematics is relative and the PhyloCode is absolute. It means that Linnean systematics combines typology (is, classification) of things with historical relationship between things (ie, ethnicity) using a compromise between these two attributes of things (under the assumption that the two attributes are diametrically opposed), whereas Cladistics on the contrary assumes as an axiom (actually claims) that these two attributes are not orthogonal, but instead consistent (and therefore don't have to be combined using a compromise). Linnean systematics thus assumes that typology is orthogonal to ethnicity, whereas Cladistics on the contrary assumes as an axiom (actually claims) that typology and ethnicity are consistent. It means that Cladistics is essential for race biology. Only iff typology is consistent with ethnicity (as Cladistics assumes, actually claims) is race biology rational.
So, is typology orthogonal to or consistent with ethnicity?
Cladistics claims that the answer to this question is not a matter of facts, but of premises. This claim means that typology can be both orthogonal to and consistent with ethnicity depending on which premises one chooses, ie, that the answer only depends on which answer one prefers. If this claim is true, then "orthogonal to" and "consistent with" are not opposites, but equalities, since the difference between them is not real. If so, then there isn't any difference between Linnean systematics and Cladistics at all, but instead they are just two different aspects on the same thing, ie, the true tree of life, whereof Linnean systematics merely is a redundant complication.
The problem for the Cladistic claim is that it is contradicted both theoretically and practically. Theoretically by Bertrand Russell's demonstration already a hundred years ago (1901) that classification is ultimately paradoxically contradictory, by meaning that the cladistic equalization of typology and etnicity ends in paradox, and practically by the fact that time is relative (ie, orthogonal) to space, by meaning that the Cladistic equalization of type and ethnicity is actually just a conflation of type and ethnicity. Type and ethnicity are factually not equal, but orthogonal.
The answer to the question above is thus that typology is orthogonal to ethnicity. Fortunately, it means that race biology is irrational. When we understand this fact, there is thus no return to the old race biology that Willi Hennig transferred from the Nazi approach to today's Cladistics. Then we can discard both it and Cladistics as resting on the old erroneous idea that ethnicity (ie, races, species, genera, and so on) necessarily also is typologically distinct, instead returning to the old and fundamental question in biological systematics: what is a species? Isn't this shift interesting, Gareth (Nelson)?
The problem with race biology is that also many of those that don't like it still believe in races. They would be better off if they could understand that belief in races itself is irrational..
So, is typology orthogonal to or consistent with ethnicity?
Cladistics claims that the answer to this question is not a matter of facts, but of premises. This claim means that typology can be both orthogonal to and consistent with ethnicity depending on which premises one chooses, ie, that the answer only depends on which answer one prefers. If this claim is true, then "orthogonal to" and "consistent with" are not opposites, but equalities, since the difference between them is not real. If so, then there isn't any difference between Linnean systematics and Cladistics at all, but instead they are just two different aspects on the same thing, ie, the true tree of life, whereof Linnean systematics merely is a redundant complication.
The problem for the Cladistic claim is that it is contradicted both theoretically and practically. Theoretically by Bertrand Russell's demonstration already a hundred years ago (1901) that classification is ultimately paradoxically contradictory, by meaning that the cladistic equalization of typology and etnicity ends in paradox, and practically by the fact that time is relative (ie, orthogonal) to space, by meaning that the Cladistic equalization of type and ethnicity is actually just a conflation of type and ethnicity. Type and ethnicity are factually not equal, but orthogonal.
The answer to the question above is thus that typology is orthogonal to ethnicity. Fortunately, it means that race biology is irrational. When we understand this fact, there is thus no return to the old race biology that Willi Hennig transferred from the Nazi approach to today's Cladistics. Then we can discard both it and Cladistics as resting on the old erroneous idea that ethnicity (ie, races, species, genera, and so on) necessarily also is typologically distinct, instead returning to the old and fundamental question in biological systematics: what is a species? Isn't this shift interesting, Gareth (Nelson)?
The problem with race biology is that also many of those that don't like it still believe in races. They would be better off if they could understand that belief in races itself is irrational..
söndag 26 augusti 2012
On the war between nominalism (ie, Linnean systematists) and realism (ie, cladists) in biological systematics
Biological systematics is a battlefield for the eternal war between the two fundamental orthogonal approaches in conceptualization: (1) "objectivity" (ie, "nominalism") and (2) "subjectivity" (ie, "realism"), that is, between assuming as an axiom (1) that objects and (2) subjects (ie, classes) are real, respectively. The difference between them resides in that the former (1) understands that an unambiguous classification is an imposibility (by Russell's paradox), whereas the latter (2) not understands that an unambiguous classification is an impossibility (by not understanding Russell's paradox). Understanding of why an unambiguous classification is an impossibility is, however, extremely complicated, but at the most fundamental level, the reason is that reality is in a constant process of change and thus is impossible to nail.
