Biological systematics offers two diametrically opposed (ie, orthogonal) classifications: Linnean systematics and Cladistics (ie, the PhyloCode), whereof Linnean systematics is relative and the PhyloCode is absolute. It means that Linnean systematics combines typology (is, classification) of things with historical relationship between things (ie, ethnicity) using a compromise between these two attributes of things (under the assumption that the two attributes are diametrically opposed), whereas Cladistics on the contrary assumes as an axiom (actually claims) that these two attributes are not orthogonal, but instead consistent (and therefore don't have to be combined using a compromise). Linnean systematics thus assumes that typology is orthogonal to ethnicity, whereas Cladistics on the contrary assumes as an axiom (actually claims) that typology and ethnicity are consistent. It means that Cladistics is essential for race biology. Only iff typology is consistent with ethnicity (as Cladistics assumes, actually claims) is race biology rational.
So, is typology orthogonal to or consistent with ethnicity?
Cladistics claims that the answer to this question is not a matter of facts, but of premises. This claim means that typology can be both orthogonal to and consistent with ethnicity depending on which premises one chooses, ie, that the answer only depends on which answer one prefers. If this claim is true, then "orthogonal to" and "consistent with" are not opposites, but equalities, since the difference between them is not real. If so, then there isn't any difference between Linnean systematics and Cladistics at all, but instead they are just two different aspects on the same thing, ie, the true tree of life, whereof Linnean systematics merely is a redundant complication.
The problem for the Cladistic claim is that it is contradicted both theoretically and practically. Theoretically by Bertrand Russell's demonstration already a hundred years ago (1901) that classification is ultimately paradoxically contradictory, by meaning that the cladistic equalization of typology and etnicity ends in paradox, and practically by the fact that time is relative (ie, orthogonal) to space, by meaning that the Cladistic equalization of type and ethnicity is actually just a conflation of type and ethnicity. Type and ethnicity are factually not equal, but orthogonal.
The answer to the question above is thus that typology is orthogonal to ethnicity. Fortunately, it means that race biology is irrational. When we understand this fact, there is thus no return to the old race biology that Willi Hennig transferred from the Nazi approach to today's Cladistics. Then we can discard both it and Cladistics as resting on the old erroneous idea that ethnicity (ie, races, species, genera, and so on) necessarily also is typologically distinct, instead returning to the old and fundamental question in biological systematics: what is a species? Isn't this shift interesting, Gareth (Nelson)?
The problem with race biology is that also many of those that don't like it still believe in races. They would be better off if they could understand that belief in races itself is irrational..
onsdag 28 augusti 2013
måndag 19 augusti 2013
On the battle between beliefs and pragmatism
Believers have a tendency to polarize matters. Exactly what they believe in doesn't matter, since there is always an opposite belief that it can battle with. Between them are pragmatists squeezed.
Belief in Creation (ie, Creationism) is the opposite to belief in a single True Tree of Life (today called Cladism), both of which end in paradox. If God created life, who, then, created God? If there is a single True Tree of Life, how, then, did it originate? The former is an endless recursion and the latter is a self-contradiction. Between them stands Carl von Linnè's pragmatic (consistent) solution of the problem, ie, an orthogonal system of classification, but who cares when the battle appears to rage between two opposite beliefs?
These two opposite beliefs aren't, however, as incompatible as they may seem. God may well have created biodiversity via a "true tree of Life", although it doesn't agree with the scriptures, and a "true tree of life" does not exclude creation. Instead, there are actually more properties that unite them than that divide them. Both are inconsistent, although in the two possible directions we can be inconsistent, that is, invoking a "pushing power" (ie, God) and conceptual confusion, but the latter of which logically leads to the conclusion that there indeed is a "pushing power" of the former, but which it instead calls "natural selection". They can thus join if they agree to call the "pushing power" (ie, the "natural selection" of the latter) God.
