lördag 30 november 2013

On the problem with our search for a truth about reality

The problem with our search for a truth about reality is that reality isn't constant, but changing. We can't find a single truth about reality because in the moment we find it, it is not true. Chasing a truth is like chasing the running point, because the truth is running. 

fredag 29 november 2013

On cladists' search for an unambiguous classification of dichotomously branching processes

Cladists are searching for an unambiguous classification of dichotomously branching processes. The problem with this search is, however, that such classification is not to be found. The obstacle is that such classification has to conflate what it distinguishes, which is paradoxically contradictory.

Cladists' search is thus vain. Never will they find what they search. (Providing that they don't "solve" this problem like particle physicists, by claiming that they indeed have found it).

onsdag 13 november 2013

Logic is not a way to truth, but a way to find empirical tests of claimed truths

The fact that conceptualization only contains two abstractions: objects and classes, means that there are also only two principally different logical lines of reasoning: 1. assuming that objects are real, traditionally called objectivity and nominalism, and 2. assuming that classes are real, traditionally called subjectivity and class-realism.

Both of these ultimately end in one and the same paradox, ie, Russell's paradox, as Bertrand Russell demonstrated in 1901, but they comprehend the paradox differently. Objectivity comprehends it as a general paradox with many specific applications (as Bertrand Russell did), whereas subjectivity comprehends it as one (out of many possible) specific class of objects that moreover is real (like the "true tree of life" of cladistics and "Higgs particle" of particle physics). Objectivity thus comprehends it (ie, Russell's paradox) as one generic abstraction consisting of many specific abstractions, whereas subjectivity comprehends is as one (out of many) real paradoxes.

The reason for this difference is that objectivity as "basic research", ie, lacking a particular question, actually searches for the primordial object it actually assumes (as an axiom), which thus is a general paradox consisting of several specific paradoxes, whereas subjectivity as "basic research" actually searches for the primordial class it actually assumes, which thus are several possible specific paradoxes.

The practical difference between them is thus that objectivity comprehends paradoxes as abstract, whereas subjectivity comprehends them as real  So, which is right? Are paradoxes abstract or real? Well, since paradoxes actually in a general sense is a conflation of object with class (which Bertrand Russell demonstrated), the question is actually whether a distinction or a conflation of object with class (ie, objectivity or subjectivity) is right. The answer is thus obvious: if a conflation of them is right, then a distinction of them is wrong, but without a distinction of them, there is nothing to conflate. A conflation of them is thus wrong independently of whether it is right or wrong.

All this is actually just a play with words. The problem, as Bertrand Russell demonstrated, is that logic can only answer questions. As a "basic research" it just rotates around its fundamental ortogonality between object and class, with a "natural" end point in Russell's paradox. Logic does not contain any "truths" in itself, but does just lead to the answer that is logically given by its assumptions (ie, premises), which thus is an abstract paradox. Never will we thus find "The Truth" by logical reasoning. The only practical use of logic is to find empirical tests of statements, which indeed can be either true or false in relation to competing statements. Running around in the treadmill of logic is actually just a play with words (although it may be awarded with the Nobel Prize as witnessed by the claimed empirical verification of the paradox "Higgs particle"), which thus consistently is exchanged with totally different claims. It simply lacks non-contradictory claims.

Logic is definitely not a way to find truths, but just a way to find empirical tests of claimed truths. In itself, it is fundamentally paradoxically contradictory and totally lacking possibilities to distinguish truths from lies by lacking possibilities to distingush true premises from false premises. It can actually arrive to contradictory conclusions, as in the case of Linnean systematics versus cladistics, because these two approaches rest on ortogonal premises, ie, objectivity and subjectivity, respectively-.

söndag 10 november 2013

On the fundamental problem for science

When humanity began conceptualizing reality, ie, dividing it into things and kinds of things, it immediately split us between those of us that started the conceptualiztion from things, called nominalists, and those that started it from kinds, called "class-realists". These two approaches are actually orthogonal, ie, diametrically opposed, in that the assumptions of one are the deductions of the other. A class-realist thus can't understand how a nominalist can "know" that a certain thing is of a certain kind, whereas a nominalist considers this allocation to be more or less arbitrary in an aim to find general statements that can be said about this kind of things. Class-realists thus ask questions about what things "really are", whereas nominalists ask questions about what things do, ie, about processes that things participate in. The discipline of finding logical answers to questions, ie, "science" in its widest sense, has since then largely been a matter of a battle between these two ortogonal approaches.

