Class-realism, as cladistics and particle physics, and Russell's paradox

Class-realism, as cladistics and particle physics, rests on the axiom that classes are real. This assumption did Bertrand Russell falsify in 1901 by demonstrating that it leads to paradox, ie, Russell's paradox, in logical reasoning.

Russell's paradox can be understood fairly simple as that a class consisting of two classes, for example class "A" consisting of class "B" and class "C", is BOTH neither class "B" nor class "C" AND both class "B" and class "C". Class "A" is thus BOTH neither nor AND both and class "B" and class "C". This relationship makes the question: "Which of "B" and "C" is "A"?" indeterminable - it is neither any of them nor both of them.

This paradox do the opposite to class-realism, nominalism - resting on the axiom that particles are real, not have to encounter, since a corresponding particle "A" consisting of the particles "B" and "C" can be allocated to another and orthogonal class to "B" and "C" (like the genera of Linnean systematics). Particles that are physically nested can be consistently allocated to different (and orthogonal) classes.

The fact that class-realism leads to paradox do class-realists themselves, however, not comprehend as a falsification of their axiom, but instead as that paradoxes are real, eg, cladistics' belief in "a single true tree of life" and particle physics' belief in "Higgs particle". This comprehension is, however, inconsistent with Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and falsified by the fact that time is relative with speed in space. It is thus falsified empirically by the only empirical fact we have to test it. There thus simply can't be such "things". Instead, belief in them is in practice an infinite recursion, ie, endless orthogonal loop.

On the impossibility to find a consistent and unambiguous model of reality

The impossibility for us to find a consistent and unambiguous model of reality, such as the ideas of "a single true tree of life" (cladistics) and of "a single Grand Unifying Theory" (particle physics), is obviously not due to reality, but to our conceptualization itself (see Russell's paradox), although reality itself obviously has the same problem, since it can't stop. It means that a search for such ideas actually mimics reality instead of modeling it. Ironic, isn't it?

What is reality and what is dream? - on cladistics and Higgs' particle-ism

Reality is fundamentally ambiguous between what we traditionally call "pattern" and "process", which also protrudes in the dual wave and particle properties of photons (among other facts).

Today, however, this fact is challenged by class-realists in the form of cladists and Higgs' particle-ists, which claim that they can bridge this fundamental ambiguity using totally abstract constructions like their ideas of "a true tree of life" and "Higgs' particle", respectively.

Such ideas can't, however, change this fact, because if they could, then the fact wouldn't have been in the first place (ie, the change would invalidate itself). Such ideas are thus nice as dreams and may be very desired, but are, sorry to say, impossible as realities. A fact is a fact and an idea is an idea. Reality is reality and dream is dream.

These class-realists are thus merely trying to solve this fundamental problem by turning it in-side-out, which doesn't accomplish anything else than that we go from rationality to irrationality.

On the place for God

A discussion about the reality we perceive with our senses does fundamentally include just three components: 1. objects, 2. classes and 3. categories: objects being the entities we divide the reality into, classes being the templates we use to group the objects, and categories being the resulting groups of objects.

This set-up does, however, mean that such a discussion actually has two theoretically possible entrances: 1. to assume as an axiom that objects are real or 2. to assume as an axiom that classes are real  The latter of these, ie, assuming as an axiom that classes are real, appears irrational in this point of my meta-discussion of such a discussion, but may none-the-less appear rational in such a discussion. When we're in a discussion, we-re actually blinded to the axioms our arguments rest on, and we can thus actually take a step from one of these fundamental axioms to the other without even being aware of that we do.

The fundamental problem for us is, however, that neither of the possible axioms can lead us to an unambiguous description of the reality we perceive, because the axiom that objects are real is ambiguous in relation to reality, whereas the axiom that classes are real is paradoxically contradictory. There is thus no unambiguous solution of the problem, ie, no unambiguous description of reality. This fact means that we can continue discussing reality for ever and ever without reaching a single unambiguous solution. It doesn't matter which entrance to the discussion we choose, we will still never find an unambiguous solution. The pure aim for a single solution, ie, a single true description of reality, is thus vain. Such single solution is thus a matter of belief rather than a matter of discussion. It is an empty hole for science, but a place for a God, like the "true tree of life" and "Higgs' particle". The problem with it is that it is paradoxically contradictory (as Bertrand Russell demonstrated) and also contradicts the fact that time is relative to speed in space, meaning that it can only be filled by ("inconsitent) belief (like cladistics and Higgs' particle-ism). This hole in conceptualization is thus either empty or filled with inconsistent content. It is actually where God has a place.  .        

Conceptualization and Higgs' particle-ism

There are particles, waves and fields, wherof fields are particles of waves. It means that if we want to close (ie, conflate) this trichotomy,then we have to conflate fields with waves, because this conflation is not obviously inconsistent although it also conflates waves with particles. The conflation is thus not a direct circularity, but an indirect circularity.

This is exactly what Higgs' particleism does. It conflates what conceptualization distinguishes, just as if such a conflation of concepts can reach a truth beyond conceptualization, when it actually just reaches the basis for the conceptualization, which is Russell's paradox. It means that Higgs' particle-ism acknowledges a paradox instead of acknowledging that it is a paradox, thereby entering a belief in a paradox.  Higgs' particle-ism is thus a belief in a paradox.