The difference between these two beliefs and pragmatism is that whereas the "natural selection" of the former is a "pushing power", ie, enhancing the probability for survival of the fittest, it is for the latter rather a "filtering power", ie, just deleting what can't survive. God for pragmatists is thus not the "pushing power" it is for creationists and cladists, but just a "filtering power" of what can possibly exist. The difference between the two beliefs and pragmatism does thus reside in how they comprehend the notion of "natural selection". For the beliefs, it is a "pushing power" that "purify" races, whereas it for pragmatists is a "filtering power" that can't avoid to give rise of races. This difference may appear insignificant, but is, on the contrary, fundamental, since none of the two beliefs thus allow for intermediates between races, but which the latter, on the contrary, does. Pragmatism does thus leave an opening for the fact that intermediates between races do exist, which the two beliefs do not. Pragmatism does thus agree with facts, which the two beliefs do not.
Pragmatism thus has the advantage to all beliefs that it can agree with all facts, which beliefs can't. Its disadvantage is that it can't be believed in, since it has no opposites. This disadvantage is, however, also the advantage of it, by pointing to the truth. (The problem that the truth is relative is, however, another matter).
The conclusion of this contemplation is that there are more properties that unite Creationism and Cladism than that divide them, and that they are actually opposite to the pragmatism they squeeze between them. And, that the pragmatism they squeeze between them actually is the only approach that can agree with all facts. It leaves pragmatism as the winner, although it can't compete with beliefs on the stage of beliefs, but insted is squeezed between them. Pragmatism is sense, whereas belief is feelings. Belief can thus defeat pragmatism only temporarily, since agreement with facts win in the long run.
Belief in Creation (ie, Creationism) is the opposite to belief in a single True Tree of Life (today called Cladism), both of which end in paradox. If God created life, who, then, created God? If there is a single True Tree of Life, how, then, did it originate? The former is an endless recursion and the latter is a self-contradiction. Between them stands Carl von Linnè's pragmatic (consistent) solution of the problem, ie, an orthogonal system of classification, but who cares when the battle appears to rage between two opposite beliefs?
These two opposite beliefs aren't, however, as incompatible as they may seem. God may well have created biodiversity via a "true tree of Life", although it doesn't agree with the scriptures, and a "true tree of life" does not exclude creation. Instead, there are actually more properties that unite them than that divide them. Both are inconsistent, although in the two possible directions we can be inconsistent, that is, invoking a "pushing power" (ie, God) and conceptual confusion, but the latter of which logically leads to the conclusion that there indeed is a "pushing power" of the former, but which it instead calls "natural selection". They can thus join if they agree to call the "pushing power" (ie, the "natural selection" of the latter) God.
The difference between these two beliefs and pragmatism is that whereas the "natural selection" of the former is a "pushing power", ie, enhancing the probability for survival of the fittest, it is for the latter rather a "filtering power", ie, just deleting what can't survive. God for pragmatists is thus not the "pushing power" it is for creationists and cladists, but just a "filtering power" of what can possibly exist. The difference between the two beliefs and pragmatism does thus reside in how they comprehend the notion of "natural selection". For the beliefs, it is a "pushing power" that "purify" races, whereas it for pragmatists is a "filtering power" that can't avoid to give rise of races. This difference may appear insignificant, but is, on the contrary, fundamental, since none of the two beliefs thus allow for intermediates between races, but which the latter, on the contrary, does. Pragmatism does thus leave an opening for the fact that intermediates between races do exist, which the two beliefs do not. Pragmatism does thus agree with facts, which the two beliefs do not.
Pragmatism thus has the advantage to all beliefs that it can agree with all facts, which beliefs can't. Its disadvantage is that it can't be believed in, since it has no opposites. This disadvantage is, however, also the advantage of it, by pointing to the truth. (The problem that the truth is relative is, however, another matter).
