The route to Linnean systematics and cladistics

The fundamental problem for conceptualization is that reality is both discrete (ie, pattern) and continuous (ie, process) at the same time, despite that this state is a conceptual contradiction, in itself, in that discreteness (separation) and continuity are orthogonal (ie, can't be equal per definition). Single entities are both discrete and in a constant process of change at the same time, despite that it is contradictory. Reality is thus contradictory between state (ie, pattern) and change (ie, process) de facto. Morever, the fact that this contradiction is orthogonal means that it also is paradoxical, which Betrand Russel also showed empirically in 1901.

This real contradiction means that we (in conceptualization) have to keep discreteness (separation) and continuity consistently apart, ie, keep a consistent aisle between them, to avoid (conceptual) paradoxical contradiction. This did Aristotle accomplish on a fundamental level by his invention of an orthogonal tool for conceptualization that distinguishes "genera" and "species" on "generic" and "specific differences". The difference between "generic" and "specific" differences is that "generic" differences are pure otherness between entities (ie, lack of a common measure), whereas "specific" differences are differences in something they share. This tool provided the foundation for objective empirical science as we know it today.

About 2000 years later, the Swedish naturalist Carl von Linné discovered the consistent hierarchical mounting of such "genera with their species" (ie, keeping a consistent aisle between discreteness and continuity), that is, a hierarchical orthogonal system, which today is known as Linnean systematics. This kind of conceptual system (ie, a hierarchical orthogonal conceptualization) is thus the end of this route. It is what the fact that reality is both discrete (ie, pattern) and continuous (ie, process) at the same time leads us to.

About 150 years later, the English naturalist Charles Darwin presented his "theory on the origin of species", which he illustrated with a strictly bifurcating graph. This illustration is, however, a bit tricky to interpret consistently, since it uses stems and nodes to illustrate discreteness (pattern) and continuity (process), but does not distinguish them explicitly. This deficit did about 100 years later lure the German entomologist to conflate discreteness with continuity by conflating nodes with stems. This conflation appeared "natural" to Hennig, but did actually bring him back to a pre-Aristotelian idea originally formulated by Parmenides (ie, that reality is one, change is impossible, and existence is timeless, uniform, necessary, and unchanging), that is, the actual opposite to Darwin's theory. This ancient (pre-scientific) conflation was, in spite of that it (1) already had been shown to be contradictory by the ancient Greeks, (2) is the opposite to Darwin's theory and (3) is falsified by the fact that time is relative to space, adopted by many biological systematists. In this brand, it was called "cladistics" and does today have a strong influence on biological systematics.

The main problem with Hennig's conflation (ie, Parmenides' idea and today's cladistics) is that it transfers the paradoxical contradiction of reality into our conceptualization of reality, thereby entering the same vain search for a stable (ie, consistent) configuration of a paradoxical contradiction that reality obviously is in, instead of discussing reality consistently, as science does. The conflation does not change the fact that reality is orthogonally (ie, paradoxically) contradictory, but merely accepts orthogonal (paradoxical) contradiction. In this sense, the conflation is indeed "natural", as Hennig and cladists asserted and assert, but it is none-the less orthogonally (paradoxically) contradictory. It is a vain search for a void practical application of a orthogonally (paradoxically) contradictory idea, that is, the idea of "a single tree of life". "Natural" does in this sense not mean unambiguous, but rather the opposite.

"Clade" is a void, the black hole for realism

"Clade" is a void. It is everything and thus ultimately nothing.

It is all possibilities and thus ultimately no possibility.

It is "class" instead of "entitity" and thus lacking single entities all together.

It is the black hole for realism.

How can we classify a bifurcating process consistently (ie, without contradiction)

The difference between Linnean systematics (ie, evolutionary taxonomy) and cladistic classification is just which of them that is a consistent (ie, non-contradictory) classification of a bifurcating process:

Linnean systematics assumes that the entities of the process are real and the class abstract, whereas cladistic classification assumes that the class of the process is real and the objects abstract. It means that whereas Linnean systematics consistently keeps the concepts "entitity", "finite class" and "infinite class" apart, cladistic classification instead conflates these concepts by using "a single clade" as entity, the class "biological species" as finite class and the class "clade" as infinite class. What Linnean systematics thus keeps consistently apart do cladistic classification instead conflate.

