Den inriktning i biologisk systematik som kallas "kladistik" är egentligen en sammanblandning av sak och sort som vänder upp och ner på dem, dvs fokuserar på sort istället för sak. Genom detta förvandlar den Darwins illuistration av evolution från att vara en fundamentalt inkonsekvent illustration i termer av sorter till att vara en till synes självklar illustration av Livets Träd. Det stora problemet med denna förvandling är att sammanblandningen av sak och sort leder in i Russell's paradox, dvs är paradoxalt självmotsägande, därför att det betyder att detta till synes självklara Livets Träd för sorter inte har en enda konsekvent lösning, dvs att alla möjliga lösningar av det är självmotsägande.
(Grundproblemet är att sorter inte uppkommer genom dikotom splittring, utan genom förändring av enskilda saker över tid, därför att det betyder att interna linjer i varje möjligt Livets träd kommer att inkludera egenskaper som i verkligheten har funnits vid olika, dvs på varandra följande, tidpunkter, så kallade "felande länkar". Orsaken till sådana "felande länkar" är alltså att en dikotomt förgrenande modell av evolution är fundamentalt inkonsekvent i att blanda ihop sak och sort. Sådana "felande länkar" är alltså ett tankefel, inte något som verkligen har funnits, dvs, inte något att leta efter, lika lite som någor enskilt sant Livets träd. Nej, evolution måste beskrivas orthogonalt, som i den Linneanska systematiken, därför att den sker över verklighetens alla fyra dimensioner).
Problemet med kladistik är att det är mycket lättare att luras in i den än att förstå vad problemet med den är, och att när man väl har lurats in i den, så kan man i värsta fall inleda ett praktiskt sökande efter något som inte står att finna (om man nu inte sysslar med något helt annat, vilket kladisterna tenderar att göra efter ett tag).
tisdag 29 januari 2013
torsdag 27 september 2012
Cladistics and Linnean systematics are merely the two possible classificatory solutions to "the problem of universals"
The "problem of universals" is an ancient problem in metaphysics about whether universals exist or not. This problem has two contradictory (orthogonal) solutions: Aristotelian essentialism and Plato's theory of forms, the former assuming that they do and the latter that they don't (at least not in the same reality as reality). Cladistics is consistent with the former and Linnean systematics is consistent with the latter, and they are mutually contradictory (ie, orthogonal). However, since classification of reality (for example into either clades or into genera, families, orders, etcetera) does not influence reality itself, Cladistics and Linnean systematics are merely the two possible (orthogonal) classificatory solutions to the problem of universals, Aristotelian essentialism and Plato's theory of forms, respectively.
This fact is, however, hidden behind the mutual contradiction between these two possible classificatory solutions by that it turns the difference between them into an existential problem for cladists and into an erroneous existential claim of cladistics to Linnean systematists. The mutual contradiction between them thus tilts the fact that they are merely the two possible (orthogonal) classificatory solutions to "the problem of universals" into a problem of cladistics' existential claim (ie, that universals exist). This claim was thus, as I have explained in recent posts on this blog, shown to be inconsistent by Betrand Russell in 1901 by what later became known as Russell's paradox (for those that hadn't understood this fact before, unlike Plato and many others).
It means that a biological systematist has to decide whether he/she believes that universals are real or not, ie, choose side between Aristotelian essentialism on the one hand and Plato's theory of forms/nominalism on the other, because the former leads to cladistic classification and the latter to Linnean systematics. However, if he/she chooses the former (ie, cladistic classification), then he/she has to be aware that it is inconsistent, ie, lacking consistent solution. None of them can thus reach the idea that cladistics calls "The Tree of Life".
This fact is, however, hidden behind the mutual contradiction between these two possible classificatory solutions by that it turns the difference between them into an existential problem for cladists and into an erroneous existential claim of cladistics to Linnean systematists. The mutual contradiction between them thus tilts the fact that they are merely the two possible (orthogonal) classificatory solutions to "the problem of universals" into a problem of cladistics' existential claim (ie, that universals exist). This claim was thus, as I have explained in recent posts on this blog, shown to be inconsistent by Betrand Russell in 1901 by what later became known as Russell's paradox (for those that hadn't understood this fact before, unlike Plato and many others).
