Single entities have two aspects: pattern and process. Pattern is the momentary aspect, that is, in time, whereas process is the temporary aspect, that is, over time. It means that it takes (at least) two consecutive patterns to make up one process, and that they, "pattern"and "process", thus are orthogonal, ie, diametrically opposed, or excluding a mutual 1-1 correspondance.
So-called "natural groups" (ie, the class, or the infinite type), that is, groups of entities that form super-entities by combining the the two aspects "class" and "historical unity", are the opposite to entities. It means that such "things" ARE two aspects at the same time, that is, that they conflate the two aspects "pattern" and "process". Such "natiral groups" thus both combine and conflate the two aspects "pattern" and "process",
This fact triggers the question: what, then, is the difference between "combining" and "conflating"? The answer depends on how one combines. If one combines by conflating, then the difference is none, that is, that there isn't any difference between them.
This fact explains the impossibility of "natural groups". Such groups have to conflate the two aspects "pattern" and "process", although these are two aspects of entities. Such groups are thus possible only if entities are impossible, and vice versa. Such groups and entities thus exclude each other.
The meaning of this fact may be difficult to understand, but it is simply that one of them is contradictory given that the other is unambiguous. This fact, in turn, means that the class "clade" (giving rise to cladistics) is practically contradictory per definition, since not both entities and natural groups of entities can be unambiguous at the same time. This fact makes applied cladistics non-sensical. The class "clade" simply can't make up a non-contradictory, ie, unambiguous, category (ie, finite class) per definition, since not both entities and natural groups of entities can make up categories at the same time.
Cladistics is thus inconsistent (actually consistently inconsistent) in an applied sense by including two categories that exclude each other. It means that cladistics rests on Russell's paradox. The only difference between science and cladistics is thus that cladistics believes that Russell's paradox can be found. Otherwise, they are totally parallell. Unfortunately, for cladistics, science is right and cladistics wrong.
lördag 24 mars 2012
tisdag 20 mars 2012
The cladistic idea of a single True Tree of Life appears as the ultimate spin of all categories
The cladistic idea of a single True Tree of Life is contradictory by illustrating change, because change is contradictory.
This fact doesn't mean that a single event (like a hypothetical origin of biodiversity from a single primordial form) can't be unambiguous, but that it can't be described unambiguously. The insurmountable barrier resides in fusing one piece of change (ie, one process) with two consecutive pieces of entities (ie, two patterns), and is called Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.
This barrier believed the German entomologist Willi Hennig himself capable of bridging by only acknowledging change (ie, contradiction), thus denying pattern (ie, unambiguity), just as if acknowledgement of only contradiction can TURN contradiction non-contradictory.
Willi Hennig thus believed himself capable of getting rid of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle by only acknowledging contradiction, and thereby turning the principle up-side-down into an opposite certainty principle, although change is just as contradictory (and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle just as real) after this mental exercise as it was before. This belief (today called cladistics) does thus emerge in an extremely tight spin from sensibility to insensibility, appearing as the ultimate spin of all categories.
This fact doesn't mean that a single event (like a hypothetical origin of biodiversity from a single primordial form) can't be unambiguous, but that it can't be described unambiguously. The insurmountable barrier resides in fusing one piece of change (ie, one process) with two consecutive pieces of entities (ie, two patterns), and is called Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.
This barrier believed the German entomologist Willi Hennig himself capable of bridging by only acknowledging change (ie, contradiction), thus denying pattern (ie, unambiguity), just as if acknowledgement of only contradiction can TURN contradiction non-contradictory.
Willi Hennig thus believed himself capable of getting rid of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle by only acknowledging contradiction, and thereby turning the principle up-side-down into an opposite certainty principle, although change is just as contradictory (and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle just as real) after this mental exercise as it was before. This belief (today called cladistics) does thus emerge in an extremely tight spin from sensibility to insensibility, appearing as the ultimate spin of all categories.
fredag 16 mars 2012
On the relation between cladistics and Linnean systematics
Cladistics and Linnean systematics are opposites. Both conceptualize reality using objects, classes and categories, but whereas cladistics assumes that categories (and thus also classes), like humans and cods, are real, ie, can be found, Linnean systematics instead assumes that objects, like you and me, are real, ie, can be found. Cladistics is thus subjective, whereas Linnean systematics is objective.