It means that if we want to classify a bifurcating process consistently (ie, without contradiction), we have to use an orthogonal system like the Linnean systematics, and that cladistic classification takes us back to where we started from (ie, to the contradiction we thus avoided by the orthogonal system).

The answer is thus that it is Linnean systematics (ie, evolutionary taxonomy) that is a consistent (ie, non-contradictory) classification of a bifurcating process. Cladistic classification is instead an inconsistent (ie, contradictory) classification of a bifurcating process (yet consistently inconsistent).

How on earth shall we handle cladistics?

Biological systematics is a threat to sense itself. It started about 2 500 years ago by dividing reality into classes, and has recently ended up in that classes not only are real, but also have an origin (ie, in the cladistic belief in a single tree of life). This "tree of life"  must, of course, be sought among the different divisions biological systematics starts with, all of which are contradictory, as shown by Russell's paradox. Biological systematics thus starts by dividing and ends by conflating into what it divided in the first place, both of which thus are contradictory.

The problem of biological systematics is its search for an unambiguous classification itself, in that this search lacks an unambiguous end, instead having a start that leads to an end that sends it back to the start again. If it is allowed to dominate peoples minds, then all of us will be caught in a narrow circularity confirming what we assume by what we deduce, without escape. Sense will be restricted to a narrow circle of self-confirmation that qualifies as a paranoia. 

Classification for its own sake is thus a parnoic circle leading ultimately to the subjective aspect of Russell's paradox, that is, cladistics. How on earth shall we handle this threat to sense itself?    

Diana Lipscomb is a public seducer

In her "Basics of Cladistic Analysis", Diana Lipscomb states that "If the evolutionary history, or phylogeny, of an organism is traced back, it connects through shared ancestors to lineages of other organisms".

This is actually the contradictory trap of cladistics itself. "The evolutionary history...of an organism...connects through shared ancestors to lineages of other organisms". What is it that Diana says connects to what? An organism (like Diana Lipscomb) does not have an "evolutionary history", but just a birth, and can thus not "connect through shared ancestors to lineages of other organisms". And, even if Diana had had an "evolutionary history", it is difficult to see how her history could "connect to" "lineages of other organisms", since it would mean that Diana's "evolutionary history" is a lineage. And, if Diana's "evolutionary history" indeed is a lineage, then it is the history of this lineage, not of Diana.

No, this statement is nothing but the cladistic dive into contradiction itself. Diana can't keep a single concept apart from other concepts, but instead confuses them all into a conceptual mess, a conceptual melt-down.

After having concluded the grandiose "[biological] systematics is no less than understanding the history of all life", Diana states that the "Systematic Process" (unclear whether she means the process to systematize biological organisms or a systematic process in a generic sense)" consists of five interdependent but distinct steps", whereof the first is:

"1. The taxa to be classified are chosen".

just as if the taxa "to be understood" can be chosen and classification equals understanding. This "step" is actually the fundamental problem for biological systematics: if the biological taxa "to be understood" can "be chosen", then understanding equals choice, and choice is subjective, that is, contradictory per definition. The problem is actually the impossible challenge to arrive to something without assuming something, that is, to just percieve the truth without prejudices.

However, the problem is worse than that. If we indeed can solve this imposible problem, then we will just arrive to a paradox, that is, Russell's paradox, meaning that every possible solution is paradoxically contradictory. It thus doesn't help if we can solve this impossible problem that cladistics claims to have solved, a solution is still void. A solution of this impossible problem is thus also lacking.

Diana thus does not only lead people into consistent contradiction, she also holds out the erroneous prospect that the truth lurks behind this contradiction. She is thus a public seducer.

The class "clade" is void

The problem with the class clade is that it is void. This fact did Willi Hennig try to turn up-side-down by asserting that "only clades are natural groups". His assertion can of course not be denied, since the class "natural group" lacks definition, but it can just as of course not make the class not void. Instead, the class clade is void independently of whether Hennig thought (and cladists think) it's "natural" or not.

Is there an objective subjectivity to be found as cladistics assumes (asserts, claims, defines)

Cladistics assumes, actually asserts, claims and defines, that there is a single "true tree of life" to be found. This assumption means that there among all erroneous trees is a single true tree, that is, a tree that is totally consistent, whereas all other trees are inconsistent. Is this assumption (assertion, claim, definition) rational?