It means that a biological systematist has to decide whether he/she believes that universals are real or not, ie, choose side between Aristotelian essentialism on the one hand and Plato's theory of forms/nominalism on the other, because the former leads to cladistic classification and the latter to Linnean systematics. However, if he/she chooses the former (ie, cladistic classification), then he/she has to be aware that it is inconsistent, ie, lacking consistent solution. None of them can thus reach the idea that cladistics calls "The Tree of Life".
måndag 24 september 2012
Succumbing to cladistics is actually succumbing to a search for an illusion
The assumption that dichotomously branching processes can be consistently classified into only clades (ie, the axiom of cladistics), is also an assumption that all such processes (ie, dichotomously branching processes) of all involved kinds of entities are congruent. If this assumption is sensible, then reality is insensible, since it means that present does not exist, and that process is impossible.
This inconsistency of the cladistic axiom may be difficult to understand, but the meaning of it isn't. It simply means that the cladistic classification, ie, into only clades, is inconsistent, ie, lacking a consistent solution.
It is thus possible to assume that dichotomously branching processes can be consistently classified into only clades, but it is not possible to make dichotomously branching processes consistently classifiable into only clades. It is possible to wish they were, but it is not possible to make them be. Wish is wish, and reality is reality.
Succumbing to cladistics is thus actually succumbing to a search for an illusion.
This inconsistency of the cladistic axiom may be difficult to understand, but the meaning of it isn't. It simply means that the cladistic classification, ie, into only clades, is inconsistent, ie, lacking a consistent solution.
It is thus possible to assume that dichotomously branching processes can be consistently classified into only clades, but it is not possible to make dichotomously branching processes consistently classifiable into only clades. It is possible to wish they were, but it is not possible to make them be. Wish is wish, and reality is reality.
Succumbing to cladistics is thus actually succumbing to a search for an illusion.
söndag 23 september 2012
On the impossibility of cladistics (and other such "natural" classifications)
The problem with the approach in biological systematics called "cladistics", ie, classifying bifurcating processes into so-called "clades" and "paraphyletic groups", is that this classification is inconsistent (actually paradoxically contradictory, see Russell's paradox), because this inconsistency means that the classification in practice is an infinite recursion, that is, a self-contradiction.
Such classification (ie, cladification) can thus search for a consistent solution forever without finding one, since there simply is none to be found. The fundamental error with the classification is that it confuses the concepts category (ie, finite class) and entity in an erroneous belief (thus actually axiom) that categories are consistent entities. This confusion is an occupational injury among people that deal too much with categorization (like biological systematists specifically and scientists generically), and is, unfortunately, shared with more simple-minded people just over-simplifying matters.
Those of us that don't confuse these concepts thus has an obligation to emphasize the difference between them, ie, that a single entity is not a category and that a category is not a single entity, because they simply can't be (see Russell's paradox), to help the confused out of this devastating confusion and hinder non-confused from falling into it. Category and entity are actually orthogonal concepts, ie, diametrically opposed, whereof category belongs to our minds, and entity belongs to reality. Never will nor can these two concepts thus meet. The difference between them is and will always be a pain in the ass for all extremist categorizers, but it will remain forever.
Such classification (ie, cladification) can thus search for a consistent solution forever without finding one, since there simply is none to be found. The fundamental error with the classification is that it confuses the concepts category (ie, finite class) and entity in an erroneous belief (thus actually axiom) that categories are consistent entities. This confusion is an occupational injury among people that deal too much with categorization (like biological systematists specifically and scientists generically), and is, unfortunately, shared with more simple-minded people just over-simplifying matters.
Those of us that don't confuse these concepts thus has an obligation to emphasize the difference between them, ie, that a single entity is not a category and that a category is not a single entity, because they simply can't be (see Russell's paradox), to help the confused out of this devastating confusion and hinder non-confused from falling into it. Category and entity are actually orthogonal concepts, ie, diametrically opposed, whereof category belongs to our minds, and entity belongs to reality. Never will nor can these two concepts thus meet. The difference between them is and will always be a pain in the ass for all extremist categorizers, but it will remain forever.
fredag 21 september 2012
The battle against cladistics is a matter of discarding belief in favor for skepticism
Cladistics only accepts a kind of group (ie, clades), which also includes the members of the group as groups. It thus only accepts groups that are also members of themselves. Such groups are thus not only groups, but also includes themselves as members of themselves. These groups are thus entities that include the groups themselves as entities.
