The fundamental problem of conceptualization is that reality in every moment is ambiguous between generics and specifics (which we call "process" and "pattern", respectively).
This problem means that if we assume that reality actually is unambiguous in every moment, then only one of them (ie, generics or specifics) can be real in a generic sense, whereas the other instead has to be paradoxically contradictory (ie, ambiguous between specific instances of the other). The only alternative is to assume that reality is ambiguous.
Now, whereas specifics rationally can be ambiguous between generics (it is just instances of different entities of a kind, or of different kinds of a specific kind), generics rationally can't be ambiguous between specifics, since it is instances of paradoxical contradiction.
It means that we have to interpret reality in terms of specifics and generics to resolve the fundamental ambiguity of reality, and of these, specifics rationally have to be considered real whereas generics thus have to be paradoxically contradictory. This solution means that conceptualization has to be ambiguous in relation to reality.
The only alternative is to assume that reality is ambiguous (as we concluded above), but since this alternative in a conceptual sense conflates specifics with generics, it is actually paradoxically contradictory in a conceptual sense.
Together, these facts mean that talking about reality in itself excludes the option to be unambiguous. Instead, they leave us with the only options to be either (1) consistent (nominalism) or (2) consistently inconsistent (realism), whereof the former is ambiguous in relation to reality and the latter is paradoxically contradictory.
Cladistics actually chooses the alternative to assume that reality is ambiguous, although the ambiguity is disguised as "unambiguous processes" (ie, clades), and does thus land in paradoxical contradiction. The meaning of this "paradoxical contradiction" is just that it is consistently contradictory (ie, can't escape contradiction).
onsdag 30 maj 2012
tisdag 29 maj 2012
Nothing is more sure than that the illusion of "a single tree of life" is just an illusion
Cladistics (1) conflates entities with classes, (2) assumes that such entity-classes are real, and (3) assumes that these entity-classes have originated by dichotomous splitting from a single ancestral entity-class. It thus appears extremely complicated, but the conceptual mess just fulfills one purpose - to confuse entities with classes and thus substitute entities with classes.
This substitution does, however, encounter one serious problem: whereas entities are allocated into classes on the basis of two kinds of differences: generic and specific, classes are in cladistics joined into other classes based on just one kind of similarities. This problem means that cladistics is consistently contradictory ending in a paradoxical contradiction, which is traditionally called Russell's paradox but which cladistics calls "the tree of life". The substitution thus turns the consistent scientific approach into a consistently inconsistent approach ending in paradox.
Cladistics is thus actually serious conceptual confusion aiming at creating an illusion that the dream of "a single tree of life" is a real possibility. This is indeed a desirable objective, but it does not promote understanding of reality. The hard fact is instead that this dream is, just this, a dream. There are actually several just as true such "trees of life", because classes are not real and they have thus not originated by dichotomous splitting from an ancestral class. Fact is instead that the illusion of "a single tree of life" is securely isolated from reality by both its internal contradiction and the continuous change of reality. To become a reality, it has to overcome its own internal contradiction and stop the world. Nothing is thus more sure than that this illusion is indeed just an illusion.
This substitution does, however, encounter one serious problem: whereas entities are allocated into classes on the basis of two kinds of differences: generic and specific, classes are in cladistics joined into other classes based on just one kind of similarities. This problem means that cladistics is consistently contradictory ending in a paradoxical contradiction, which is traditionally called Russell's paradox but which cladistics calls "the tree of life". The substitution thus turns the consistent scientific approach into a consistently inconsistent approach ending in paradox.
Cladistics is thus actually serious conceptual confusion aiming at creating an illusion that the dream of "a single tree of life" is a real possibility. This is indeed a desirable objective, but it does not promote understanding of reality. The hard fact is instead that this dream is, just this, a dream. There are actually several just as true such "trees of life", because classes are not real and they have thus not originated by dichotomous splitting from an ancestral class. Fact is instead that the illusion of "a single tree of life" is securely isolated from reality by both its internal contradiction and the continuous change of reality. To become a reality, it has to overcome its own internal contradiction and stop the world. Nothing is thus more sure than that this illusion is indeed just an illusion.
onsdag 23 maj 2012
On Willi Hennig's (ie, cladistics') conceptual meltdown
Reality can be described in at least two different ways in different aspects: as consecutive patterns (like "hairy" and "bald") or as process (like "changing from hairy to bold"). This duality means that there isn't any single true description of reality to be found per definition, because all descriptions are are indecisive between patterns and process per definition.
