tisdag 13 mars 2012

Cladistics is the opposite to geomatics

Cladistics (ie, the belief in a single truth in the form of The Tree of Life) is the opposite to geomatics (ie,  the discipline of gathering, storing, processing, and delivering spatially referenced information). Only one of them can thus be correct: if cladistics is correct, then geomatics is over-complication, whereas if geomatics is correct, then cladistics is over-simplification.

The difference between them is that geomatics distinguishes between reference and referent, which cladistics doesn't. The question is thus whether distinction of reference and referent is overcomplication or if equalization of them is over-simplification? The question is thus whether reference and referent has to be distinguished at all?

If we do not distinguish reference and referent, then a fat man is a fat man instead of a man that is fat. If this man loses weight and becomes thin, then he is accordingly a new man, that is, a thin man, instead of being a man that has gone from being fat to being thin. The identity of this man does not reside in being an entity, but in being an entity of this or that kind. The cladistic confusion of reference and referent does thus connect the identity of an entity to any category it is allocated to, instead of to its being of an entity itself. This approach is traditionally called typology, because it attaches greater importance to which category an entity is allocated to, than to its being an entity itself. This approach has also done much harm over the history of humanity by reducing single entities into anonymous instances of a category, thereby allowing sweeping generalizations over single entities about any category.  

The cladistic confusion of reference and referent does thus anonymize entities (like you and me) in favor for categories (ie, kinds), like fat, thin, good, bad, beautiful, ugly, and so on. This approach can't be claimed to be wrong on the basis on what we have said so far, but these are the fundamental generic differences between the cladistic confusion and geomatics' distinction of reference and referent. Geomatics attaches all importance to that an entity is an entity, and no importance to which category this entity is allocated to, because allocations to categories are always provisional. No entity does necessarily belong to any category, because a non-contradictory overall categorization is impossible. This statement does, however, claim that cladistics, ie, the typological approach, is wrong by denying its practical possibility.

So, how can I support the statement that "a non-contradictory overall categorization is impossible"? Well, the fundamental support resides in that every single category contains several categories per definition. There is no single non-contradictory solution for a system wherein every unit contains both several units and several entities at the same time, per definition. Instead, units that contain both several units and several entities at the same time are contradictory between units and entities per definition.

We can thus conclude that the cladistic confusion of reference and referent is contradictory per definition, which keeping them apart isn't.Cladistics thus appears to be wrong and geomatics right, luckily.  

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