If cladistics is not a paranoic circularity, then the question is what a paranoic circularity is. If cladists actually believe that they can partition reality into only such groups, then their mental statuses ought to be assessed. The question is thus whether cladists are in need of an assessment of their mental statuses or if they simply are confusing concepts for profit. Both of these are just as serious, since its paranoic approach is typological and thus supporting racism. If such groups actually would have been consistent, then racism would also have made sense, but since they aren't, it doesn't.
Cladistics is thus a reappearance of the same old oversimplified racism that dominated the beginning of the 20-ieth century. One would have hoped that it had stayed away longer, but the core of it was effectively transfered by the German entomologist Willi Hennig in the form of cladistics, and does today appear to have taken the power in biological systematics again, although it is clearly paranoic and thus not making sense. Making sense is thus, obviously, not a necessary prerequisite for an approach to be accepted, but instead belief, obviously, overrides making sense.
If we do not find a way to discard cladistics, then we're heading towards the same development as that in the beginning of the last century. And, if the description of cladistics above can't do this trick, then the question is what can. If the approach is immune to both being understood as paranoic and being falsified by facts, then nothing can stop it. Then, racism itself (ie, subjectivity) is bound to return over and over again, polarizing people and thus eradicating objectivity. Then, the question is: are you with us or with them, without any option to be objective in between.
The battle against cladistics is thus a battle for objectivity against subjectivity, and thus a battle against all subjective notions, such as racism. It is a battle for an objective approach between all opposite subjective approaches. It is a battle for gray between black and white, It is a battle for objective understanding between subjective notions. It is a battle for sensibility between beliefs. It is a battle for human rights between mine and your rights. It is a battle for the right to remain neutral between opposite subjective opinions (and skeptical to both of them). It is a battle for the freedom of both thoughts and talk. It is a battle for the freedom to explain that cladistics is both insensible and falsified by facts. It is a battle for the fact that the racism of cladistics is not supported by science, but instead by a belief in science, when science actually is not a matter of belief, but, on the contrary, of discarding belief.
The battle against cladistics is thus a matter of discarding belief in favor for skepticism (when cladistics instead is a battle of discarding skepticism in favor for belief).
If cladistics is not a paranoic circularity, then the question is what a paranoic circularity is. If cladists actually believe that they can partition reality into only such groups, then their mental statuses ought to be assessed. The question is thus whether cladists are in need of an assessment of their mental statuses or if they simply are confusing concepts for profit. Both of these are just as serious, since its paranoic approach is typological and thus supporting racism. If such groups actually would have been consistent, then racism would also have made sense, but since they aren't, it doesn't.
Cladistics is thus a reappearance of the same old oversimplified racism that dominated the beginning of the 20-ieth century. One would have hoped that it had stayed away longer, but the core of it was effectively transfered by the German entomologist Willi Hennig in the form of cladistics, and does today appear to have taken the power in biological systematics again, although it is clearly paranoic and thus not making sense. Making sense is thus, obviously, not a necessary prerequisite for an approach to be accepted, but instead belief, obviously, overrides making sense.
If we do not find a way to discard cladistics, then we're heading towards the same development as that in the beginning of the last century. And, if the description of cladistics above can't do this trick, then the question is what can. If the approach is immune to both being understood as paranoic and being falsified by facts, then nothing can stop it. Then, racism itself (ie, subjectivity) is bound to return over and over again, polarizing people and thus eradicating objectivity. Then, the question is: are you with us or with them, without any option to be objective in between.
The battle against cladistics is thus a battle for objectivity against subjectivity, and thus a battle against all subjective notions, such as racism. It is a battle for an objective approach between all opposite subjective approaches. It is a battle for gray between black and white, It is a battle for objective understanding between subjective notions. It is a battle for sensibility between beliefs. It is a battle for human rights between mine and your rights. It is a battle for the right to remain neutral between opposite subjective opinions (and skeptical to both of them). It is a battle for the freedom of both thoughts and talk. It is a battle for the freedom to explain that cladistics is both insensible and falsified by facts. It is a battle for the fact that the racism of cladistics is not supported by science, but instead by a belief in science, when science actually is not a matter of belief, but, on the contrary, of discarding belief.