This fact does not exclude the possibility to partition reality into only processes (ie, conflating pattern with process), like Willi Hennig did with the class "clade" (originally erroneously called "monophyletic groups"), thus creating an impression that there indeed are true descriptions of reality to be found, and that all of these descriptions furthermore can be consistently combined into a single true description of reality (ie, Hennig's "single tree of life"). This possibility is, however, merely a conceptual (abstract) illusion. Fact is that the possibility is consistently (ie, paradoxically) contradictory by instead incorporating the fundamental duality into the class "process" (ie, "clade"), thus making it internally indecisive, that is, consistently (ie, paradoxically) contradictory. The "denial" of patterns by conflating them with process does not actually get rid of patterns, but only inconsistently interprets them as processes, which thus is paradoxically contradictory (ie, making such "processes" indecisive between patterns and process).
Hennig appears to have believed he "solved" this problem (ie, fact) by equalling "process" with "later" patterns, ie, what he called "apomorphies", thus distinguishing these from "earlier" patterns, ie, what he called "plesiomorphies". This distinction is, however, actually irrational by resting on the assumption that there indeed are true descriptions of reality to be found, and that all of these descriptions furthermore can be consistently combined into a single true description of reality (ie, Hennig's "tree of life"). Fact is the opposite, that is, that there isn't any single true description of reality to be found per definition, because all descriptions are are indecisive between patterns and process per definition, meaning that Hennig's distinction of "earlier" and "later" patterns, ie, what he called "plesiomorphies" and "apomorphies", instead is consistently (paradoxically) inconsistent. Patterns actually can't be consistently partitioned into only "earlier" and "later" when there are more than two consecutive patterns, since it then are at least three kinds of patterns: "earlier", "change" (ie, process) and "later" per definition.
The possibility Willi Hennig thus utilized to partition reality into only processes (ie, conflating pattern with process) using "clade" (originally erroneously called "monophyletic group") is thus actually a consistently (paradoxically) inconsistent conceptual (abstract) illusion. All possible such phenomena including more than two consecutive patterns are actually paradoxically contradictory. This fact is, however, visible only in the objective aspect. In the subjective aspect does it reside in the observer's own eyes and reveals itself only by his/hers consistent inconsistency.
This fact does not exclude the possibility to partition reality into only processes (ie, conflating pattern with process), like Willi Hennig did with the class "clade" (originally erroneously called "monophyletic groups"), thus creating an impression that there indeed are true descriptions of reality to be found, and that all of these descriptions furthermore can be consistently combined into a single true description of reality (ie, Hennig's "single tree of life"). This possibility is, however, merely a conceptual (abstract) illusion. Fact is that the possibility is consistently (ie, paradoxically) contradictory by instead incorporating the fundamental duality into the class "process" (ie, "clade"), thus making it internally indecisive, that is, consistently (ie, paradoxically) contradictory. The "denial" of patterns by conflating them with process does not actually get rid of patterns, but only inconsistently interprets them as processes, which thus is paradoxically contradictory (ie, making such "processes" indecisive between patterns and process).
Hennig appears to have believed he "solved" this problem (ie, fact) by equalling "process" with "later" patterns, ie, what he called "apomorphies", thus distinguishing these from "earlier" patterns, ie, what he called "plesiomorphies". This distinction is, however, actually irrational by resting on the assumption that there indeed are true descriptions of reality to be found, and that all of these descriptions furthermore can be consistently combined into a single true description of reality (ie, Hennig's "tree of life"). Fact is the opposite, that is, that there isn't any single true description of reality to be found per definition, because all descriptions are are indecisive between patterns and process per definition, meaning that Hennig's distinction of "earlier" and "later" patterns, ie, what he called "plesiomorphies" and "apomorphies", instead is consistently (paradoxically) inconsistent. Patterns actually can't be consistently partitioned into only "earlier" and "later" when there are more than two consecutive patterns, since it then are at least three kinds of patterns: "earlier", "change" (ie, process) and "later" per definition.