    

On classes and empirical science

No, classes are not real, because the assumption that they are lands in paradox (ie, Russell's paradox). We can, of course, classify reality, but classification is ultimately inconsistent, actually paradoxically contradictory.

To believe in classification, like Cladistics and Higg's particle-ism do, is thus paradoxically contradictory. Empirical science can't be belief, but can just be a consistent method to discuss reality. It can't replace beliefs, because it does not believe.

The classification of empirical science is thus ultimately paradoxically contradictory, but the conclusions of it isn't. Empirical science is merely a tool to predict future, nothing more and nothing less. This it does more or less accurately, but never perfect. Empirical science is thus merely a help to us to prepare for what is coming. The fact that it has spin-off effects like designing televisions and digitalization of data is just a bonus.

Empirical science is thus not served by belief in it, but, on the contrary, opposed by it. We actually ought never believe in what we conclude must be the case. In the moment we believe in it, it disappears like a ghost.  

More wrong than cladistics is impossible to be

The old idea of ​​a single "true tree of life", today providing the foundation for Cladistics, confronts the two fundamentally different approaches in our conceptualization of reality: realism (ie, assuming that classes are real) and nominalism (ie, assuming that objects are real). The fundamental problem for our conceptualization of reality is namely that not both classes and objects can be real at the same time, since they can't fuse. This problem can be analogized with that not both reality and a map of reality can be real at the same time, since they can't fuse. Confronted with this fundamental choice between classes (ie, map) and objects (ie reality), realism (ie, cladistics) thus claims (asserts) that there indeed is a single "true tree of life" (ie, claims that there indeed is a single "true" map of reality), whereas nominalism denies the existence of such a single "true tree of life" (ie, comprehends reality as reality).

So, which of them do you think is right: realism claiming that map is reality or nominalism comprehending reality as reality?  The answer appears obvious (at least to me). realism's claim that map is reality is obviously wrong when it is confronted with the fact that reality is reality. 

It was realists that set up this confrontation with nominalism by their claim that there indeed is a single "true tree of life", which they thus obviously lose (ie, there isn't any "true tree of life". Their claim thus appears like a pink elephant that they claim can fly. The problem with this claim is that there are no pink elephants, and even if there had been, they wouldn't have been able to fly. The claim is thus totally wrong, more wrong than that is actually impossible to be.

The problem for biological systematics is thus how it shall explain to cladists that they are wrong. Whether cladists understand that they're wrong or not does not, however, matter, since they are wrong anyway.A failure to explain to cladists that they're wrong is thus a failure for biological systematics. It leaves biological systematics as a dream that there are pink elephants that can fly.
.   

     .    

On the idea of a "true tree of life, and the problem with Cladistics for biological systeatics

The reason why there isn't any "true tree of life" is that classification is ultimately paradoxically contradictory, as Bertrand Russell demonstrated with Russell's paradox already in 1901.

This fact means that the question of a "true tree of life" is not a question about reality, ie, which the "true tree of life" is, but about modeling reality, ie, whether we can describe the history of organisms in terms of a consistent "true tree of life" or not, and the answer is thus "not".

The problem with Cladistics is thus that it misunderstands the question of a "true tree of life" fundamentally as a question about reality, when it actually is about modeling reality consistently, and that it thereby can't understand the answer that there isn't any "true tree of life", because it misunderstands this answer as an existential claim (assertion), when it actually is just a conclusion on our possibilities to model reality consistently. The answer merely concludes that there isn't any "true tree of life" because this model is paradoxically contradictory, since a paradoxical contradiction is not one, but many . (Cladists don't comprehend the notion of "trees of life" as a model of reality, but as a single reality, ie, The True Tree of Life).

This cladistic inability to understand the context means that Cladistics searches for something that can't be found, This search is, of course, their own business, but one question is why Swedish tax payers shall sponsor this vain search on Swedish universities? Why shall they sponsor a search for a pink elefant when their money can be used for many more sensible purposes? Another question is whether this inability to understand shall be allowed to be taught in Swedish universities at all? There may be students that do understand the context, and what will the "teachers" do with them? In such a case, the student actually ought to teach the teacher, but since cladists are not susceptible to anticladistic arguments, such intelligent students will thus be excluded from the universities. There are thus major problems with having cladists on universities. But, who can clear them out?

The question of a possible "true tree of life" and the answer to it

The reason why there isn't any unambiguous classification to be found, such as the idea of "a true tree of life" that cladistics rests on, is that classification is ultimately paradoxically contradictory, which we can understand from the fact that classification is orthogonal and which Bertrand Russell also demonstrated with his "Barber's paradox".

It means that the question of a possible "true tree of life" is not about reality (ie, an existential question), ie, whether there is a "true tree of life or not", but about methodology (ie, a practical question), ie, whether we can describe the history of biodiversity in the form of a consistent "true tree" or not, and the answer is thus "not". This is actually the reason why Linné invented his consistent orthogonal system of classification.

There are thus some of us that understand the question of a possible "true tree of life" and also know the answer to it, the nut for us to crack is the how we shall convey this understanding and knowledge to the rest of us, especially when they on the contrary claim (assert) that there indeed is a "true tree of life", so that they can halt their vain and confusing search for it.

But, then again, maybe they actually understand the question and also know the answer, but don't see it as problem for their approach, but rather an advantage...? Its absence of a consistent solution does at east ensure the perpetual employment...