The conclusion of this contemplation is that there are more properties that unite Creationism and Cladism than that divide them, and that they are actually opposite to the pragmatism they squeeze between them. And, that the pragmatism they squeeze between them actually is the only approach that can agree with all facts. It leaves pragmatism as the winner, although it can't compete with beliefs on the stage of beliefs, but insted is squeezed between them. Pragmatism is sense, whereas belief is feelings. Belief can thus defeat pragmatism only temporarily, since agreement with facts win in the long run.
fredag 16 augusti 2013
Is cladistics sensible?
Cladistics (Willi Hennig and his followers) claims that there is a single true description of history, which it calls the true tree of life.
But, how can there possibly be a single true description of history, when there isn't a single true description of present?
Can Claditics' claim create a single true description of present?
Are facts created by claims?
Is cladistics sensible?
But, how can there possibly be a single true description of history, when there isn't a single true description of present?
Can Claditics' claim create a single true description of present?
Are facts created by claims?
Is cladistics sensible?
tisdag 13 augusti 2013
On the route into the consistently inconsistent reasoning that is called "cladistics"
Those biological systematists that are called cladists believe that there is a single true description of the origin of biodiversity, which they call "the true tree of life". Whether they also believe that there is a single true description of any other historical event, a single true painting of any part of reality, or a single true description of our the present reality is unknown, but the reason for this their obviously erroneous belief is known - that they believe that "species" are real.
Cladistics actually started with a discussion trying to find an answer to the question: what is a species? The answer to this question was sought after by trying to find a definition that encompasses everything they put into the concept "species". When this discussion had reached tens of different definitions, some of the biological systematists (ie, the cladists) simply changed focus from this question into the question: which is the true tree of life? The fact that this question requires an answer to the former question was dealt with by trying to define "species" post-hoc circularly in terms of the notion of a "true tree of life". This circularity led cladists into the erroneous belief in a "true tree of life" by simply shifting focus from one question to another without them even being aware of that it did. Once in the belief, they simply didn't know how to get out of it, because they didn't know how they got into it. They were simply stuck in the belief by lacking the understanding that could have kept them outside of it.
The original question was thus: what is a species? Now, this question is inconsistent by asking for what we actually decide. A species is simply what we say a species is. If we, for example, say that humans is a species, and define what we mean by "human", then humans is a species. It isn't more complicated than that. The (cladistic) idea that the question "what is a species?" has an answer rests on the assumption that species are real, ie, existing entities, like objects (eg, organisms), an assumption that, however, is inconsistent, since not both objects and species can be real at the same time by being orthogonal. If objects are real, then species are abstract, and vice versa. In conceptualization, there has to be a difference between "real" and "abstract" (ie, the represented and representation), and one of them has to be on the opposite side to the other to avoid self-contradiction. In a fundamental sense, it doesn't really matter whether we call objects or species real, but in a consistency sense, species can't, of course, be real if objects (eg, organisms) are abstract. Species can't consist of abstract entities, but abstract species can consist of real objects. This means that objects (eg, organisms) has to be real, and species has to be abstract to avoid inconsistency.
There is, however, a further problem with the concept species. Whereas an object is single both in reality and in abstraction, a species is a infinite in abstraction (ie, a type, or abstraction) and finite in reality (ie, a category). It means that assuming that species are real (and thus can be defined) conflates infinity with finity, which can't be practically accomplished, since infinity and finity are orthogonal. This imposibility composes a practical barrier to all attempts to define the concept species. No matter how "natural" we think that species are, we still will thus never succeed to define them. Instead, they are actually impossible to define.
We can thus describe the origin of biodiversity in terms of "the origin of species", but this description can never reach unambiguity, since species can't be unambiguous. Changing focus from the definition of species into "the true tree of life" does not change this fact, but just discards it. This discarding does thus not , however, change this fact, but just leads into the consistently inconsistent reasoning that cladistics is.
