What is a rabbit, really?

Human discussion about reality has forever been split between the two approaches nominalism (i.e., comprehending classes as artificial constructs, that is, resting on the axiom that only objects are real) and realism (i.e., resting on the axiom that classes are real). The two approaches can't be distinguished in discussions except by that when a nominalist for example says: "this is a rabbit", a realist asks: "how do you know?". The difference between them is that the nominalist views the classification as a provisional agreement to discuss common properties of objects of this kind, whereas the realist views it as a statement of a fact.

Neither of these two approaches is thus completely satisfactory concerning the question "what something really is", or "how the universe is constructed"; nominalism not considering the question and realism just asking the question (i.e., not providing the answer). Considering the great interest in this question, it is, however, important to straighten out if there possibly can be an answer to this question and what it, in that case, possibly can be.

The first question (i.e., super-question) is thus: can the question (i.e., sub-question) "what is a rabbit, really?" have an answer? It implies (i.e., assumes as an axiom) that there is an existential "True" class for every object, i.e., that every object basically IS a single something, that is, belongs to a single fundamental class. The super-question is thus if this axiom is sensible, that is, if there is there an existential "True" class for every object, if each object is a single something and if each object belongs to a single fundamental class? The answer to this question can be found in the fact that the axiom requires that every single object also is a single class, since every class that includes more than one object has to turn at least one object ambiguous between at least two classes. The answer to the super-question whether the sub-question  "what is a rabbit, really?" can have an answer is thus that it can, given that every object also is a single class.

This answer also gives the answer to the second question, that is, what this answer can possibly be. The answer is that the answer must be that every object is its own class. The sub-question is thus sensible ONLY IF each object is its own class.

The simple logical reasoning above thus discloses that realism is sensible ONLY IF each object is its own class. It means that the question "what is a rabbit, really" does not have an answer per definition, since it doesn't specify which rabbit, and that the more general question "what something really is" has the answer "what it is". The latter is thus a feedback-answer to the question. (For a more thorough understanding of this conclusion, please read Gödel, Escher and Bach by Douglas Hofstadter.)

The generic conclusion of this logical reasoning is thus that realism is a feedback-loop from answers to questions, that is, paranoia. It ports wherever the question leads it to end up, thus drifting with the question it poses, but always contradictory.