In search for an answer to this question, we can first clarify that the set of all possible "trees" has to be internally contradictory, since all "trees" are different. Every "tree" in this set thus has to be contradictory to all other "trees" in the set. It means that the cladistic asumption that one of these "trees" is consistent is inconsistent, since it would mean that this "tree" is not contradictory to at least one other "tree" in the set, and thus not be a member of this set. This clarification thus allows us to conclude that the cladistic assumption (assertion, claim, definition) that there is a single "true tree of life" to be found is correct if this tree is not a member of the set "all possible trees", but wrong if it is a member of this set. The assumption (assertion, claim, definition) is thus wrong in every case.

The cladistic assumption is actually the subjective aspect of Russell's paradox, that is, assuming that classes are real instead of objects. This assumption also leads to Russell's paradox, with the difference that it believes that Russell's paradox is real.

On the difference between Linnean systematics and cladistic classification

Both Linnean systematics and cladistic classification classify a bifurcating process in a generic aspect (ie, all specific aspects at the same time). The difference between them is that:

Linnean systematics is a consistent (ie, non-contradictory) orthogonal system, whereas cladistic classification is inconsistent (ie, contradictory).

It means that Linnean systematics can incorporate the generic aspect of a single bifurcating process, whereas cladistic classification can only produce specific (ie, contradictory) classifications.  

Willi Hennig's (the father of cladistics) fundamental mistake

Willi Hennig's (the father of cladistics) fundamental mistake was to assume that change is consistent, ie, non-contradictory, based on his irrational axiom that classes are real. This assumption is wrong per definition, ie, change is contradictory per definition, since change is indistinguishable from contradiction per definition.

For example, change from possession of legs to lack of legs (as in the hypothetical loss of legs between lizards and snakes) is indistinguishable from, ie, equals, contradiction between possession of legs and lack of legs.

It means that change is contradictory per definition, that is, the opposite to Hennig's assumption.

This fact means Hennig's assumption that there is a single unambiguous, ie, non-contradictory, clade, called "the tree of life", to be found is wrong per definition. Fact is, instead, that there isn't any non-contradictory clade (to be found) at all per definition. The class clade actually equals the class contradiction. It is nothing but contradictory.

"Only acknowledging clades", as in cladistics, thus equals "only acknowledging contradictions". This approach is thus irrational and practically empty, and thereby impossible to explain (or understand) consistently. We can, however, understand that its fundamental error resides in its axiom that classes are real, and the corollary assumption that change is consistent. It isn't. Instead, change is contradictory per definition, and classes are abstract per definition. And, a contradictory abstract can't be turned into a consistent reality by simply acknowledging it.

Dream is dream and reality reality, and never will the two meet.       

The problem with cladistics

The problem with cladistics is not that cladists don't understand, but that they claim that not understanding is a virtue (ie, being "natural"). This claim actually excludes people that understand from being "natural", just like the Khmer Rouge's reign of terror excluded educated people from their idea of being "natural".

Cladistics, similar to Khmer Rouge and many other simplistic approaches, is a movement of over-simplification. It is not driven by understanding, nor even a wish to understand, but by an over-simplified idea. It thus conquers the world by violence rather than by arguments, because its arguments are irrational.

Biological systematics thus has to get rid of cladists to survive as a science and avoid being turned into a sect (with its consistently splitting internal tensions). It thus has to reject cladistics as a package, rather than piece by piece. Cladistics is nothing but an over-simplification of the Art of Classification, that is, Systematics. The sooner biological systematics gets rid of it, the better. 

What Russell's paradox tells us concerning realism (like cladistics)

Russell's paradox tells us that realism (ie, assuming that classes are real), like cladistics, is bound to end up in Russell's paradox. Classes are simply fundamentally paradoxically contradictory by being orthogonal.

Together, all of us have thus led realists to their ultimate Waterloo, ie, cladistics, by encouraging subjectivity. The process can be comprehended as a reaction against the scientific revolution, which, thus, surprsingly for realists, ends in a paradox. The scientific revolution thus has not been falsified, but just overturned by a movement that ended in paradox.

This is the situation we're in right now.  