The possibility Willi Hennig thus utilized to partition reality into only processes (ie, conflating pattern with process) using "clade" (originally erroneously called "monophyletic group") is thus actually a consistently (paradoxically) inconsistent conceptual (abstract) illusion. All possible such phenomena including more than two consecutive patterns are actually paradoxically contradictory. This fact is, however, visible only in the objective aspect. In the subjective aspect does it reside in the observer's own eyes and reveals itself only by his/hers consistent inconsistency.
tisdag 15 maj 2012
The "true tree of life" must be a fuzzy set
Biological systematists have been searching for the "true" classification since the dawn of man. They are convinced that every biological organism belongs to one and only one "true class" (or "true set of classes"), which is also the "natural group" (or "natural groups") for the organism. For them, classes are not something we allocate organisms to, but something organisms are. They just try to find out which classes every organism is (or which "natural groups" it belongs to). The approach is strictly typological, and has also been practically applied as "race cleansing" from time to time.
Never has it struck these biological systematists that the classes reside in their own eyes, although they have changed their minds about the specifics of these "natural groups" for about two and a half millenia by now. On the contrary, the post-war German entomologist Willi Hennig asserted (claimed, defined) that such "natural groups" are to be found practically by reversing our own classification !!! His suggestion led these biological systematists to assert (claim, define) that they have found "the natural groups" every time they have classified and reversed the classification (whichever classification it is) over and over again. The only difference to before Hennig is that they now also reverse their classification arriving to what they started with. That is, they think they have derived the "natural groups" instead of simply classified them, although they derive exactly what they classify.
One wonders how long they can continue with these stupid practices resting on the erroneous axiom that classes are real? Bertrand Russell showed that this axiom is paradoxically contradictory already 1901 and Einstein revealed some years later that time is relative to space, which falsifies this axiom, so when will these biological systematists acknowledge these facts and discard their erroneous axiom? When will they give up for facts and discard their erroneous idea of a single true tree of life?
I said it before and I say it again: there is no "true" classification of biological organisms to be found. None of us (organisms) can be pidgeon-holed into a single set of "natural groups". Instead, all of us are a little bit of this and a little bit of that, and can thus be pidgeon-holed into many different sets of "natural groups". It isn't that "natural groups" do not exist, but that every single set of "natural groups" is contradictory. If "natural groups" actually do exist, they they must thus be fuzzy sets.
It means that the idea of a "single "true tree of life" must be a fuzzy set.
Never has it struck these biological systematists that the classes reside in their own eyes, although they have changed their minds about the specifics of these "natural groups" for about two and a half millenia by now. On the contrary, the post-war German entomologist Willi Hennig asserted (claimed, defined) that such "natural groups" are to be found practically by reversing our own classification !!! His suggestion led these biological systematists to assert (claim, define) that they have found "the natural groups" every time they have classified and reversed the classification (whichever classification it is) over and over again. The only difference to before Hennig is that they now also reverse their classification arriving to what they started with. That is, they think they have derived the "natural groups" instead of simply classified them, although they derive exactly what they classify.
One wonders how long they can continue with these stupid practices resting on the erroneous axiom that classes are real? Bertrand Russell showed that this axiom is paradoxically contradictory already 1901 and Einstein revealed some years later that time is relative to space, which falsifies this axiom, so when will these biological systematists acknowledge these facts and discard their erroneous axiom? When will they give up for facts and discard their erroneous idea of a single true tree of life?
I said it before and I say it again: there is no "true" classification of biological organisms to be found. None of us (organisms) can be pidgeon-holed into a single set of "natural groups". Instead, all of us are a little bit of this and a little bit of that, and can thus be pidgeon-holed into many different sets of "natural groups". It isn't that "natural groups" do not exist, but that every single set of "natural groups" is contradictory. If "natural groups" actually do exist, they they must thus be fuzzy sets.
It means that the idea of a "single "true tree of life" must be a fuzzy set.
fredag 11 maj 2012
On the relation between "entity", "class" and "category", and cladistics
There is a fundamental difference between entities (ie, objects) and classes in that every single class contains at least two entities. A single entity thus can't be a single class, just like a single class can't be a single entity. The reason is that if a single class indeed could be a single entity, then "infinite class" (what we traditionally call "class") would equal "finite class" (what we traditionally call "category"), and there would thus not be any difference between the concepts "entity", "class" and "category", which is contradicted by the fact that "class" can't equal "category", since it would mean that "infinity" equals "finity", which simply is a contradiction.