Cladistics actually started with a discussion trying to find an answer to the question: what is a species? The answer to this question was sought after by trying to find a definition that encompasses everything they put into the concept "species". When this discussion had reached tens of different definitions, some of the biological systematists (ie, the cladists) simply changed focus from this question into the question: which is the true tree of life? The fact that this question requires an answer to the former question was dealt with by trying to define "species" post-hoc circularly in terms of the notion of a "true tree of life". This circularity led cladists into the erroneous belief in a "true tree of life" by simply shifting focus from one question to another without them even being aware of that it did. Once in the belief, they simply didn't know how to get out of it, because they didn't know how they got into it. They were simply stuck in the belief by lacking the understanding that could have kept them outside of it.
The original question was thus: what is a species? Now, this question is inconsistent by asking for what we actually decide. A species is simply what we say a species is. If we, for example, say that humans is a species, and define what we mean by "human", then humans is a species. It isn't more complicated than that. The (cladistic) idea that the question "what is a species?" has an answer rests on the assumption that species are real, ie, existing entities, like objects (eg, organisms), an assumption that, however, is inconsistent, since not both objects and species can be real at the same time by being orthogonal. If objects are real, then species are abstract, and vice versa. In conceptualization, there has to be a difference between "real" and "abstract" (ie, the represented and representation), and one of them has to be on the opposite side to the other to avoid self-contradiction. In a fundamental sense, it doesn't really matter whether we call objects or species real, but in a consistency sense, species can't, of course, be real if objects (eg, organisms) are abstract. Species can't consist of abstract entities, but abstract species can consist of real objects. This means that objects (eg, organisms) has to be real, and species has to be abstract to avoid inconsistency.
There is, however, a further problem with the concept species. Whereas an object is single both in reality and in abstraction, a species is a infinite in abstraction (ie, a type, or abstraction) and finite in reality (ie, a category). It means that assuming that species are real (and thus can be defined) conflates infinity with finity, which can't be practically accomplished, since infinity and finity are orthogonal. This imposibility composes a practical barrier to all attempts to define the concept species. No matter how "natural" we think that species are, we still will thus never succeed to define them. Instead, they are actually impossible to define.
We can thus describe the origin of biodiversity in terms of "the origin of species", but this description can never reach unambiguity, since species can't be unambiguous. Changing focus from the definition of species into "the true tree of life" does not change this fact, but just discards it. This discarding does thus not , however, change this fact, but just leads into the consistently inconsistent reasoning that cladistics is.
fredag 9 augusti 2013
How long will cladistics' belief in a single "true tree of live" survive within biological systematics?
The problem with cladistics is that it conflates states of things with change between states of things.
This conflation gives rise to the question: "why do we distinguish states of things and change if we then conflate them?", and, "which of all possible conflations of them equals them?".
Every possible conflation is namely also paradoxically contradictory (see Russell's paradox), so, how can we possibly ever agree on a particular conflation of them, when we can't even agree on the fact that it is a conflation of states of things with change between states of things?
Now, if we can't possibly ever agree on a particular conflation of them, then we have to ask ourselves what we are doing and why. Our efforts will never result in any stable state, but will just give rise to new inconsistencies forever. This chase started from an axiomatic belief in a single "true tree of life", so when will we abandon this belief? After ten years, after one hundred years, after one thousand years, or never?
So, how long will cladistics' belief in a single "true tree of live" survive within biological systematics? (It will never die as an idea, but the question is how long it will survive in biological systematics).
This conflation gives rise to the question: "why do we distinguish states of things and change if we then conflate them?", and, "which of all possible conflations of them equals them?".
Every possible conflation is namely also paradoxically contradictory (see Russell's paradox), so, how can we possibly ever agree on a particular conflation of them, when we can't even agree on the fact that it is a conflation of states of things with change between states of things?
Now, if we can't possibly ever agree on a particular conflation of them, then we have to ask ourselves what we are doing and why. Our efforts will never result in any stable state, but will just give rise to new inconsistencies forever. This chase started from an axiomatic belief in a single "true tree of life", so when will we abandon this belief? After ten years, after one hundred years, after one thousand years, or never?
So, how long will cladistics' belief in a single "true tree of live" survive within biological systematics? (It will never die as an idea, but the question is how long it will survive in biological systematics).
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