Both of them (ie, categories (and thus also classes) and objects) can't be real at the same time, since they are orthogonal, ie, diametrically opposed, and that it thus would mean that they would be synonymous, which they obviously aren't. Cladistics pretends that it acknowledges both categories and objects at the same time, but in practice it acknowledges categories (and thus also classes) instead of objects. Both of them can't be acknowledged at the same time, because they are orthogonal.
Cladistics and Linnean systematics thus represent the two possible entrances to conceptualization: (1) assuming that categories (and thus also classes) are real and (2) assuming that objects are real, respectively. The problem with cladistics is that it is contradictory between categories and classes (ie, finite classes and infinite classes), whereas the problem with Linnean systematics is that it is ambiguous in relation to reality. Neither is thus unambiguous in relation to reality. It means that we can't be unambiguous in relation to reality at all, since no entrance to conceptualization is unambiguous in relation to reality, but instead are constrained to discuss advantages and disadvantages of the two possible entrances to conceptualization.
The main advantage with objectivity (eg, Linnean systematics) is that it agrees with facts. Discussing reality using a conceptualization that does not agree with facts (like the cladistic concepts "clade" and "paraphyletic group") has to be confused, since the concepts are contradictory. The concepts simply can't be defined non-contradictory. This main advantage with objectivity explains its success in the form of empirical science and modern IT applications as object oriented programming (eg, Geomatics). Objectivity is thus superior to subjectivity by agreeing with facts.
In spite of this strong advantage of objectivity, it has severe problems being accepted in biological systematics. Biological systematists obviously prefer conducting confused existential discussions to producing a standardized system of classification. It is just as if they can't abandon the naive idea that there is a single truth to be found; as if their own existence hangs on the existence of a single truth. In practice, however, it is the other way around.
Both of them (ie, categories (and thus also classes) and objects) can't be real at the same time, since they are orthogonal, ie, diametrically opposed, and that it thus would mean that they would be synonymous, which they obviously aren't. Cladistics pretends that it acknowledges both categories and objects at the same time, but in practice it acknowledges categories (and thus also classes) instead of objects. Both of them can't be acknowledged at the same time, because they are orthogonal.
Cladistics and Linnean systematics thus represent the two possible entrances to conceptualization: (1) assuming that categories (and thus also classes) are real and (2) assuming that objects are real, respectively. The problem with cladistics is that it is contradictory between categories and classes (ie, finite classes and infinite classes), whereas the problem with Linnean systematics is that it is ambiguous in relation to reality. Neither is thus unambiguous in relation to reality. It means that we can't be unambiguous in relation to reality at all, since no entrance to conceptualization is unambiguous in relation to reality, but instead are constrained to discuss advantages and disadvantages of the two possible entrances to conceptualization.
The main advantage with objectivity (eg, Linnean systematics) is that it agrees with facts. Discussing reality using a conceptualization that does not agree with facts (like the cladistic concepts "clade" and "paraphyletic group") has to be confused, since the concepts are contradictory. The concepts simply can't be defined non-contradictory. This main advantage with objectivity explains its success in the form of empirical science and modern IT applications as object oriented programming (eg, Geomatics). Objectivity is thus superior to subjectivity by agreeing with facts.
In spite of this strong advantage of objectivity, it has severe problems being accepted in biological systematics. Biological systematists obviously prefer conducting confused existential discussions to producing a standardized system of classification. It is just as if they can't abandon the naive idea that there is a single truth to be found; as if their own existence hangs on the existence of a single truth. In practice, however, it is the other way around.
onsdag 14 mars 2012
Biological systematics in terms of cladistics is a severe misunderstanding
If cladists were cartographers, then they would battle about which map that is the true map. Cladists obviously lack ability to straighten out the relation between reality and maps (ie, descriptions) of it, instead confusing them to the extent of believing that maps of reality can BE reality (ie,a belief in a true map).