On the relation between cladistics and the difference between objects, classes and categories

Neither single nor several classes (ie, infinite classes) can make up a category (ie, a finite class). But, there can be several categories of classes. Classes are namely real (ie, finite) only in the sense of being different. In the sense of being similar, they simply collapse into nothing. Categories is what make classes real.

This was expressed by Linné as: the properties do not make the genus, but the genus makes the properties.

Neither classes nor categories can thus be single, only objects can.

It also means that single objects can't form lineages, since lineages in a definitional sense are infinite classes, which thus can't be single, only several consecutive objects can.

A perhaps seemingly paradoxical consequence of this is that single lineages can't be real, since it would mean that infinite classes could make up categories, which they thus can't, by meaning that the lineage of all lineages, ie, everything over time, can't be real. This perhaps seemingly paradox is a consequence of that it conflates what it distinguishes, thus ending up with nothing. The consistent solution of the paradox is that reality belongs to the single consecutive objects in the lineage, not to the lineage itself. It is not the lineage, but the objects in the lineage that are real. The lineage do not make the objects, but the objects make the lineage.

This is the fact that cladistics turns up-side-down by "only acknowledging" lineages (and thus such paradoxes). It means that cladistics succeeds to achieve consistent, paradoxical contradiction in a single strike. This does not mean, however, that it also creates a single class that can make up a category, like the cladistic idea "a single true tree of life", but only that it enters the paradoxically contradictory belief in such a "thing".

On the discrepancy between the fundamental assumption of cladistics and facts

Cladistics s rests on the fundamental assumption that it is possible to reduce four dimensions consistently into three dimensions, and thereby that it is possible to reduce three dimensions consistently into two dimensions, and thus that everything can ultimately be consistently described in terms of black and white.

This assumption is, however, simply wrong. In every dimension reduction, the reduced dimension has to be spread over the remaining dimensions as some kind of error. A two-dimensional illustration simply can't convey all information in a four-dimensional illustration.

This fact means that every illustration is a dimensional reduction. We simply can't illustrate reality as it is. This fact is also illustrated by Magritte's painting,"Ceci, ce'st ne pas une pipe". An illustration of something can never become the same thing as that which it illustrates.

The cladistic assumption is thus wrong. It is not possible to illustrate anything consistently in less dimensions than what it actually occupies, since it would mean that it is something else than what it is. The cladistic idea s thus fundamentally inconsistent.    

Is cladistics a new approach?

Cladists think that cladistics is a new approach. Nothing could be more wrong. Already Aristotle discussed clades in terms of genera with their species.

The problem with such "things" (ie, clades, or genera with their species) is, however, to join them without contradiction. This problem did Linné solve about 2,000 years later. About 150 years later, Darwin presented his theory on the origin of biodiversity vizualizing it with a bifurcating tree graph he stated illustrated "the origin of species". What Darwin didn't mention, however, was that such bifurcating process also can be illustrated with a node-based tree graph, that these two types of tree graphs are orthogonal, and that such process thus in practice can't be illustrated unambiguously. (Whether this oversight was due to ignorance of this fact or not is impossible to say).

The only new property of cladistics is thus that it conflates node-based graphs with stem-based graphs, thereby creating the impression that the result IS the process itself, resulting in that it gets the fact that bifurcating processes can't be illustrated unambiguously up-side-down. Instead of understanding that it means that an unambiguous such process can't be found, it thinks that the problem is to find one. It is thus a direct running into the ditch from Linné's classification system and Darwin's process model by conflating them into an imaginary classification of a process model that is paradoxically contradictory in a real sense per definition. It does thus not have a single right. This property of cladistics, ie, not having a single right, is the only property that distinguishes it from all other approaches. Only it is totally wrong. Its concept of "clades" does, however, date back to at least the ancient Greeks. Cladistics just takes the irrational route from there, conflating both them and everything else.

Cladistics is thus a new approach only in that it is the irrational way of joining clades, when the Linnean system is the rational way. Cladistics can thus consistently be called irrational cladistics, when Linnean systematics is rational cladistics. It is just an orthogonal conceptual rotation around the fact that bifurcating processes can't be illustrated unambiguously. A play with concepts around a phenomenon that can't be unambiguously nailed with concepts.