The relation between entity and class is thus orthogonal, which can be described mathematically by the formula X/Y=Y/X (read as that X (entity) relates to Y (class) like Y relates to X).
Cladistics conflates this orthogonal relation between entity and class by conflating the concepts "entity" and "class". This conflation does not equalize entities and classes, but just leaves consistency for consistent inconsistency.
The relation between entity and class is thus orthogonal, which can be described mathematically by the formula X/Y=Y/X (read as that X (entity) relates to Y (class) like Y relates to X).
Cladistics conflates this orthogonal relation between entity and class by conflating the concepts "entity" and "class". This conflation does not equalize entities and classes, but just leaves consistency for consistent inconsistency.
torsdag 10 maj 2012
The problem with clades
The problem with clades is that each of their internal branches (ie, between nodes) consistently represents two entities: one descendant and one ancestor, because it means that these branches consistently contain changes between character states and thus can possess mutually exclusive properties. This fact is difficult to interpret, but among other things, it means that a "true" clade, like the idea of a "true tree of life", is shorter than the "most parsimonious" such tree. However, since this state is impossible, the practical implication of the fact is instead that there are several just as parsimonious trees. The fact thus means that the idea of a "true" clade in practice is a matter of gray scale rather than of black and white. Every bifurcating process that has to be represented with at least one internal branch does in fact offer several just as parsimonious tree illustrations, all of which are contradictory. There is thus no consistent tree illustration of any bifurcating process that has to be represented with at least one internal branch to be found.
This impossibility may be difficult to understand, but the alternative is to search for something that can't be found.
This impossibility may be difficult to understand, but the alternative is to search for something that can't be found.
måndag 7 maj 2012
On the beauty of Linnean systematics
The beauty of the Linnean system is that it acknowledges the fundamental orthogonality of reality.
That this fact is not merely a coincidence is shown by Linné's statement that "it is not the characters that make the genus, but the genus that gives the characters". This statement points at the two facts that (1) there is a difference between a genus (ie, process) and its characters (ie, patterns), and (2) a genus (process) is not defined by its characters (patterns), but defines its characters. It thus points at the fact that a genus is the opposite to entity (in this case a "biological species"), which instead is defined by its characters per definition (in our conceptualization of reality).
Malte Ebach uses this statement in Darwin's interpretation that:"Such expressions as that famous one of Linnaeus, and which we often meet with in a more or less concealed form, that the characters do not make the genus, but that the genus gives the characters, seem to imply that something more is included in our classification than mere resemblance. I believe that something more is included, and that propinquity of descent, - the only known cause of the similarity of organic beings, - is the bond, hidden as it is by various degrees of modification, which is partially revealed to us by our classifications" (Darwin, 1859, p. 413f.
However, Darwin's interpretation of Linnaeus' statement is an unfortunate conflation of conceptualization and facts.The "something more" that is included in classification than mere resemblance is difference: the difference between species and genus in that whereas characters make the species, they don't make the genus; they make the species that the genus consist of. The statement just points at the fundamental difference between genera and the entities (in this case "biological species) it consists of. The genus and its species do together form a totality wherein both only exist in terms of the other. Linnaeus' statement thus points at the difference between genus and species.
What Darwin forgot in his interpretation of Linnaeus' statement, and also cladists of today forget, is that classification includes both resemblances (ie, similarities) and differences, and that it does this at the same time. For example, distinguishing humans and chimps as two classes of primates on resemblances does at the same time distinguish primates and non-primates by differences. Classification uses both resemblances and differences at the same time. For Darwin, and today's cladists, differences in classification appear given, whereas resemblances, and the reason for them, appear to be the issue. For Linnaeus, classification of reality itself was the issue.
The fundamental question in biological systematics is how to classify the biological diversity consistently, and that question did Linnaeus answer. Darwin's theory that resemblances among biological organisms may be due to "propinquity of descent" may be true or not, its truthfulness is not critical for Linnaeus answer to the fundamental question in biological systematics. The reason for the resemblances does not actually matter, Linnaeus system holds independently of the reason for the resemblances. Nothing can be classified consistently without an orthogonal system such as Linnaeus', because classification, and also ultimately reality itself, is orthogonal.