The problem with traditional maps is that a 2-D representation of a 3-D reality has to err in either area, distance or angle, because the dimensional reduction from 3 to 2 can't preserve all three. The problem with phylogenetic illustrations is that a 2-D representation of a 4-D reality (then including time) is that every single representation is contradictory, because there are several just as correct 2-D representations of a single 4-D reality. And, since illustrations of phylogenies are 2-D representations of a 4-D reality, there are several just as correct illustrations of the phylogeny of biodiversity. The cladistic conflation of illustration (ie, representation) with the illustrated (ie, the represent) may be "natural", but is none the less contradictory. A single true such representation simply can't be found, because all of them are contradictory. The "natural" belief that such thing can be found is simply wrong.
Biological systematics in terms of cladistics is thus a severe misunderstanding. The illustration of the origin of biodiversity in the form of a dichotomously branching graph does not equal evolution, but is merely an illustration of it. A classification of this process in terms of the illustration (ie, cladistics) is contradictory, because there are several just as correct ways to illustrate one and the same process (see Jeremy Martin et al.). Abandoning the scientific Linnean system (ie, evolutionary taxonomy) for a cladistic classification would thus be a severe mistake.
The problem with traditional maps is that a 2-D representation of a 3-D reality has to err in either area, distance or angle, because the dimensional reduction from 3 to 2 can't preserve all three. The problem with phylogenetic illustrations is that a 2-D representation of a 4-D reality (then including time) is that every single representation is contradictory, because there are several just as correct 2-D representations of a single 4-D reality. And, since illustrations of phylogenies are 2-D representations of a 4-D reality, there are several just as correct illustrations of the phylogeny of biodiversity. The cladistic conflation of illustration (ie, representation) with the illustrated (ie, the represent) may be "natural", but is none the less contradictory. A single true such representation simply can't be found, because all of them are contradictory. The "natural" belief that such thing can be found is simply wrong.
Biological systematics in terms of cladistics is thus a severe misunderstanding. The illustration of the origin of biodiversity in the form of a dichotomously branching graph does not equal evolution, but is merely an illustration of it. A classification of this process in terms of the illustration (ie, cladistics) is contradictory, because there are several just as correct ways to illustrate one and the same process (see Jeremy Martin et al.). Abandoning the scientific Linnean system (ie, evolutionary taxonomy) for a cladistic classification would thus be a severe mistake.
tisdag 13 mars 2012
Cladistics is the opposite to geomatics
Cladistics (ie, the belief in a single truth in the form of The Tree of Life) is the opposite to geomatics (ie, the discipline of gathering, storing, processing, and delivering spatially referenced information). Only one of them can thus be correct: if cladistics is correct, then geomatics is over-complication, whereas if geomatics is correct, then cladistics is over-simplification.
The difference between them is that geomatics distinguishes between reference and referent, which cladistics doesn't. The question is thus whether distinction of reference and referent is overcomplication or if equalization of them is over-simplification? The question is thus whether reference and referent has to be distinguished at all?
If we do not distinguish reference and referent, then a fat man is a fat man instead of a man that is fat. If this man loses weight and becomes thin, then he is accordingly a new man, that is, a thin man, instead of being a man that has gone from being fat to being thin. The identity of this man does not reside in being an entity, but in being an entity of this or that kind. The cladistic confusion of reference and referent does thus connect the identity of an entity to any category it is allocated to, instead of to its being of an entity itself. This approach is traditionally called typology, because it attaches greater importance to which category an entity is allocated to, than to its being an entity itself. This approach has also done much harm over the history of humanity by reducing single entities into anonymous instances of a category, thereby allowing sweeping generalizations over single entities about any category.
The cladistic confusion of reference and referent does thus anonymize entities (like you and me) in favor for categories (ie, kinds), like fat, thin, good, bad, beautiful, ugly, and so on. This approach can't be claimed to be wrong on the basis on what we have said so far, but these are the fundamental generic differences between the cladistic confusion and geomatics' distinction of reference and referent. Geomatics attaches all importance to that an entity is an entity, and no importance to which category this entity is allocated to, because allocations to categories are always provisional. No entity does necessarily belong to any category, because a non-contradictory overall categorization is impossible. This statement does, however, claim that cladistics, ie, the typological approach, is wrong by denying its practical possibility.