In this war in biological systematics between objectivity and subjectivity, the approach called "cladistics" is an elevator (or bridge) from objectivity to subjectivity. It functions by first conflating object (ie, organisms) with class (ie, biological species), and then by treating groups of such classes as real entities (ie, objects), called "clades", although classes can't be objects, since they are orthogonal to them, and that classes thus can't be real entities (ie, objects). It thus creates an impression that classes indeed can be objects although they actually can't. By this, it not just conflates the concept object with the concept class, but moreover turns these concepts up-side-down, thereby creating a mess of all other concepts.
Cladistics is, however, not a new approach, but actually the same old realism that the ancient Greek Parmenides formulated about 2,500 years ago, although dressed in new clothes. The problems cladistics encounters are thus the same as Parmenides' approach encountered, which have been thoroughly discussed in the history of philosophy. However, the worst blow to this approach was delivered quite recently by Einstein's discovery (actually objective conclusion) that time is relative to space (which later was empirically verified), since realism claims that change is an impossibility (and thus an illusion), because an impossibility (illusion) can't contain factual differences (like the difference in the pace of time at different paces of time). An illusion can't contain factual differences. This discovery (actually objective conclusion) did thus actually falsify Parmenides realism and with it cladistics, thus before cladistics was born. Cladistics was thus falsified before it was born.
Cladistics is thus actually only a desperate attempt by realists to escape the fact that an unambiguous classification is an impossibility (ie, Russell's paradox). Before it emerged, some objective biological systematists had proposed that biological systematics should try to agree about a certain systematization of biological organisms (based on the Linnean systematics), but pre-cladists reacted aggressively against this proposal claiming that there indeed is a single true classification to be found (based on Willi Hennig's conflation of object with class). These pre-cladists thus simply refused to acknowledge the fact that an unambiguous classification is an impossibility. They moreover won supporters (ie, cladists) so that this fact (ie, that an unambiguous classification is an impossibility) is still not acknowledged in biological systematics.
If biological systematics could reach a consensus to acknowledge this fact, then it could make a difference in future for humanity. It actually could contribute to the development of thinking. But its refusal to acknowledge this fact instead turns itself into a mess, actually the worst possible mess. Which way it will go in the future is determined by its participants. Clear thinking participants lead it towards clearly formulated conclusions, while confused participants lead it towards confused conclusions, and confused conclusions are those conclusions that contradict facts.
In this war in biological systematics between objectivity and subjectivity, the approach called "cladistics" is an elevator (or bridge) from objectivity to subjectivity. It functions by first conflating object (ie, organisms) with class (ie, biological species), and then by treating groups of such classes as real entities (ie, objects), called "clades", although classes can't be objects, since they are orthogonal to them, and that classes thus can't be real entities (ie, objects). It thus creates an impression that classes indeed can be objects although they actually can't. By this, it not just conflates the concept object with the concept class, but moreover turns these concepts up-side-down, thereby creating a mess of all other concepts.
Cladistics is, however, not a new approach, but actually the same old realism that the ancient Greek Parmenides formulated about 2,500 years ago, although dressed in new clothes. The problems cladistics encounters are thus the same as Parmenides' approach encountered, which have been thoroughly discussed in the history of philosophy. However, the worst blow to this approach was delivered quite recently by Einstein's discovery (actually objective conclusion) that time is relative to space (which later was empirically verified), since realism claims that change is an impossibility (and thus an illusion), because an impossibility (illusion) can't contain factual differences (like the difference in the pace of time at different paces of time). An illusion can't contain factual differences. This discovery (actually objective conclusion) did thus actually falsify Parmenides realism and with it cladistics, thus before cladistics was born. Cladistics was thus falsified before it was born.
Cladistics is thus actually only a desperate attempt by realists to escape the fact that an unambiguous classification is an impossibility (ie, Russell's paradox). Before it emerged, some objective biological systematists had proposed that biological systematics should try to agree about a certain systematization of biological organisms (based on the Linnean systematics), but pre-cladists reacted aggressively against this proposal claiming that there indeed is a single true classification to be found (based on Willi Hennig's conflation of object with class). These pre-cladists thus simply refused to acknowledge the fact that an unambiguous classification is an impossibility. They moreover won supporters (ie, cladists) so that this fact (ie, that an unambiguous classification is an impossibility) is still not acknowledged in biological systematics.
If biological systematics could reach a consensus to acknowledge this fact, then it could make a difference in future for humanity. It actually could contribute to the development of thinking. But its refusal to acknowledge this fact instead turns itself into a mess, actually the worst possible mess. Which way it will go in the future is determined by its participants. Clear thinking participants lead it towards clearly formulated conclusions, while confused participants lead it towards confused conclusions, and confused conclusions are those conclusions that contradict facts.
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