Linnaeus' system does thus not depend on the reason for resemblances (ie, similarities), but is, instead, the only kind of system (ie, an orthogonal system) that can classify (anything) consistently. It is actually the solution of Russell's paradox by bridging this paradox. Darwin appears to be right about the source for many resemblances among biological organisms, but he misunderstood Linnaeus. Linnaeus system does not contradict what Darwin proposes, but is just one kind of the only possibility to classify his proposal consistently, that is, in terms of an orthogonal classification. Malte Ebach (and cladists in general) appears to interpret Darwin's misunderstanding as supporting an inconsistent classification like cladistics. I'm sure that Darwin would rotate in his grave if he could hear this interpretation of his misunderstanding of Linnaeus statement.
The beauty of the Linnean system is thus that it acknowledges the fundamental orthogonality of reality. It is actually the first application of object-oriented programming that is so common today in the form of apps for iPhones and iPads. All of them starts with a void, which is the truth cladistics searches (ie, the true tree of life). Darwin could not find a consistent illustration for his theory, and cladists (like Malte Ebach) uses his inconsistent illustration as axiom. Cladists (like Malte Ebach) thus acknowledge consistent inconsistency instead of consistency.
That this fact is not merely a coincidence is shown by Linné's statement that "it is not the characters that make the genus, but the genus that gives the characters". This statement points at the two facts that (1) there is a difference between a genus (ie, process) and its characters (ie, patterns), and (2) a genus (process) is not defined by its characters (patterns), but defines its characters. It thus points at the fact that a genus is the opposite to entity (in this case a "biological species"), which instead is defined by its characters per definition (in our conceptualization of reality).
Malte Ebach uses this statement in Darwin's interpretation that:"Such expressions as that famous one of Linnaeus, and which we often meet with in a more or less concealed form, that the characters do not make the genus, but that the genus gives the characters, seem to imply that something more is included in our classification than mere resemblance. I believe that something more is included, and that propinquity of descent, - the only known cause of the similarity of organic beings, - is the bond, hidden as it is by various degrees of modification, which is partially revealed to us by our classifications" (Darwin, 1859, p. 413f.
However, Darwin's interpretation of Linnaeus' statement is an unfortunate conflation of conceptualization and facts.The "something more" that is included in classification than mere resemblance is difference: the difference between species and genus in that whereas characters make the species, they don't make the genus; they make the species that the genus consist of. The statement just points at the fundamental difference between genera and the entities (in this case "biological species) it consists of. The genus and its species do together form a totality wherein both only exist in terms of the other. Linnaeus' statement thus points at the difference between genus and species.
What Darwin forgot in his interpretation of Linnaeus' statement, and also cladists of today forget, is that classification includes both resemblances (ie, similarities) and differences, and that it does this at the same time. For example, distinguishing humans and chimps as two classes of primates on resemblances does at the same time distinguish primates and non-primates by differences. Classification uses both resemblances and differences at the same time. For Darwin, and today's cladists, differences in classification appear given, whereas resemblances, and the reason for them, appear to be the issue. For Linnaeus, classification of reality itself was the issue.
The fundamental question in biological systematics is how to classify the biological diversity consistently, and that question did Linnaeus answer. Darwin's theory that resemblances among biological organisms may be due to "propinquity of descent" may be true or not, its truthfulness is not critical for Linnaeus answer to the fundamental question in biological systematics. The reason for the resemblances does not actually matter, Linnaeus system holds independently of the reason for the resemblances. Nothing can be classified consistently without an orthogonal system such as Linnaeus', because classification, and also ultimately reality itself, is orthogonal.
Linnaeus' system does thus not depend on the reason for resemblances (ie, similarities), but is, instead, the only kind of system (ie, an orthogonal system) that can classify (anything) consistently. It is actually the solution of Russell's paradox by bridging this paradox. Darwin appears to be right about the source for many resemblances among biological organisms, but he misunderstood Linnaeus. Linnaeus system does not contradict what Darwin proposes, but is just one kind of the only possibility to classify his proposal consistently, that is, in terms of an orthogonal classification. Malte Ebach (and cladists in general) appears to interpret Darwin's misunderstanding as supporting an inconsistent classification like cladistics. I'm sure that Darwin would rotate in his grave if he could hear this interpretation of his misunderstanding of Linnaeus statement.