So, how can I support the statement that "a non-contradictory overall categorization is impossible"? Well, the fundamental support resides in that every single category contains several categories per definition. There is no single non-contradictory solution for a system wherein every unit contains both several units and several entities at the same time, per definition. Instead, units that contain both several units and several entities at the same time are contradictory between units and entities per definition.
We can thus conclude that the cladistic confusion of reference and referent is contradictory per definition, which keeping them apart isn't.Cladistics thus appears to be wrong and geomatics right, luckily.
The difference between them is that geomatics distinguishes between reference and referent, which cladistics doesn't. The question is thus whether distinction of reference and referent is overcomplication or if equalization of them is over-simplification? The question is thus whether reference and referent has to be distinguished at all?
If we do not distinguish reference and referent, then a fat man is a fat man instead of a man that is fat. If this man loses weight and becomes thin, then he is accordingly a new man, that is, a thin man, instead of being a man that has gone from being fat to being thin. The identity of this man does not reside in being an entity, but in being an entity of this or that kind. The cladistic confusion of reference and referent does thus connect the identity of an entity to any category it is allocated to, instead of to its being of an entity itself. This approach is traditionally called typology, because it attaches greater importance to which category an entity is allocated to, than to its being an entity itself. This approach has also done much harm over the history of humanity by reducing single entities into anonymous instances of a category, thereby allowing sweeping generalizations over single entities about any category.
The cladistic confusion of reference and referent does thus anonymize entities (like you and me) in favor for categories (ie, kinds), like fat, thin, good, bad, beautiful, ugly, and so on. This approach can't be claimed to be wrong on the basis on what we have said so far, but these are the fundamental generic differences between the cladistic confusion and geomatics' distinction of reference and referent. Geomatics attaches all importance to that an entity is an entity, and no importance to which category this entity is allocated to, because allocations to categories are always provisional. No entity does necessarily belong to any category, because a non-contradictory overall categorization is impossible. This statement does, however, claim that cladistics, ie, the typological approach, is wrong by denying its practical possibility.
So, how can I support the statement that "a non-contradictory overall categorization is impossible"? Well, the fundamental support resides in that every single category contains several categories per definition. There is no single non-contradictory solution for a system wherein every unit contains both several units and several entities at the same time, per definition. Instead, units that contain both several units and several entities at the same time are contradictory between units and entities per definition.
We can thus conclude that the cladistic confusion of reference and referent is contradictory per definition, which keeping them apart isn't.Cladistics thus appears to be wrong and geomatics right, luckily.
söndag 11 mars 2012
Cladistics is an entrance to fundamental inconsistency problems
Cladistics assumes as an axiom, claims and defines that there are true and false clasifications, although there can't be. Its axiom, claim and definition instead actually both equals and differentiates infinite classes (ie, classes) and finite classes (ie, categories) at the same time, which is contradictory. Fact is, instead, that cladistics is a contradictory, actually paradoxically contradictory, conflation of infinite classes with finite classes.
Cladistics is thus not a solution to any problem, but an entrance to fundamental inconsistency problems.
Cladistics is thus not a solution to any problem, but an entrance to fundamental inconsistency problems.
söndag 4 mars 2012
On the illusion called cladistics
Cladistics is simply the claim (assertion) that there is a True, ie, non-contradictory, classification to be found. It is the dream of total unambiguity presented as a claim (assertion).
The problem with cladistics is simply that its claim (assertion) is wrong. There is no True, ie, non-contradictory, classification to be found, because if there had been, then change would have been an illusion and time would not have been relative to space.
Cladistics is thus totally, meaning totally, wrong. It is, in fact, the mental desease we call paranoia. It may appear "natural" to paranoids, but it is just because it is the paranoia.
The problem with cladistics is simply that its claim (assertion) is wrong. There is no True, ie, non-contradictory, classification to be found, because if there had been, then change would have been an illusion and time would not have been relative to space.
Cladistics is thus totally, meaning totally, wrong. It is, in fact, the mental desease we call paranoia. It may appear "natural" to paranoids, but it is just because it is the paranoia.
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