Comments to Mikael Härlin and Per Sundberg's article: Taxonomy and Philosophy of Names. in: Biology and Philosophy 13 (2).

In this article, Mikael and Per wrote in the abstract that:

"Although naming biological clades is a major activity in taxonomy, little attention has been paid to what these names actually refer to. In philosophy, definite descriptions have long been considered equivalent to the meaning of names and biological taxonomy is a scientific application of these ideas. One problem with definite descriptions as the meanings of names is that the name will refer to whatever fits the description rather than the intended individual (clade)".

The issue is thus about what names refer to. An entitled question is then: what can names refer to? Traditionally, we simply point at things naming them. Mikael and Per do, however, thus claim that "In philosophy, definite descriptions have long been considered equivalent to the meaning of names". This meaning does, however, concern classes, not single individuals, The name of a single individual, like me, is not equivalent to any description of me. The philosophical meaning concerns classes of individuals, like humans. 

Then, Mikael and Per claims that: "one problem with definite descriptions as the meanings of names is that the name will refer to whatever fits the description rather than the intended individual (clade)". This statement appears to confuse individuals with classes. "Definite descriptions as the meanings of names" only concerns classes, not individuals. Mikael and Per's names are, for example, not dependent of "definite descriptions as the meanings of" them. Although the names of classes can be, and are, defined by "definite descriptions as the meanings of names", names of individuals (like Mikael and Per) aren't. There is thus a difference between names on individuals and names on classes, which Mikael and Per appears to miss.

Mikael and Per's blindness for the difference between individual and class thus leads them to the confusing conclusion that "the name will refer to whatever fits the description rather than the intended individual (clade)". They thus, obviously, think that we (the rest of us) can't keep track of what there are and what we create, because they can't. They, obviously, think that we are as confused as they are.

I can reassure Mikael and Per that I do not share their confusion. I can, on the contrary, differentiate between one human (like me) and humans (like us), and can thus also differentiate between naming of them. Their confusion is not my confusion. I do, moreover, not see any reason to publish their confusion, if it is not a major desease, and then published as a desease.

I can thus not understand how Biology and Philosophy could choose to publish Mikael and Per's confusion as a scientific article. To me, it is an expression of a desease rather than a rational opinion. Can anyone of them defend the article against my comments?