The beauty of the Linnean system is thus that it acknowledges the fundamental orthogonality of reality. It is actually the first application of object-oriented programming that is so common today in the form of apps for iPhones and iPads. All of them starts with a void, which is the truth cladistics searches (ie, the true tree of life). Darwin could not find a consistent illustration for his theory, and cladists (like Malte Ebach) uses his inconsistent illustration as axiom. Cladists (like Malte Ebach) thus acknowledge consistent inconsistency instead of consistency.
torsdag 3 maj 2012
Hennig's (the cladistic) idea of "a single true tree of life" is actually a paradox - the subjective aspect of Russell's paradox
Hennig's (the cladistic) idea of "a single true tree of life" is actually a paradox - the subjective aspect of Russell's paradox. Such thing can't be found without paradoxical contradiction per definition, because classification is orthogonal. The idea is thus a practical void. It is just the paradoxically contradictory end point for realism.
onsdag 2 maj 2012
On the paradoxical contradiction of the class "clade"
The concept "clade" terms a class of entities (ie, "ancestors including all their descendants"). This class of entities appear "natural" to some biological systematists, but is none the less paradoxically contradictory (ie, the subjective aspect of Russell's paradox).
This fact can be understood by considering that the fact that every class can be a member of another class (like how humans is a member of primates) means that every clade also can be a member of another clade (ie, that every clade contains member clades). Now, if there among all clades should be a single clade that is not a member of any other clade (like the idea "a true tree of life"), then this clade of clades must also equal (be the same as) each and every of its member clades, and thus exclude the possibility of any other clade of clades besides It (ie, exclude the existence of more than one clade of clades), thereby contradicting the fact that there are several clades per definition. Ie, if there are several clades, then there is no single clade, and vice versa.
The class "clade" thus actually excludes the possibility of single instances of itself by excluding the possibility of clades that are not members of other clades.
The same explanation can be given in terms of entities: the fact that every entity can be a member of another entity (like how a cell in my body is a member of me) means that every clade of entities also can be a member of another clade of entities (ie, that every clade of entities contains member clades of entities). Now, if there among all those clades of entities should be a single clade that is not a member of any other clade (like the idea "a true tree of life"), then this clade of clades must equal (be the same as) each and every of its member clades and thus exclude any other clade of clades besides It (ie, exclude the existence of more than one clade of clades), thereby contradicting the fact that there are several clades per definition.
The class "clade" is thus actually just a mental circularity inside of Russell's paradox, that is, the subjective aspect of Russell's paradox. It actually lacks a single unambiguous solution (but has several ambiguous solutions in orthogonal systems of classification like the Linnean systematics).
This fact can be understood by considering that the fact that every class can be a member of another class (like how humans is a member of primates) means that every clade also can be a member of another clade (ie, that every clade contains member clades). Now, if there among all clades should be a single clade that is not a member of any other clade (like the idea "a true tree of life"), then this clade of clades must also equal (be the same as) each and every of its member clades, and thus exclude the possibility of any other clade of clades besides It (ie, exclude the existence of more than one clade of clades), thereby contradicting the fact that there are several clades per definition. Ie, if there are several clades, then there is no single clade, and vice versa.
The class "clade" thus actually excludes the possibility of single instances of itself by excluding the possibility of clades that are not members of other clades.
The same explanation can be given in terms of entities: the fact that every entity can be a member of another entity (like how a cell in my body is a member of me) means that every clade of entities also can be a member of another clade of entities (ie, that every clade of entities contains member clades of entities). Now, if there among all those clades of entities should be a single clade that is not a member of any other clade (like the idea "a true tree of life"), then this clade of clades must equal (be the same as) each and every of its member clades and thus exclude any other clade of clades besides It (ie, exclude the existence of more than one clade of clades), thereby contradicting the fact that there are several clades per definition.
The class "clade" is thus actually just a mental circularity inside of Russell's paradox, that is, the subjective aspect of Russell's paradox. It actually lacks a single unambiguous solution (but has several ambiguous solutions in orthogonal systems of classification like the Linnean systematics).
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