The battle against cladistics is thus a matter of discarding belief in favor for skepticism (when cladistics instead is a battle of discarding skepticism in favor for belief).
måndag 17 september 2012
Linnean systematics and cladistics are just two different kinds of classifications of dichotomously propagating processes
Linnean systematics and cladistics are just two different kinds of classifications of dichotomously propagating processes: Linnean systematics accepting the fact that the classification of such processes can't be unambiguous, and cladistics instead searching for unambiguous classifications of such processes (ie, not accepting the fact that classification of such processes can't be unambiguous).
These two kinds of classifications are thus just different (orthogonal) opinions on whether classification of dichotomously propagating processes can be unambiguous or not, whereof cladistics is wrong.
These two kinds of classifications are thus just different (orthogonal) opinions on whether classification of dichotomously propagating processes can be unambiguous or not, whereof cladistics is wrong.
On biological systematics and "True Trees of Life"
The "new" (actually pre-scientific) approach in biological systematics that is called "cladistics" rests on the idea, actually belief, that "there is a single True Tree of Life" (which thus is possible for us to find).
This belief may appear sensible in the light of Darwin's theory "on the origin of species", but is actually an illusion emerging from a combination of Darwin's theory and a generally typological approach. The illusion is, however, not easy to disclose.
The problem with the belief resides in that such "True Tree" in practice is a trace backwards in time from the situation today, and that the situation today in practice can be classified in several different, but just as "true" ways, because it means that there are several True Trees of Life per definition. The fact that the situation today thus in practice is ambiguous, moreover means that the possible "True Trees" in practice are contradictory. (The idea (ie, belief) that there should be a single unambiguous classification of the situation today is falsified by the fact that classification is inherently orthogonal and thus ultimately paradoxically contradictory, also shown by Russell's paradox).
The problem with the cladistic belief is thus not that there isn't a single True Tree of Life, but that there are several contradictory True Trees of Life. The problem with this fact for the belief is that the fact that these True Trees of Life are contradictory means that they can't be consistently summarized in a single True Tree of Life, but can instead only be consistently assembled in an orthogonal system of classification, like the Linnean systematics (and thus also evolutionary taxonomy).
It means that the founding idea (ie, belief) for cladistics, ie, that "there is a single True Tree of Life" (which thus is possible for us to find), is wrong. Fact is that there is no such thing to be found. Instead, there are several contradictory True Trees of Life which can only be consistently (coherently) assembled using an orthogonal system of classification, like the Linnean systematics (and thus also evolutionary taxonomy). Cladistics is thus an erroneous belief in a single True Tree of Life, whereas Linnean systematics is a consistent (coherent) assembly of the True Trees of Life.
This belief may appear sensible in the light of Darwin's theory "on the origin of species", but is actually an illusion emerging from a combination of Darwin's theory and a generally typological approach. The illusion is, however, not easy to disclose.
The problem with the belief resides in that such "True Tree" in practice is a trace backwards in time from the situation today, and that the situation today in practice can be classified in several different, but just as "true" ways, because it means that there are several True Trees of Life per definition. The fact that the situation today thus in practice is ambiguous, moreover means that the possible "True Trees" in practice are contradictory. (The idea (ie, belief) that there should be a single unambiguous classification of the situation today is falsified by the fact that classification is inherently orthogonal and thus ultimately paradoxically contradictory, also shown by Russell's paradox).
The problem with the cladistic belief is thus not that there isn't a single True Tree of Life, but that there are several contradictory True Trees of Life. The problem with this fact for the belief is that the fact that these True Trees of Life are contradictory means that they can't be consistently summarized in a single True Tree of Life, but can instead only be consistently assembled in an orthogonal system of classification, like the Linnean systematics (and thus also evolutionary taxonomy).
It means that the founding idea (ie, belief) for cladistics, ie, that "there is a single True Tree of Life" (which thus is possible for us to find), is wrong. Fact is that there is no such thing to be found. Instead, there are several contradictory True Trees of Life which can only be consistently (coherently) assembled using an orthogonal system of classification, like the Linnean systematics (and thus also evolutionary taxonomy). Cladistics is thus an erroneous belief in a single True Tree of Life, whereas Linnean systematics is a consistent (coherent) assembly of the True Trees of Life.
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