The fundamental problems for these two approaches is that the former (ie, nominalism) is ambiguous in relation to the reality it discusses, and that every particular process thus can be described in several just as true ways, whereas the latter (ie, class-realism) ultimately leads to paradox (see Russell's paradox). None of them can thus produce the single truth humanity asks for.

These two orthogonal approaches can only be combined consistently in one way: in Plato's "Theory of Forms", although this combination gives rise to the questions what and where the world of Forms is. This combination is none-the-less the only consistent fusion of these two orthogonal approaches.

These facts leave "science" (in its widest sense) without any possibility to find the single truth humanity asks for. Class-realism has recently suggested that paradoxes (like the True tree of life" of cladistics and "Higgs particle" of particle physics) IS the answer (even claiming that "as a layman I would now say - I think we have Higgs particle"), although paradoxes are contradictions, not things. like their "layman's" "Higgs particle". If reality indeed could be explained by laymen, then why pay scientists like the particle physicists at Cern to explain it? This explanation is furthermore not new, there are many "monads" in the history of science.     
  

onsdag 6 november 2013

Cladistics and Higgs particle-ism are simply just annoying conceptual conflations of "object" and "class"

Things like "the true tree of life" of cladistics and "the Higgs particle" of particle physics are logical end paradoxes of conflation of "object" with "class", ie, actually assuming that classes are real instead of objects, as in the cases of the class "species" of cladistics and all classes of "elementary particles" of particle physics, which also Bertrand Russell demonstrated in 1901 with his "Russell's paradox". The simple reason for this fate of such conflations is that classification is orthogonal and therefore leads to paradox in logical reasoning if we conflate the direction of the orthogonality of classification.

Exactly how it leads to paradox is, however, more difficult to explain, because it only concerns conceptualization and logic themselves, not the reality they refer to, that is, the relation between the concepts "objects" (or "particles") and "classes" together with the relation between "premises" and "deductions" of logic, and thus is confusing.

The fundamental problem is that whereas few of us would ever conflate "premises" with "deduction", many of us have a tendency to conflate "objects" with "class" (notice that the former in these two pairs is in plural whereas the latter is in singular), although the relation between the former of the pairs to the latter of the pairs is the same in both pairs: a deduction can't exist without presumed premises just as a class can't exist without presumed objects. This problem (ie, that many of us have a tendency to conflate "objects" with "class") thus means that those (many of us) start their logical reasoning from assumed classes instead of from assumed objects, meaning that they get the relation between the two pairs "objects and class" and "premises and deduction" as orthogonal, meaning that they actually conflate "plural" with "singular" by conflating "class" with ""premises" and "objects" with "deduction". This conflation leads to some kind of Russell's paradox because a single single object thereby is "a half" deduction. Such "a half" deduction (ie, Russell's paradox) are thus both "the true tree of life" of cladistics and "the Higgs particle" of particle physics. Typical for such figments of the imagination is that they are singular, ie, "THE true tree of life" and "THE Higgs particle", in difference from, for example, "species", "leptones" and "bosons". As "half deductions" they are paradoxically contradictory between pattern and process, as the Barber in Barbers paradox.

Belief in such paradoxes is either devastating or irrelevant. It is devastating if it induces a practical search for the paradox, because a paradox can't, of course, be found, and irrelevant if it claims to have found the paradox (like particle physics). It is simply just an annoying conceptual conflation in science.             

lördag 2 november 2013

Is Peter Higgs greater than Einstein?

If there is a Higgs particle, as particle physics claim, then this particle is both an infinite class, a finite class and a particle at the same time. It is thus the universe itself. It is the largest and the smallest, and all natural laws at the same time. As such, it leaves no room for randomness. It is really the God for classification, ie, for class-realism. It is the explanation for everything and nothing at the same time. It is the end of conceptualization itself. Beyond it is nothing but our primary needs (like sex and food). We thus have to choose between hailing Higgs particle or realizing that it is a paradox.

The only advantage with awarding Higgs particle with the Nobel Prize is that it awarded Peter Higgs himself and not the particle physicists at Cern that claim to have verified it. If this monster indeed is real, then the theoretical discoverer of it ought to be awarded, not the practitioners that claim to have seen it. Peter Higgs is thus a genious, like Einstein. Hail him, not the engineers at Cern. How on earth could he find out that this particle is real?

So, it is time to hail Peter Higgs. Is he even greater than Einstein? Is he even the greatest human of all times? Or, is he simply wrong?